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ABSTRACT
Jenny Leigh Smith
THE SOVIET FARM COMPLEX:
INDUSTRIAL AGRICULTURE IN A SOCIALIST CONTEXT, 1945-1965
"The Soviet Farm Complex" is a history of food, farming and the environment in the
postwar Soviet Union. It tells the story of how different technical and institutional
authorities created an industrial Soviet countryside in the generation after World War II.
Beyond the leadership of the Soviet state, international trade relationships, new
technologies, unusual scientific cultures, stubborn environmental realities and human
shortcomings played important roles in shaping the progress of agricultural change. Four
historical fields inform this project: the history of technology, agricultural history, Soviet
history and environmental history. Each of the five chapters addresses a different time,
place and theme in the history of the Soviet countryside, providing a close-up view of the
most important aspects of postwar rural change.
Soviet agricultural reform has often been interpreted as a failure: a textbook case of poor
central planning and destructive, high-modernist logic on the part of the Soviet state. In
fact, this study shows that the collective farming system as a whole was not particularly
dysfunctional, nor was it doomed to failure simply by virtue of being centrally planned.
Much like the capitalist farms with which it competed, Soviet farms struggled to
overcome enormous environmental, economic and social barriers to success. Similarly to
capitalist systems, the Soviet Union's farming complexes succeeded in some places,
while failing spectacularly in others. The history of Soviet agricultural change is not a
history of faceless state agents imposing change from a great distance. Rather, it is made
up of many different kinds of people working at many different jobs. Agricultural
scientists and bureaucrats performed research, wrote reports, created policies and issued
orders, sometimes against their better judgment and sometimes with the full force of their
beliefs behind them. On the ground, agricultural laborers tried to follow the orders that
originated from these higher echelons although workers and their work often experienced
periods of great transition. In the universities, teachers endeavored to instruct their
students in modern and efficient methods of producing food, and in every city and village
the powerful tool of Soviet propaganda strived to persuade citizens of the value and logic
of all aspects of agricultural modernization. By examining the connections between state
authority, agricultural modernization and environmental change, this dissertation shows
that the industrialization of the Soviet countryside was a dynamic and convoluted
process, affected far more by the seemingly trivial histories of genetic variation, animal
nutrition and weather than by the machinations of powerful politicians or the
mismanagement of inept bureaucrats.
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Introduction
After World War II the Soviet government committed to rebuilding and
improving agriculture in the Soviet Union. The official aim of this project was to restore
and increase the output and availability of food, but in this dissertation I argue that these
public goals were not always the most important ones. Agriculture in the Soviet Union
did more than produce food for citizens; the implementation of agricultural reform both
lengthened the reach and strengthened the grasp of the central government. These
changes sprang from a coordinated vision of socialist production and consumption of
food that had developed in the early postwar era. Understanding the successes and
failures of Soviet food production demands equal attention to both the stated and unstated
objectives of agricultural reforms. Whether explicit or implicit, few Soviet reforms were
realized in full. In the long run, the most successful transformations were the result of
negotiations between state idealism and local realities.
What were the secondary motives of Soviet agriculture, and why did they become
so important after World War II? In addition to producing food, the goals of Soviet
agricultural policy were geopolitical and environmental. In terms of geography and
demographics, farms created stable, settled populations and industrial farms increased the
dependency of farmers on the state by limiting producer self-sufficiency. While Soviet
farmers had traditionally produced almost all of their own food, this pattern decreased in
the postwar period as rural workers came to rely upon the same state-sponsored food
networks as urban residents.'
Agricultural reforms, somewhat similar in spirit, strived to overcome environmental
barriers to agricultural production. The Soviet Union's combination of large territory and
singularly harsh weather made it unique among nations involved in the project of
modernizing agriculture, as frigid winters and long distances limited farm productivity
and cramped distribution networks. Nevertheless, as new techniques of growing grain,
breeding animals and processing and preserving food emerged, state planners became
convinced that advances in science and technology could trump these environmental
limits. Like so many other projects the Soviet state had undertaken in its efforts to control
nature, surmounting nature was a display of state power.2
In order to understand the lasting impact of agricultural reform in the Soviet
Union, it is necessary to keep all three of these goals in mind: producing sustenance,
establishing governance, and overcoming environmental barriers. Maintaining effective
leadership in rural areas and displaying a mastery over nature became venues for the
Soviet Union to display its legitimacy for both local and foreign audiences. Such displays
occasionally superseded the more immediate goal of producing food. This observation
stands in contrast to common wisdom among scientists and historians, who often criticize
Soviet agriculture as inefficient and enduringly backward in its aims.3 It is certainly true
that the gains the Soviet Union made in agriculture after World War II were modest when
'Basile Kerblay, "L'evolution de l'Alimentation Rurale en Russie, 1896-1960," Annales: E.S.C. (Sep.-
Oct.1962): 885-913.
2 Overcoming natural limits is a common theme in environmental history; see e.g., Donald Worster, Rivers
of Empire (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), and William Cronon, Nature's Metropolis: Chicago ad
the Great West (New York: W.W. Norton, 1991). Paul Josephson has addressed the issue in a Soviet
context: see Paul Josephson, Industrialized Nature: Brute Force Technology and the Transformation of the
Natural World, (Washington: Island Press, 2002) 1-14.
3 For example, see Zhores Medvedev, Soviet Agriculture (New York: Norton, 1987).
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compared with those of the United States or other industrialized countries. Yet measuring
the success of Soviet agriculture only in terms of food and fiber output assumes a narrow
view of the role of agriculture in modern society. In fact, the Soviet state had a strong
incentive to pursue agricultural reforms even when they had little utility for simply
raising food production. Practices that worked best at establishing geopolitical stability
and control over nature were sometimes at odds with the goal of producing more food,
but given the Soviet Union's relatively new status as a powerful industrialized country, it
was reasonable that the state made these priorities as important as food production in the
postwar Soviet Union.
Industrialization increased food production, but it also intensified processes of
colonization. Lands were occupied faster and used more intensively thanks to new farm
machines and agricultural chemicals. Because of the larger scale of industrial agriculture,
the modernized system had a deeper impact on the environment. The Soviet Union's
goals of controlling nature were ultimately quixotic, but technological improvements like
heated greenhouses, electric lights, and new strains of cold resistant plants and animals
allowed farms to flourish in environments that had been previously hostile to settled
agriculture. In many cases the modifications necessary to modernize food and farming
systems gave agricultural authorities greater leverage to manage rural life. Because
industrialization and modernization had their foundations in a faith in science and
technology, scientific research institutes and other agents of scientific and technical
authority were logical entry points into rural affairs for the state.
This dissertation focuses on the scientific and technical institutions charged with
managing and improving food and agriculture to show how the conflicting ambitions of
the state to feed and to control its territory played out on the ground. Because it was
removed from the scene of action and because it was constantly being reorganized, the
Ministry of Agriculture made mistakes and miscalculations when it initiated agricultural
reform. The distance between the plans the Ministry of Agriculture made and the realities
agricultural authorities encountered was sometimes vast. This dissertation examines these
disparities, looking for reasons for failures and shortcomings in agricultural reform. The
Soviet Union's government may have tried to be a totalitarian system, but its claims to
power were never total and the interstitial spaces where abstract state ambitions yielded
to local limits and common sense provided fertile ground for productive ad-hoc
agriculture. I argue that compromises and negotiated solutions between the state and local
systems were essential to the success of agricultural reform.
In order to better understand the relevance of this study, it is useful to back up and
look at the larger role that agriculture and industrialization have played in modern
history. While this dissertation is a case study of a particular place and time, the
conflicting functions of agriculture as a tool of food production and state control have
been important for centuries. Agriculture began as a way to feed people, but it has
evolved into a system that produces more than just food. Because agriculture is a more
efficient form of subsistence than other livelihoods such as hunting or nomadic
pastoralism, agricultural production created food surpluses that allowed human
populations to increase, cities to flourish and national territories to emerge. Agriculture
favors the formation of strong, centralized states. Once these states are created they take
charge of managing agriculture and agricultural work by collecting taxes, purchasing
surplus grains and encouraging some farming practices while discouraging others. The
way states manage their agricultural systems determines the lasting success of these
states.4
Farming is an act of colonization that is simultaneously biological and political.
In the effects humans have had on the environment, agriculture is the most diverse,
lasting and important.5 At the biological level agriculture reworks landscapes by creating
a mosaic of monoculture fields, access roads, open pastures, irrigation canals and shelter
corridors of hedgerows and windbreaks. Agriculture promotes the global circulation of
seeds, tools and creatures, altering cuisines (for example, the introduction of the new
world chili into South Asia) and ecological relationships (for example, the arrival of
sheep into Mexico). Agriculture is also dependent upon and plagued by microbes, and
these smaller agents of change have played their own parts in remaking the living world
through pathogenic diseases and through the more benevolent processes of fermentation
that produce alcohol, cheese, yeast breads and other food staples.
Politically, agriculture creates territory and turns land into an item of property that
can be bought, sold or traded just like more fungible assets such as cattle or spices.
Farming allows populations to maintain large armies and large bureaucracies. It obliges
people to live in just one place and these settled populations seek trade and protection
relationships with surrounding territories that are the bases of local and national
governments. Settled populations are susceptible to being overrun by tyrants in a way that
4 Reay Tanahill, ed., Food in History (New York: three Rivers Press, 1988) 19-56.
B.L. Turner, The Earth as Transformed by Human Action: Global and Regional Change in the Biosphere
over the Past 300 Years, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
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nomads are not, and thus while agriculture creates powerful enforcing institutions like
armies and bureaucracies, it also creates dependencies.6
What kinds of agriculture are in the best interests of a strong state? Clearly the
need to produce surplus food, not just to feed urban residents but also to generate revenue
on the international market are crucial to the success of a strong state. I argue that in the
postwar period in the USSR, the type of food that was grown and processed was just as
important as its abundant quantities. Any despotic nation might produce abundant
amounts of grain, but only the countries with the most advanced technologies in animal
agriculture could produce surplus quantities of animal products: butter, lard, milk and
meat. In the realm of food and agriculture, the Soviet Union staked its modernist
reputation on its livestock, chiefly its pigs and cows; thus the lives and afterlives of
animals are of special interest to this inquiry.
Strong states are also interested in the performance of hinterlands and border
areas. Orderly control in the farthest reaches of any empire indicates an effective central
authority under the direction of competent managers.7 This dissertation looks at border
control in Ukraine, specifically the threat of agricultural contamination that the
international border posed and how the state responded to this threat. It also deals with
the relationship between the state and its distant, difficult Siberian hinterland. The
Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of State Farms and a series of production ministries
and departments devoted a great deal of attention at Siberia in the later 1950s in an effort
6 Peter Bellwood, First Farmers: The Origins ofAgricultural Societies (London, 2004),Vere Gordon
Childe, New Light on the Most Ancient East, The Oriental Prelude to European History (New York: E.F.
Praeger, 1935).
7 Mark Bassin, "Turner, Soloviev and the 'Frontier Hypothesis': The Nationalist Signification of Open
Spaces." Journal of Modern History 65 (1993): 473-511.
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to make its agriculture and industry profitable.8 Siberia represented an outer limit to
Soviet state power.' Geopolitically Siberia was important because it bridged the Eurasian
land mass, but it was nearly impossible to administrate effectively because it was large
and difficult to transect. Environmentally, Siberia was so cold much of the territory was
uninhabitable. It does no state any good to build an empire it cannot sustain, and the more
sustainable models of development and expansion in Siberia that borrowed heavily from
longstanding patterns of native use.
Chapter Outline
The dissertation consists of four chapters, organized in roughly chronological
order from 1945-1965. All four chapters deal with the relationship between a state
authority (often the Soviet Ministry of Agriculture or one of its subordinates) and a sector
of the Soviet Union's vast agricultural network that was the object of modernization. The
chapters examine the state's shifting policies toward crop agriculture, animal agriculture,
food processing, and farming the Siberian frontier.
The first chapter describes how the Soviet state used the scientific authority of its
newly developed plant quarantine station to persuade Soviet peasants to return to
collective farming immediately after World War II. It argues that the efforts of the
quarantine stations, while publicly engaged in preventative entomology, were also
8 Anne Applebaum, Gulag: A History (New York, 2003), Neil J. Melvin, Soviet Power and the
Countryside: Policy Innovation and Institutional Decay (Hampshire, 2003).
9 On Siberia and the Russian state, see Mark Bassin, "Expansion and Colonialism on the Eastern Frontier:
Views of Siberia the Far East in Pre-Petrine Russia," Journal of Historical Geography (January, 1988): 3-
21, Mark Bassin, Inventing Siberia: Visions of the Russian East in the Early Nineteenth Century."
American Historical Review 96, no.3 (1991): 763-794, James Forsyth, A History of the Peoples ofSiberia:
Russia's North Asian Colony, 1581-1990 (New York, 1992), George Kennan, Siberia and the Exile
System(New York, 1891), Steven Marks, Road to Power: The Tran-Siberian Railroad and the
Colonization ofAsian Russia, 1850-1917 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991), Alan Wood, History of
Siberia from Russian Conquest to Revolution (London: Routledge, 1991), Alan Wood and R.F. French, eds.
The Development of Siberia: People and Resources (London: Routledge, 1989).
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enlisted as an authority that helped the state keep track of private production and
discourage the cultivation of potatoes, the primary staple of the postwar countryside. In
order to understand the work of the quarantine stations, one must look not only at its
stated goal (eliminating potato beetles and other potential crop pests) but also its unstated
goals of diminishing private production.
During the war many Soviet collective farmers, including those in the occupied
territories of Ukraine, had turned to subsistence farming in allotment gardens. After the
war farmers generally ignored the orders of the Federal Ministry of Agriculture and
continued raising potatoes on their allotments instead of returning to the collectives to
grow grain. Potato growing as an act of rural self-preservation was countered by the
state's quarantine stations. These stations sought to control the spread of biological
invasions by monitoring agricultural produce. Although the quarantine stations were
created to combat external crop enemies, by 1948 the Ukrainian stations had begun to
spend the largest part of their time and budget fighting internal potato pests. Both of the
primary threats to the regional potato crop, a potato blight and the potato beetle, were
only present in Ukraine in minute quantities and both posed very little real threat to
potato crops. The mismatch between the level of threat and the energy and money
expended indicates that the state may have had ulterior motives in operating quarantine
stations in Ukraine. Indeed, evidence suggests that while the quarantine stations were not
effective at their stated goals of identifying or abolishing biological invasions, they were
quite effective at dissuading Ukrainian peasants from growing potatoes instead of grain.
Concerned with the low number of animals that remained in the country after
World War II, increasing and improving animal stocks became a priority in the late
1940s. For a country that produced just a fraction of what the United States produced in
meat and milk, this was a bold and controversial goal. While Soviet animal production
never approached the very high level of the United States, it made some important gains,
especially in the early 1950s. How did the Soviet state increase the supply of meat and
animal products? Due to postwar scarcities, the Soviet Union did not have the machines,
advanced feed regimes, prophylactic antibiotics and other inputs that are normally
associated with the industrialization of livestock. Nonetheless, this sector of the USSR's
economy rapidly modernized between 1948 and 1955, and animal production was re-
ordered, intensified, and dramatically improved. The Soviet state, supported by its
scientific institutes, relied on a relatively low-tech approach to livestock improvement in
which management and individual care were believed to be the most important factors in
livestock improvement.
Lysenkoism was an important part of this approach to animal management, since
Lysenko ignored the role that genetics and heredity played in improving breeds. Placing
Lysenko's theories in the context of animal agriculture rather than plant agriculture
shows that as a management theory that organized animals and labor, a Lysnekoist
ideology proved remarkably effective. Lysenkoism was easy to understand, all-
encompassing, and it played to the Soviet Union's postwar strengths, emphasizing the
human factor in agricultural production, drawing on the Soviet Union's long history of
animal acclimatization and hybridization projects and encouraging fast-paced change.
Unlikely as it sounds, in animal agriculture Lysenkoism provided a commonsense
framework for increasing the value and productivity of Soviet animals.
The second chapter argues that in spite of an unlikely scientific basis for
improvement, Soviet meat and milk production advanced considerably. The third chapter
treats the consumption end of this equation. How did the Soviet state improve diets and
food distribution networks? As animal products and a greater variety of foods became
more plentiful, the Soviet state needed to ensure that its citizens could access this food.
For most of its brief history, the Soviet Union had been in a situation of food shortage.
Now that this scarcity was subsiding, what did socialist diets and socialist food networks
look like?
New technologies of food preservation and food production played a significant
role in determining what was grown, what was eaten and where it was purchased. This
chapter examines the development of socialist nutrition and argues that, in contrast to the
rest of the developed world, the specter of malnutrition cast a long and dark shadow over
food and agricultural policy in the Soviet Union, affecting everything from baby food to
tomato farms to fishing laws. A close reading of 1950s and 1960s era cookbooks shows
how the state marketed its nutritional information to the general public and balanced
knowledge about an ideal diet with its knowledge about the food available to Soviet
citizens. Surprisingly, diet was a place where smaller niches mattered more than mass
identity. Different foods were suggested for different sectors of the population: food for
invalids differed from the food for pregnant mothers, which in turn was different from
food recommended for heavy workers. Nutritional science divided people into different
categories of age, health and-uniquely-worker status.
The architecture of food distribution also affected what people ate and how they
acquired it. At a time when western countries were moving toward self-serve and one-
stop grocery stores, the Soviet Union's stocks were sold in specialized stores that were
dominated by long lines and inefficient centralized distribution, a metaphor for the
country's national problems with food transportation and distribution. Nevertheless, the
clunky-looking Soviet system had its uses, including prohibiting excess consumption.
Unlike retail management in capitalist countries, one function of food shops in the Soviet
Union was to slow consumers down, making food distribution more orderly by stretching
out the process.
The fourth and final chapter of the dissertation examines the limits of the Soviet
Union's new agriculture and food networks. How far could the Soviet state push this new
system? The answer was not as far as rural Siberia. Agriculture's ulterior motives of
state-building and environmental control broke down in the face of extreme distance and
extreme cold. The chapter focuses on agricultural reform in Siberia, specifically Irkutsk
Oblast from the period 1954-1965. Irkutsk, like much of the Asian Soviet Union,
experienced enormous population growth and industrial development during this time, as
the Soviet Union endeavored to settle its Siberia frontier and develop the economy of its
most underexploited territory. Siberia had been an economic boon for the Russian empire
for centuries as the main suppliers of furs- notably sable skins- for the Russian
market. Its original settlement patterns reflected this economy of fur trading, but Irkutsk's
population remained low due to its harsh climate and largely unfavorable agricultural
conditions.
Until the later 1950s, farming was a marginal activity in Irkutsk. Agriculture was
concentrated in small collective farms (kolkhozy) which of necessity had to focus on
breaking even. Most lost money. As Irkutsk became a center of industrial development,
the Ministry of Agriculture accordingly began to plan bigger industrial state
farms(sovkhozy) which would feed the new population of workers, as well as help to
increase the population of the oblast. Unfortunately, these new farms were entirely
unprepared for the climate and the isolation of Irkutsk. Located far from rivers and roads,
the sovkhozy lost workers to the better paying industrial projects. It became clear almost
immediately that only the most heavily subsidized sovkhozy had any chance at survival.
The older and smaller kolkhozii, with less access to government backing, were in real
financial straits; the smallest and most marginal farms faced the steepest debts.
An ascendant world fur market helped to save Siberian agriculture by allowing it
to co-exist with the more traditional and sustainable activity of hunting. After years of a
declining market, fur began to enjoy a renewed popularity in the 1950s. The Soviet
Union's Institute for Hunting Industry was the authority that redirected failing agriculture
toward successful hunting. It enlisted the men of the failing kolkhozii to hunt sables and
squirrels, issuing hunting permits for two weeks every year and purchasing their quarry at
generous set prices. This innovation was successful: the Soviet Union established itself as
world's primary fur supplier and sable trim, stoles and wraps became fashionable items in
New York, London and Tokyo. By encouraging Soviet farmers to return to a traditional,
non-agricultural economy, the state provided them with a profitable way of making a
living. In the long term, mining, hunting, fishing and fur farming once again became the
most profitable industries of Siberia, since agriculturally and industrially, the region was
otherwise non-sustainable.
Historiography
"The Soviet Farm Complex" is a history of agriculture, food, modernization and
environmental limits in the postwar Soviet Union. Given its interdisciplinary nature, the
dissertation is informed by works from four historical fields: the history of agriculture,
environmental history, the history of technology and Russian and Soviet history. The first
three disciplines are strongest in works about topics in the history of North America and
Western Europe. Agricultural and environmental histories in particular are fields that are
bound to a tradition of U.S. scholarship. Although some books have had a more
international focus in recent years, topics in American history still occupy the largest part
of the scholarship."' A number of local environmental histories of non-western places
have become paradigm-changing works, often by virtue of their ability to uncover
familiar themes in unfamiliar places, as well as to offer new insights into old problems
and historical questions."
Histories about twentieth-century agriculture have often discussed the effect that
industrialization has had on agriculture and agricultural communities.'2 Studies have
10 Transnational histories of this sort include William McNeill, Plagues and Peoples (New York: Anchor,
1977), Jared Diamond, Guns, Germs and Steel: the Fates of Human Societies. New York: W.W. Norton &
Company, 1999. Ramachandra Guha, Environmentalism: A Global History (New York: Longman, 1999),
Robert B. Marks, The Origins of the Modern World: A Global and Ecological Narrative (Lanham, MD:
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2002), John R. McNeill, Something New Under the Sun: An
Environmental History of the Twentieth Century World (New York: W.W.Norton, 2000). John F. Richards,
The Unending Frontier: An Environmental History of the Early Modern World (Berkeley: UC Press, 2003).
1 Examples of this trend include Peter Boomgaard, Frontiers ofFear : Tigers and People in the Malay
World, 1600-1950 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001), Warren Dean, With Broadax and Firebrand:
The Destruction of the Brazilian Atlantic Forest (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), William
H. Fisher, Rain Forest Exchanges: Industry and Community on an Amazonian Frontier (Washington, DC:
Smithsonian Institute Press, 2000), Madhav Gadgil and Ramachandra Guha This Fissured Land: An
Ecological History of India (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993) Akhil Gupta, Postcolonial
Developments; Agriculture in the Making ofModern India (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1998),
Jan Douwe van der Ploeg, " Potatoes and Knowledge" in An Anthropological Critique ofDevelopment: the
Growth of gnorance, edited by Mark Hobart (New York: Routledge, 1993) 209-227.
12 Works on the history of industrial agriculture include Hal S. Barron, Mixed Harvest: The Second Great
Transformation of the Rural North, 1870-1930, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997),
David B. Danbom, The Resisted Revolution: Urban America and the Industrialization ofAgriculture, 1900-
17
focused on machines, labor, gender, genes, chemicals and changing rural societies, but
only rarely do these works place the history of agriculture, which is, after all a form of
environmental manipulation, into the larger context of the history of the environment. 13
With few notable exceptions, environmental historians likewise tend to ignore agriculture
and focus instead on forests, parks, rivers, while overlooking the embedded status of
agriculture in any society and landscape dependent on farming for its food base." Until
very recently, most environmental histories were written about wilderness and the role of
humans was limited to that of the destroyer of natural landscapes. The interplay between
states, ordinary people and the environment, such as this dissertation describes is a topic
that has been visited only infrequently in environmental history. Recent histories of food
and cuisine in society, a topic previously studied only as cultural or technological history,
has become a venue for more wide-ranging discussions of the relationship between
1930, (Ames: Iowa State University Press, 1979), Deborah Fitzgerald, the Business of Breeding: Hybrid
Corn in Illinois, 1890-1940, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990), Deborah Fitzgerald, 'Every Farm a
Factory': The Industrial Ideal in American Agriculture, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003), Jack
Kloppenburg, First the Seed: The Political Economy of Plant Biotechnology, 1492-2000, (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1988), Mark Kramer Three Farms: Making Meat, Milk and Money from the
American Soil, (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977), Mary Neth, Preserving the Family Farm: Women
Community and the Foundations ofAgribusiness in the Midwest, 1900-1940 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1995), Sanford J. Rikoon, Threshing in the Midwest: A Study of Traditional Culture and
Technological Change (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988), Robert C. Williams, Fordson,
Farmall and Poppin' Johnny: A History of the Farm Tractor and Its Impact on America, (Urbana:
University of Illinois Press, 1987).
13 Agricultural histories that establish a rich environmental context include Judith Carney, Black Rice: the
African Origins of Rice Cultivation in the Americas (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001), Pete
Daniel, Breaking the Land : the Transformation of Cotton, Tobacco, and Rice Cultures since 1880
(Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1985), Colin Duncan, The Centrality ofAgriculture: Between
Humankind and the Rest ofNature (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1996), Steven Stoll, The
Fruits ofNatural Advantage: Making the Industrial Countryside in California (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1998).
14 Exceptions to this status quo include William Cronon, Nature's Metropolis: Chicago and the Great West.
(New York: Norton, 1991), Mart A. Stewart, What Nature Suffers to Groe: Life, Labor, and Landscape on
the Georgia Coast, 1680-1920 (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2002), Donald Worster, Dust Bowl;
The Southern Plains in the 1930s (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979).
agriculture, the environment, state regulation and patterns of eating.15 In the Soviet case
these patterns reveal a uniquely socialist approach to modem ingredients and cuisines.
In discussing agricultural industrialization, scholars tend to fall into two camps:
those who focus on the results of industrialization, and those who focus on the process.
With the benefits of hindsight, results-based studies often indulge in praise or sharp
criticism of agricultural industrialization. 16 Studies that focus instead on the process of
industrialization analyze how individuals, states and private corporations supported
expensive new processes of industrialization and why some forms of industrialization
were chosen over others. This dissertation falls into the latter group, examining the
process of industrialization as it unfolded across the Soviet countryside. This study often
focuses on the effects that particular technologies, scientific discoveries or new
management techniques have had in changing the general pattern of agriculture and food
distribution, an approach it holds in common with a number of works in American and
European histories of industrialization, but that is not common to Soviet scholarship.17
'5 Examples of these books include: Akhil Gupta, Postcolonial Developments: Agriculture and the Making
of the Modern State in India (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1998), James McCann, Maize and
Grace Africa's Encounter with a New World Crop, 1500-2000 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
2005),Michael Pollan The Botany ofDesire: A Plant's Eye View of the World (New York: Random House,
2001), Arturo Warman, Corn and Capitalism: How a Botanical Bastard Grew to Global Dominance, trans.
Nancy L. Westrate (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003)_Redcliffe Salaman's The Social
and Cultural History of the Potato is an early example of this approach to the history of food and food
crops.
16 Classics in the category of books interested in results include: Lawrence Busch, Plants, Power, and
Profit: Social, Economic, and Ethical Consequences of the New Biotechnologies (Cambridge: Blackwell,
1991), Jim Hightower, Hard Times, Hard Tomatoes: A Report of the Agribusiness Accountability project
on the Failure ofAmerica's Land Grant College Complex (Cambridge, Mass: Schenkman Publishing
Company, 1971) Otto T. Solbrig and Nancy J. Solbrig, So Shall You Reap: Farming and Crops in Human
Affairs (Washington, D.C.: Island Press, 1994), John L. Shover, First Majority--Last Minority: The
Transformation of Rural Life in America. (DeKalb, IL.: University of Illinois Press, 1976).
17 Works in American and European history that fit this category include: Shane Hamilton, "Cold
Capitalism: the Political Ecology of Frozen Concentrated Orange Juice." Agricultural History 77, no. fall
2003), John Perkins Geopolitics and the Green Revolution: Wheat, Genes and the Cold War, (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1997) William Boyd and Michael Watts "Agro-Industrial Just-In-Time: The
Chicken Industry and Postwar American Capitalism," in David Goodman and Michael Watts eds.,
Globalising Food: Agrarian Questions in Global Restructuring (London: Routledge, 1997). One exception
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Agricultural histories in the larger field of Soviet history are relatively scarce,
especially for the post World War II era. Much of the scholarship has focused on this
postwar period, especially the period in which Nikita Khrushchev ruled the Soviet Union
as a time of relative freedom and prosperity."1 The intellectual and economic ties the
Soviet Union maintained with the United States in spite of the Cold War inspired many
of the country's postwar reforms, and thus a transnational perspective is central to
understanding postwar Soviet history. Over the course of the 1950s, the Soviet Union
developed strong intellectual and social ties to American businesses, entrepreneurs and
individuals.' 9 The Soviet agricultural histories that do exist are often excellent. Some of
the best are not formal historical studies at all, but rather Cold War era political or
economic analyses that have withstood the test of time. Early Sovietologists, often
employed by the RAND Corporation or the State Department, produced a number of
significant works describing both pre- and post-war agricultural production that are still
relevant today. Coming from backgrounds in diplomacy and agricultural economics,
analysts produced contemporary works in economics or political science that have
become classics for any scholar interested in Soviet agriculture.2 ' While these scholars
within Soviet scholarship to this general lack is Robert F. Miller, One Hundred Thousand Tractors: the
MTS and the Development of Controls in Soviet Agriculture. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press,
1970
18 Asif Azam Siddiqi, Challenge to Apollo. the Soviet Union and the Space Race, 1945-1974 (Washington,
DC: NASA History Division, Office of Policy and Plans, 2000), Neil J. Melvin, Soviet Power and the
Countryside: Policy Innovation and Institutional Decay, (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), Elena
Zubkova, Russia After the War: Hopes, Illusions and Disappointments, 1945-1957. trans. Hugh Ragsdale
(Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1998).
19 David Engerman, Modernization from the Other Shore: American Intellectuals and the Romance of
Russian Development (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2003), Richard Lowitt and Harold
Lee, Roswell Garst: Letters from an American Farmer (Urbana: Northern Illinois University Press, 1987),
Anthony Sutton, Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 3vols. (Stanford: Hoover Inst.
Press, 1968-1973),Yale Richmond, Cultural Exchange and the Cold War; Raising the Iron Curtain
(University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2003).
20 Joseph Berliner, Factory and Manager in the USSR, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,
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were primarily charged with correcting the misinformation of triumphal Soviet
scholarship, their work transcends the superior tone of much area studies literature. It is
detailed, thorough, and while most of these works remain skeptical of Soviet programs,
these authors are generous to praise the policies that showed promise.
Some of the best Soviet sociological and historical studies from mid-century were
undertaken by British and French academics inspired by the Annalks school and Marxist
economic theory in order to describe everyday life in the Soviet Union. Among these
scholars, Moshe Lewin and Basile Kerblay are notable for their careful equal attention to
rural and urban issues, as well as the ability to place economics and demography in their
pre-revolutionary cultural contexts. In an era when many scholars concentrated almost
exclusively on the role of the party or the state, Basile Kerblay excelled at describing
everyday life, implicitly arguing for the importance of seemingly mundane social and
cultural details. 21 Lewin's books focus on collectivization and rural life in the Soviet
Union and the effect of social movements on political power, for analyses of 1920s and
1930s agriculture, there is no better reference. 2
Scholars who left the Soviet Union provided an insider's perspective to the
history of the Soviet Union and while these works are often severely critical of the Soviet
(New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1958), James Coogan, "Bread and the Soviet Fiscal System."
The Review of Economics and Statistics 35, no.2 (1953): 161-167, Naum Jasny, "The Plight of the Soviet
Collective Farms." The Journal of Farm Economics, no. 2 (1948), Alec Nove, "Rural Taxation in U.S.S.R."
Soviet Studies, 5, no. 2 (1953): 159-166, Roy D. Laird, Collective Farming in Russia--A Political Study of
the Soviet Kolkhozy, (Lawrence, University of Kansas Press, 1958), Roy D. Laird, Soviet Agriculture: The
Permanent Crisis (New York, F.A. Praeger, 1965), Anthony Sutton, Western Technology and Soviet
Economic Development. 3 vols, (Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press, 1968,1971,1973), Lazar
Volin, Milk Production in the Soviet Union: Recent Developments, (Washington, D.C.:USDA, Foreign
Agricultural Service, 1959).
21 Basile Kerblay, "L'evolution de l'Alimentation Rurale en Russie, 1896-1960." Annales: E.S.C. Sep.-Oct.
(1962): 885-913, Basile Kerblay, Les Marches Paysannes in U.R.S.S. (Paris, 1965), Basile Kerblay,
Modern Soviet Society, (New York: Random House, 1983).
22 Moshe Lewin, ed. The Making of the Soviet System: Essays in the Social History ofInterwar Russia.
New York: New Press, 1994. Moshe Lewin, Russian Peasants and Soviet Power: A Study of
Collectivization. Translated by Irene Nove. New York: Norton, 1968.
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system, they are also uniquely insightful.2 Among these, Medvedev's work Soviet
Agriculture stands out as the best general reference on Soviet farming. Although
Medvedev is too strong in his claims of the overall failure of the system, Soviet
Agriculture is a thorough and well-informed book, and it is the reference most often cited
in this dissertation, especially for production figures. Medvedev had both personal and
professional reasons to condemn the Soviet system but although his work is critical,
Soviet Agriculture offers genuine insight into the goals and troubles of the system.
From the beginning of the Soviet Union, the Soviet state embraced the progress
that advances in science and technology promised. Histories of Soviet science and
technology have focused on a wide range of topics, from cybernetics to science education
to nuclear power.24 Early works in this subject, such as those of Loren Graham, Kendall
Bailes, and ]David Joravsky outlined how Soviet scientific institutions created and
maintained the authority the Soviet state required of them.25 In the 1920s and 1930s, some
of the Soviet Union's best scientists and engineers were purged because they critiqued
23 V. Litvin, The Soviet Agro-Industrial Complex: Structure and Performance. Boulder, CO,
Westview Press, 1987), Zhores Medvedev, Soviet Agriculture, (New York: W.W. Norton and Company,
1987),A.A. Nikonov,Spiral' Mnogovekovoy Dramy: Agrarnaia Nauka i Politika Rossii (Moscow: The
Encyclopedia of Russian Villages Publishing House, 1995); P. Tolochko, ed., Holod v Ukraini 1946-1947.:
Dokumenty i Materialy (Kiev: M.P. Kots, 1996).
24 Michael Froggatt, "Renounicing Dogma: Teaching Utopia: Science in Schools Under Khrushchev," in
Polly Jones ed., The Dilemmas ofDe-Stalinization: Negotiation Cultural and Social Change in the
Khrushchev Era (London: Routledge, 2006) pp. 250-267, Slava Gerovitch, From Newspeak to Cyberspeak,
a History ofSoviet Cybernetics. (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2002), Sonja Schmid "Celebrating
Tomorrow Today: the Peaceful Atom on Display," Social Studies ofScience,2006 forthcoming.
2 5Kendall Bailes, Technology and Society under Lenin and Stalin,(Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1978), Loren Graham, The Soviet Academy of Science and the Communist Party, 1927-1932 (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1972), Loren Graham, Science and Philosophy in the Soviet Union, (New York:
Knopf, 1972), Loren Graham, "Reasons for Studying Soviet Science: The Example of Genetic
Engineering," in Linda Lubrano and Susan Gross Solomon, eds., The Social Context of Soviet Science
(Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 1980) pp.225-240, David Joravsky, Soviet Marxism and Natural
Science, 1917-1932 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961), David Joravsky, The Lysenko Affair
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970), Miller, One Hundred Thousand Tractors, Conway
Zirkle, Evolution, Marxian Biology and the Social Scene (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press,
1959).
the Soviet Union's approach to industrial development. 26 As Soviet environmental
historians have shown, the environmental consequences of full-steam ahead
industrialization were particularly devastating. 27 In the history of the post World War II
era, science and technology became the main arenas in which the Soviet Union competed
with Western democratic countries in the Cold War.28 While histories of Soviet science
both before and after World War II carefully describe institutions, debates and high
profile scientific and technical projects, they tend to overlook the less prestigious day to
day forms of technology and science. This dissertation fills this gap, showing how high-
minded theories such as Lysenkoism and centralized institutes such as the Institute for
Social Nutrition and the Academy of Agricultural Science actually effected change on the
ground.
The increasing popularity of new social history as a genre has offered a different
perspective on the Soviet experience, often focusing on the daily lives of disenfranchised
citizens. Many of these books in social history have logically focused on groups in urban
areas, where the kinds of people most likely to leave paper trails for historians to follow
26 Loren Graham, The Ghost of the Executed Engineer: Technology and the Fall of the Soviet Union.
(Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1993), Conway Zirkle ed., Death of a Science in Russia.
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press,1949)
27 Murray Feshbach and Alfred Friendly, Jr., Ecocide in the USSR, (New York: Basic Books, 1992),
Marshall Goldman, The Spoils ofProgress: Environmental Pollution in the Soviet Union, (Cambridge: MIT
Press, 1972), Anton Strutchkov, "Nature Protection as Moral Duty: the Ethical Trend in the Russian
Conservation Movement." Journal of the History of Biology 25, no. 3 (1992): 413-428, Nikolai N.
Vorontsov, "Nature Protection and the Government of the USSR." Journal of the History ofBiology 25, no.
3 (1992): 369-385, Douglas R. Weiner, A Little Corner ofFreedom: Russian Nature Protection from Stalin
to Gorbachev (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999).
28 Slava Gerovitch, From Newspeak to Cyberspeak, a History of Soviet Cybernetics. (Cambridge, Mass.:
MIT Press, 2002), David Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy, 1939-
1956, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1994),Paul Josephson, New Atlantis Revisited:
Akademgorodok, the Siberian City of Science (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), Alexei B.
Kojevnikov, Stalin's Great Science: the Times and Adventures ofSoviet Physicists (London: Imperial
College Press, 2004), Nikolai Krementsov, Stalinist Science, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
1997), Asif Siddiqi, Challenge to Apollo: the Soviet Union and the Space Race, 1945-1974. (Washington,
DC: NASA History Division, Office of Policy and Plans, 2000).
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lived and worked. Among this sizable literature of urban focused social histories, several
works were influential to this study. Among them are Stephen Kotkin's Magnetic
Mountain: Stalinism as Civilization, which focused on the relationship between state
power, Communist idealism and material reality in the boom town of Magnitogorsk, and
Julie Hessler's A Social History of Soviet Trade: Trade Policy, Retail Practices, and
Consumption, 1917-1953 which provides detailed descriptions of the long-neglected
Soviet consluner and state retailing practices.
Outside the discipline of history, works from the field of Post-Soviet studies
informed this dissertation. Political scientists and anthropologists, among them Katherine
Verdery, Martha Lampland, Jessica Allina-Pisano and Elizabeth Dunn have written about
transitions across Russia and Eastern Europe from socialism to capitalism.29 As their
writings admirably establish, socialist farming may have been troubled, but converting to
capitalism has introduced even greater risks, uncertainty and complexity in rural areas.
Questions of property, the nature of work, quality control, effective management and
social status were all rapidly redefined in the wake of the dissolution of the Soviet Union
and the Eastern Bloc countries.
Histories of technology place networks, institutions, animal and other non-human
actors front and center in their accounts of historical change.3" Historians of technology
also tend to maintain a healthy skepticism of the all-encompassing claims of progress and
improvement that modernizing regimes are so eager to voice. Bruno Latour's discussion
29 Elizabeth Dunn, Privatizing Poland: Baby Food, Big Business and the Remaking of Labor (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 2004), Bruce Grant and Nancy Ries, eds., Culture and Society after Socialism
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003), Martha Lampland, The Object ofLabor: Commodification in
Socialist Hungary (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), Jessica Allina-Pisano, "Soviet Men into
Peasants: Property Rights and Economy in the Black Earth, 1991-2000." Ph.D. diss., Yale University,
2003), Katherine Verdery, The Vanishing Hectare: Property and Value in Postsocialist Transylvania
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003).
30 Thomas Hughes, Networks ofPower, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983),
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of the agencies and social lives of objects, networks and information regimes have been
especially influential to this study.31 David Nye and Weibe Bijker's edited collections on
the history technology argue strongly for the social construction of technology. Philip
Scranton's edited volume Industrializing Organisms argues, as I do that animals have
undergone an intensified version of natural selection in the process of industrializing, and
their pivotal role in revolutionizing diets and agricultural regimes makes them especially
important to stories about 20 th century agriculture.
Histories of agricultural change are important because they highlight the centrality
of agriculture to human history. Farms, with their bucolic rural setting and
straightforward products are hardly the most obvious place from which to view the limits
of state power in modem society. But agriculture is an important proving ground in
industrial societies. Beyond the more high profile activities of high energy physics and
large-scale engineering, states must feed their citizens, and this task has proven to be one
of the most difficult. The Soviet Union found the project of feeding its citizens especially
challenging, and the way it reformed and expanded its agricultural system helped define
and strengthen the Soviet Union's authority.
31 Bruno Latour, "Where are the Missing Masses? The Sociology of a Few Mundane Artifacts." In Shaping
Technology/Building Society, edited by Wiebe Bijker and John Law, 225-258. Cambridge: MIT Press,
1993.
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Chapter One: The Potato War
This first chapter describes the work of the plant quarantine station, a scientific
and bureaucratic rural agency that was originally set up to monitor the movement of
potatoes and other fruits and vegetables between regional and national borders. It argues
that in order to understand the work and purpose of the quarantine station, the public
goals of the stations must be read against what was simultaneously privately
accomplished by such stations. The quarantine stations, while publicly engaged in
preventative entomology and plant pathology also served as an authority that helped the
state keep track of private production and discourage the cultivation of potatoes, the
primary staple of the postwar countryside.
During the war many Soviet collective farmers, including those in the occupied
territories of Ukraine had turned to subsistence farming in allotment gardens. After the
war farmers generally ignored the orders of the Ministry of Agriculture and continued
raising potatoes on their private plots instead of returning to the collectives to grow grain.
While the Ministry of Agriculture was concerned about the persistence of self-production
after the war, it was initially in a weak position to effectively discourage such action. The
Soviet state needed to establish a wider swath of authority in the countryside and it did so
by establishing a new scientific authority in situ : the quarantine station. Although
quarantine stations were created to combat external crop enemies across the Soviet
Union, by 1948 Ukrainian stations had begun to spend the largest part of their time and
budget fighting internal potato pests. Both of the primary threats to the regional potato
crop, a potato blight and the potato beetle, were only present in Ukraine in minute
quantities and both posed very little real threat to potato crops. The mismatch between
the level of threat and the energy and money expended indicates the state may have had
ulterior motives in operating quarantine stations in Ukraine. Indeed, evidence suggests
that while the quarantine stations were not effective at their stated goals of identifying or
abolishing biological invasions, they were quite effective at dissuading Ukrainian
peasants from growing potatoes instead of grain.
In order to better understand the situation the quarantine stations faced when they
were established in the postwar countryside, it is useful to look at what had happened in
agriculture before the quarantine stations arrived. Both agriculturally and politically, the
previous decade had been quite an eventful one for rural places. How had World War II
affected food security and the faith of rural people in the ability of the Soviet government
to effectively collect and distribute food? How did expert scientific and technical
knowledge re-legitimize state control of agriculture?
Background: Subsistence
Of all the nations that fought in World War II, the Soviet Union experienced the
heaviest losses of life and property. The USSR's extraordinary state commission, formed
after the war to calculate losses resulting from the war and from defense, estimated the
cost of World War II for the USSR at 2,569 billion rubles.32Beyond property damage, the
human toll of the war was tremendous. The number of war deaths in the Soviet Union is
contested but ranges from the low official Soviet estimate of 7 million dead to more
32 Elena Zubkova, Russia after the War: Hopes, Illusions and Disappointments, 1945-1957, trans. Hugh
Ragsdale (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1998),.20. Losses were measured at the ruble's "fixed
price" of 1926-1927. In dollar terms this equals $128 billion dollars in losses and destruction and an
additional $357 billion in increased wartime expenditure. Cited in Roger Munting, "Lend-Lease and the
Soviet War Effort," Journal of Contemporary History 19 no.3 (1984).495-510.
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recent tabulations of 25 to 30 million persons. 33 Of these, an estimated 10-15 million were
civilian deaths, and many of these deaths occurred as the result of a lack of food. At the
very least, 1.-2 million Soviet citizens died from the effects of malnutrition during the
war, although the real number is likely much higher. Feeding civilians as well as soldiers
during the war was a constant challenge and as the high civilian death toll indicates, this
was a task at which the Soviet state faltered.
By 1942, with German troops on the outskirts of Moscow, the Soviet Union's
ability to manage the orderly distribution of food had diminished. With an intense war
being fought on Soviet lands, the Ministry of procurement was not able to successfully
direct provisioning for both soldiers and civilians, especially given the large number of
Soviet civilians living in inaccessible rural areas where railroad cars, which had become
the primary vehicles of food distribution, could not reach. As a result of the war
emergency, the procurements agency narrowed its task in 1942 and focused primarily on
feeding the Red Army, civilians were left to their own devices. People living in cities that
were occupied or surrounded by German forces had the most difficult time acquiring
food. Small urban gardens, goods stolen from enemy supplies and meager relief supplies
were all these populations had with which to sustain themselves. Inadequate stores often
meant malnutrition and famine for residents. 34 City residents in unoccupied lands were
33 Zubkova, Russia after the War, 20. The issue is contentious. See B.V. Sokolov, Tsena Pobedy (Moscow,
1991), N.S. Timasheff, "The Postwar Population of the Soviet Union," The American Journal of Sociology
54 no.2 (1948). 148-155.
34 William Moskoff's The Bread of Affliction, The Food Supply in the USSR during World War II,
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990) is the best work on the food situation during the war. See
especially the account of Kharkov, pp. 55-57. The best-known urban famine was the 900-day blockade of
Leningrad in which over 600,000 people perished. The classic works on the subject are Harrison Salisbury,
The 900 Days: The Siege ofLeningrad (New York and Evanston: Harper & Row, 1969), Dmitri Pavlov
Leningrad 1941: The Blockade, trans. John Clinton Adams, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
1966). Between October 1941 and August 1943, an estimated 30,000 Kharkov residents died during the
German occupation or about 10% of the unevacuated population.
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better off. They survived off city gardens, privately traded produce, and as the war
dragged on, urban dwellers made increasingly frequent rural provisioning trips." While
this sector of the population were expected to fend for themselves in order to find
potatoes, vegetables, and the scarce meat and milk products, city people had the
additional insurance policy of bread ration cards. The ministry of provisions often could
not provide enough bread for all cardholders, but residents of cities were at least in theory
entitled to bread if it became available. Collective farmers and other rural residents had
no such guarantee; they were not issued ration cards. Rural people were left to grow what
they could, the idea being that those who lived in farming areas would be able to produce
whatever food was required; never mind that the state had spent much of the 1930s
reducing the: self-productive capacity of the individual and collective farmer.36
Private garden plots had been an issue of contention between the state and rural
citizens throughout the 1930s. Peasants saw their gardens as a livelihood and means of
survival while Soviet authorities believed that individual production distracted collective
farmers from the more important task of building socialist agriculture. In the face of
disapproval, rural farmers often ignored state deterrents to individual farms, cultivating
household plots of the same size and abundance as in pre-collective days.37 Having lived
through famines in 1921 and 1931-1932, rural people had little cause to trust in the Soviet
state in matters of food provisioning. Maintaining a private plot was an act of resistance
35 William Moskoff, The Bread ofAffliction, pp. 94-112 and 185-206. On private trade and rural
pilgrimage, see Hessler, A Social History of Soviet Trade: Trad Policy, Retail Practices and Consumption
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004) 279-289.
36 For an overview of works on collectivization and the struggle to reduce self-production, see James A.
Millar "Mass Collectivization and the Contribution of Soviet Agriculture to the First Five-Year Plan; A
Review Article," Slavic Review 33.no.4 (December,1974): 750-66. More recently, see Sheila Fitzpatrick,
Stalin's Peasants.: Resistance and Survival in the Russian Village after Collectivization (New York and
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), and Lynne Viola, Peasant Rebels under Stalin.. Collectivization
and the Culture of Peasant Resistance (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996).
37 Fedor Belov, A Soviet Collective Farm (New York: Praeger, 1955).
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against state authority, a vote of no confidence against the state's claim it could
redistribute food abundantly and regularly. Throughout the 1930s private gardens
provided basic foodstuffs such as turnips, cabbages, beets and potatoes, as well as scarcer
luxury products such as berries, melons, chicken, butter, sour cream and eggs. Selling
these products at bazaars and markets was one of the few ways in which peasants could
acquire a cash income, rather than payments-in-kind. In spite of their status as an
economic lifeline, by the late 1930s collective farmers had released their grip on the issue
of allotment gardens. Increasing workloads on collective farms meant that rural people
had very little time to labor over their own plots and new (in 1938 and 1939) strict
penalty taxes and fines discouraged all but the most rudimentary individual production.38
In spite of the fact the Soviet government had just spent a decade wrenching the
nominal holdings of private agriculture out of the hands of collective farmers, by 1942 it
had few options in the face of extreme scarcity to do anything but encourage any and all
kinds of agricultural production regardless of whether they conformed to a socialist ideal
of production. The wartime policy that most supported self-production among rural and
urban populations alike was the 1942 decision to issue private allotment gardens to all
civilian households. Beginning in 1942 but especially from 1943 onward the state
assigned plots to urban workers through their place of employment and informally
encouraged private cultivation by those working in agriculture. This had the effect of
pushing collective farmers back onto the allotment lands they had abandoned or reduced,
often expanding the area under cultivation.3 9 While allotment gardens did not solve the
38 Alec Nove, "Rural Taxation in the USSR," Soviet Studies 5, no.2 (1953): 159-166.
39 Moskoff, The Bread ofAffliction, CITE
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chronic civilian food shortages, they did make up for a significant portion of the losses
caused by war, especially in the occupied lands in the southern Soviet Union. 4 '
The measures the state took to encourage private cultivation were emergency
provisions that were supposed to have been removed at the end of the war. But at war's
end, the expectation that the state would smoothly transition back into controlling food
production was at odds with the views of rural peasants who recognized how marginal
their position was in the immediate postwar period. Peasants refused to relinquish the
right to grow their own food both to eat and to sell. This instinct of self-preservation and
preference for individual control over farming was complemented by the euphoric,
anticipatory attitude that victory had brought to the nation as a whole: many Soviet
citizens expected that after the privation and sacrifices the country endured Stalin would
allow for more autonomy and a better economic life after the war.41 Instead, the postwar
period continued prewar trends of repression and overwork, with few signs that life might
get easier or more prosperous. In cities and factories the postwar era quickly ushered in a
number of changes that made everyday life more difficult. A principal problem was that
the Red Army did not return to its prewar size after World War II and this meant there
was a shortage of young men available to fill newly created industrial jobs.42 In addition
to a general lack of labor the oppression and harassment of various social groups
increased. The government suspected Jews, ethnic minorities and civilians who had lived
40 Hessler, A Social History of Soviet Trade. 299-300.
41 Vera Dunham, In Stalin's Time. Middleclass Values in Soviet Fiction (Durham: North Carolina Press,
1990). Also, Zubkova, op.cit. 36 For general works on the postwar era, see V.P. Popov, Rossisskaia
Derevnia Posle Voinu: iiun' 1945-mart 1953, (Moscow,1991), O.M. Verbitskaia, Rossiskoe Kres'tanstvo:
Ot Stalina k Khrushchevu (Moscow 1992).
42 Matthew Evangelista, "Stalin's Postwar Army Reappraised," International Security 7, no. 3 (1982) 110-
38.
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in Nazi occupation zones as traitors and collaborators.43 Far from euphoric, the Stalinist
notion of business as usual cast a postwar gloom over cities and towns as the communist
party reasserted its authority and legitimacy by refining who could and could not belong
to the legitimate inner circle of Soviet victors.
Rural people largely remained outside and apart from this inner circle, though the
hard times they experienced were different in scope and form from what took place in
Soviet cities. The state's influence over the countryside had always been far more limited
than its presence in the towns and in the postwar period this control was even less
prevalent.44 During the war, the Soviet government directed its attention toward
mobilizing troops and supporting the war effort. In order to do this effectively it ceased
paying close attention to other sectors of society and the economy. Settled peasants living
on agriculturally productive land were the most capable of self sufficiency and the least
vocal about losing access to the services such as education and healthcare the state
normally provided. Neglect on the part of the state made the lives of rural people
markedly worse in the immediate postwar era, especially in the realms of housing, food
supply, roads and transportation, where the Soviet government made few attempts to
rebuild what war had destroyed.45 Just as in wartime, the immediate postwar era was one
in which uncertainty ruled in rural areas and the Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry
of Provisions were generally incapable of ushering in a return to (socialist) agricultural
43 Amir Weiner, Making Sense of War: The Second World War and the Fate of the Bolshevik Revolution
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001).
44George Kennan, U.S. Ambassador to the USSR, wrote in 1946: "Russia is not a rechtstaat. The
relationships between its citizens and the state are governed only in a minor degree by legal norms and
rights." Letter from Kennan to John N. Hazard, April 3, 1946, Department of State Publication 8470
Foreign Relations: 1946, Volume 6 (Washington, DC: USGPO, 1969) 728-730.
45 In contrast, the work of rebuilding urban housing, improving food supply and urban transportation was
quickly taken up in the postwar era. See Donald Filtzer, "The Standard of Living of Soviet Industrial
Workers in the Immediate Postwar Period, 1945-1948," Europe-Asia Studies 51, no. 6 (1999): 1013-1038.
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normalcy. This failure to stabilize the countryside was due in part to the instability of the
previous decade-what did stability mean for regions where crisis and repression had
been the status quo since late 1929?
In the eyes of the Ministry of Agriculture, one thing stability meant was grain
production. Since grain was a commodity in short supply across Europe, it was
something the Soviet Union might make a profit in selling, provided it produced and
collected enough of it. If state officials saw grain as an ally of the Soviet economy,
potatoes were its enemy. The Soviet Ministry of Agriculture did not want collective
farmers producing potatoes to feed themselves instead of working to produce a surplus in
some other commodity that the state could collect and sell.4 6 However, simply ordering
collective and state farms to produce more grain was not an effective approach to the
problem. Between 1946 and 1948 a number of factors limited the production and
collection of grain in the countryside. Foremost, the war had destroyed much of best
farmland. An average of 25% of food-growing capacity was lost between 1941-1945, and
many of these losses were concentrated in the major grain producing regions in southern
Russia and eastern and southern Ukraine.47 Stalin's infamous "scorched earth" policies
during the war meant that if German troops had not wrecked the lands they occupied,
then the Soviet Red Army had done so beforehand, burning Soviet houses and crops and
butchering farm animals as they retreated to the East.48
46 Filtzer, "The Standard of Living of Soviet Industrial Workers in the Immediate Postwar Period, 1945-
1948."
47 Martin Gilbert, An Atlas of Russian History (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993).1940-1945.
48 Moskoff, The Bread ofAffliction,.27. This policy was introduced on July 3, 1941 in a speech by Joseph
Stalin. In his words, "in case of a forced retreat... all rolling stock must be evacuated, the enemy must not
be left a single engine, a single railway car, not a single pound of grain or gallon of fuel. The collective
farmers must drive off all their cattle and turn over their grain to the safe keeping of the state authorities for
transportation to the rear. All valuable property, including non-ferrous metals, grain and fuel that cannot be
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Lack of draft power was a second major inhibition to state grain production in the
immediate postwar period. In the European part of the Soviet Union the war had killed 1
in 7 rural workers, 1 in 2 draft animals, and displaced or destroyed over half of all farm
machines.49_Draft power was also cramped by a major postwar West to East demographic
shift, as returning soldiers and evacuated peasants chose to relocate to or remain in the
East, largely in Siberia and Kazakhstan. While many migrants left the European Soviet
Union willingly, Volga Germans, Crimean Tatars and other ethnic minorities, many of
whom had been established farmers in European Russia and Ukraine for centuries, had
been forcibly relocated East and were not permitted to return to their homelands at the
end of the war."' The shortage of labor power in the European Soviet Union was not
limited to a human diaspora, animals had also been evacuated to the East during the war
and did not necessarily make the return journey back to the European Soviet Union.
While field tractors and other farm machines provided some of the traction needed to
plant and harvest grain, the Soviet Union's farms were still heavily reliant on biological
rather than mechanical power in the postwar era and the human and animal draft power
that had been moved East was sorely missed at war's end.
The success of grain crops was also limited by the environment, specifically by
ecological disruptions the war had instigated. The rise and persistence of the tenacious
Russian thistle in postwar fields was a constant bane to planners and farmers alike.51
withdrawn must be destroyed without fail. In areas occupied by the enemy, guerilla units....must set fire to
forests, stores and transports."
49 Zhores Medvedev, Soviet Agriculture (New York: W.W.Norton & Company, 1987).
50o Michaela Pohl, "The Virgin Lands between Memory and Forgetting: People and Transformation in the
Soviet Union, 1954-1960" (Indiana University, 1999), Karl-Eugen Wddekin, The Private Sector in Soviet
Agriculture, trans. Keith Bush (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973).
"' The information on weeds in based on Medvedev Soviet Agriculture CITE and information contained in
"Spravka: 0 sostoianii dela bor'by s sorniakami", RGAE,fond 7486 opis 23 delo 6 (hereafter RGAE
7487/23/6.
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While thistles and other weeds had been a chronic problem in imperial and early Soviet
agriculture, campaigns to clean fields in the 1930s had succeeded in removing many of
these weeds. The war reversed this progress and fields that were left fallow during the
war increased their numbers of thistles. The thistle problem might have been solved by a
single season of weeding, but in spite of advertising campaigns issued by collective farm
administrations, the campaign to weed out thistles-a job that could be performed by
children--was unsuccessful until at least 1949. Because of ineffective management and
poor labor discipline, it took three times longer than it should have to recover from this
serious but easily managed infestation. The point of the thistle example is not just to
show how war can disrupt normal working patterns and soil productivity (although this is
true); it illustrates how ineffective an older rural bureaucracy-the collective farm
office-was at affecting change at the local level after the war. Although the "campaign
against weeds" began in 1945 and was widely publicized, and although films were
screened and educational evening seminars were held on the weed problem, these old-
fashioned forms of propaganda were not effective. Fieldworkers did not get around to
properly clearing the fields for three full years. The endurance of the Russian thistle was
proof that the connection between Soviet policymakers in Moscow and workers in rural
departments in the immediate postwar era was weak.
A drought in 1946 also inhibited the immediate recovery of agriculture and was
one of the causes of a serious famine across Ukraine and parts of Russia and
Kazakhstan.52 While historians have established that the 1946-1947 famine was caused
not simply by crop failure but also by political repression and organizational
52 On the 1946 famine, see Nicholas Ganson, "The Ukrainian Famine, 1946-1947," Ph.D. diss., University
of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, 2005 and Zima, Golod v SSSR, 1946--1947 godov: Proiskhozhdenie i
Posledstviia (Moscow, 1999).
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mismanagement, it was the combination of social, political and environmental elements
that made the famine so deadly.
Although contemporary documents bear witness to the postwar famine the Soviet
Union experienced in Ukraine, the Eastern Urals and Kazakhstan, they are few and far
between, and the '46-'47 famine is more evident in absences rather than manifestations.
Between 1 and 2 million-pre-dominantly rural-people perished, but only a little over
half of these deaths were formally registered, and the larger figure was determined by
noting who was missing from later census and tax data." The postwar famine was
willfully overlooked by both the Soviet administration, whose actions made a bad
situation worse and the Soviet Union's wartime allies, including the United States.
Following in the tradition of New York Times reporter Walter Duranty, famous for his
reluctance to release reports affirming a nationwide famine in 1931-1932, the postwar
U.S. government chose not to see or respond to reports of drought and famine coming out
of Ukraine and Southern Russian in 1946. 54 The monthly narrative report on harvest
productivity made by the US Foreign Agricultural Service, one of the few American
representatives in the country breaks off in the midst of the 1946 harvest and in 1946 and
1947 combined there are only three reports on agricultural conditions in any part of the
country.55
In 1946, the U.S. State Department's knowledge about Soviet agriculture came
from an official named Joseph Bulik. His job, as a foreign agricultural service agent was
53 Michael Ellman, "The 1947 Soviet Famine and the Entitlement Approach to Famines," Cambridge
Journal ofEconomics (2000).
54 On Walter Duranty, see Zara Witkin, An American Engineer in Stalin 's Russia: The Memoirs of Zara
Witkin1932-1934 (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1991).
55 National Archives and Records Administration (from hereon, NARA), Record Group 166, Foreign
Agricultural Service Narrative Reports 1946-1949 Box 1002
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to report on field and crop conditions throughout the USSR. In 1946 Bulik's colleagues
working in other European countries were there to build a case for US food aid to these
regions by describing food privation and postwar human suffering in detail. In contrast,
Bulik only briefly alludes to the much more severe food crisis in Ukraine. One report on
the situation states that there was 'very little margin indeed for the peasant until the 1946
harvest could be taken in... this... has created the kind of situation not conducive to the
current happiness of a hard-headed peasant..."5' In this same report, Bulik mentions that
one woman working in the fields in Ukraine spontaneously cried out to him when he
stopped to take her photograph, "We are dying of hunger!"'5 Bulik offers no further
comment.
Bulik's indifference to the starving woman in the fields is representative of the
attitude the U.S. maintained in general. While the United States was publicly engaged in
lend-lease assistance to Ukraine, it was privately very suspicious of the USSR's
agricultural production capacity, believing it to be several times greater than it actually
was. In 1946 and 1947, reported yields from the USSR were so low that the United States
suspected the Soviet Union of underreporting its predicted wheat harvest in an attempt to
keep world prices high until the Soviet harvest, which was taken in later in the season,
could flood the market. Based on this suspicion, the United States kept a close hold on its
relief supplies, preferring to dole them out to countries with which it did not feel it was
competing economically or ideologically.58
56 NARA, Record Group 166 Foreign Agricultural Service Narrative Reports 1946-1949 Box 1002 USSR:
Crop Estimating 1949-1946, "Report on a Second Day's Visit in the Kiev Region of the Ukraine, Joseph L.
Bulik, August 7, 1946.
57 Joseph Bulik was prevented from doing much work as an agricultural attach6 after May of 1947 due to a
dispute between the United States and the Soviet Union over how much access Soviet agricultural officials
might have to USDA experiment stations.
58 For example, Harry S. Brown of the Agricultural Service writes to President Truman in 1947
"According to newspaper reports, Soviet Russia has a substantial surplus of wheat. ...I respectfully suggest
that the United State Government should publicly offer to credit Soviet Russia against her lend-lease
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Because of the drought in 1946 and 1947 grain harvests, even if not requisitioned,
would not have been adequate to prevent famine in some parts of the country. The 1947
famine might have been averted if grain had not been requisitioned and the country had
been offered larger international donations, but mobilizing food in the postwar period
quickly became difficult, and the onset of the Cold War and the re-emergence of
peacetime bureaucracy hindered the distribution of goods and materials.' 9
Broadly speaking, the three years immediately following World War II
represented a significant dip in world food production. The chaos of the war disrupted
agricultural work and production in every engaged country. Although the US and Canada
produced record amounts of wheat in the immediate postwar years, even their high
national surpluses did not adequately fill the gap between grain production and demand.
Countries including the United Kingdom, Greece, Spain, France, Germany, China and the
Soviet Union faced the threat of famine and disease in the immediate postwar period
because of wartime disruption. Because they were experiencing shortages, these
countries should have all been net importers of basic staples such as grains. Surprisingly,
the Soviet Union was a net exporter rather than importer of grain in 1946. Although the
United States had been a major supplier of Soviet Union food assistance through 1945
and into 1946, it was mostly in the form of processed meat and packaged oils, rather than
staples such as grain. In spite of the fact the USSR's productivity in grains had been
severely damaged by war, the Soviet state committed itself to helping recovery efforts by
donating 1.5 million tons of wheat to France.60 More problematically, the central
indebtedness for all wheat she is willing to give to the European countries participating in the Marshall
plan." NARA, State Department records on microfilm, publication number LM 176, Reel 30,
861.61311/11-47
59 Zima notes the synergy of hunger, malnutrition and epidemic disease in increasing the death toll. Also,
the birth rate was negatively affected, as severe malnutrition reduces fertility, and this had a major, but
officially unregistered impact on the postwar population. (Zima, Golod v SSSR p.175)60 NARA, State Department records on microfilm LM 176, reel # 30 861.61311/11-47. Russia also
negotiated the sale of 50,000 tons of wheat to India in the spring of 1948. There is some evidence that the
United States and Great Britain pressured the Soviet Union into increasing its international grain
commitments in the two years after the war as a way to compensate for what the US perceived as the
USSR's "default" status on the Lend-Lease Program.
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government stepped up its wheat procurements from all kolkhozii, while simultaneously
decreasing the payments in kind farmers received in grain. It is likely this was done with
an eye toward selling wheat on the world market."6 Because of scarcity (due both to
drought and the state's inability to effectively collect its stated requisitions), the price of
wheat inflated. Had the Soviet Union been able sell a substantial amount of wheat abroad,
this might have been a good tactic for acquiring cash to pay for war reconstruction. This
tactic failed because Soviet wheat production in 1946 was just a little over one-third what
it had been in 1940. The Ministry of Procurements made ambitious efforts to collect grain
on the larger, more productive sovkhozii, or state farms, but these campaigns did not tally
up to a cumulative national surplus, as state farms still produced a minority of Soviet
grain.62
The 1946 wheat harvest was not adequate to cover the needs of the Red Army, the
civilian population and the pledge of assistance the Soviet Union had made to France for
1947. With grain requisitioning in full-force, most people in the Soviet Union faced a
long, uncertain spring and summer in 1947, with little hope of adequate bread supplies.
One analysis of Soviet grain supplies before and after the war shows that in 1947 kolkhoz
workers received less than half the amount of grain as a payment in kind as they had in
1940.63 No sector of the population had a more uncertain future than the Ukrainian
collective farmers who had just lived through a wartime occupation and a famine, whose
regionally specific case we will now consider. In response to the requisitioning of grain
and in a continuation of wartime practices, Ukrainian collective farmers, like collective
61 This policy to increase wheat stocks is disputed. According to Zima, to embassy dispatches, personal
accounts found it the Harvard Interview Project and to Khrushchev's memoirs, workers and farm managers
perceived a major increase in grain demand from the central state in 1946.
2 The state-ordered decrease in vodka production may have freed up more grain for domestic use and
export. See Hessler, A Social History of Soviet Trade. p. 306 and Online Appendix "Vodka production and
sales": http://darkwing.uoregon.edu/-hessler.
63 V.P. Popov, Rossiiskaia Derevnia posle Voiny (Ilyun' 1945- Mart 1953) (Moscow: Prometei, 1993).,
reprinted in Vladimir Kazarezov, Krest'ianskii Vopros VRossii (Ot Kollektivizatsii Do Perestroiki), 3 vols.,
vol. 2 (Moscow: FGNU: ROSINFORMAGROTEKh, 2001).260.
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farmers throughout the Soviet Union continued to employ an insurance policy of raising
potatoes to guard against food insecurity.
In 1946 the Soviet Union's Agriculture head agency (then called Narkomzem, but
soon to become the Ministry of Agriculture) failed to rally peasants to abandon potato
farming not just in Ukraine, but across European Russia. The strongest evidence for this
statement comes from state's own records of increasing potato harvests in the years
immediately after the war.64 The failure to curb potato production on the part of the
Ministry was the result of a lack of incentives and an absence of state-supported
initiatives discouraging the practice. Inducements to collective work had never been the
Ministry's strong suit, as collectivization offered few benefits to Soviet peasants. As a
general rule, the collectivized peasant worked harder, earned less money, ate less and was
more susceptible to the natural perils of farming than his precursor working in the 1920s,
when the Soviet Union had a more laissezfaire attitude toward individual farm
production.65 Throughout the war the state's cash payments and payments in kind to
collective farmers were regularly defaulted on, and peasants were chronically underpaid,
with the misnamed "labor-day" work unit decreasing in value as it stretched into several
days of labor, even as the cost of living, and especially the price of food, rose because of
war scarcities.
Potato growing was a subsistence activity that occasionally became an act of
disobedience against state authority in parts of formerly occupied Ukraine. When
peasants chose to grow potatoes and tended these crops in lieu of going back to work in
state grain fields, the state perceived a problem. Although farmers were willing to do
business with the state and sell their surplus potatoes to state-owned subsidiaries for cash
after the war (often to vodka factories), they were not willing to put much time or labor
64 Narodnye Khoziastvo 1952, CITE
65 For a discussion of 1920s agricultural policy and the relative freedom it provided Soviet peasants with,
see V.P. Danilov, Sovetsakaia Dokolkhoznaia Derevniia: Naselenie, Zemlepol'zovanie, Khoziaistvo
(Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "Nauka", 1977), Moshe Lewin, Russian Peasants and Soviet Power: A Study of
Collectivization, trans. Irene Nove (New York: Norton, 1968).
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into collective fields.66 For the first few years after the war, the choices of farm workers
played a major role in food production and marketing. They retained control over the
crops they raised, the time they spent engaged in collective, rather than individual work,
and the style in which they farmed. For example, in parts of Ukraine during the war,
farmers had returned to-and stuck with-strip farming, a practice the Soviet
government had condemned as inefficient and backward, and had all but abolished during
collectivization. They used these strip plots as potato fields.67
It was not until 1949 that the Soviet Ministry of Agriculture was able to curb
potato strip production and persuade the majority of Ukrainian farmers to raise grain on
collective farms for the state instead of potatoes on private plots for private use and
sale. 68 The primary challenge that the state faced in combating private production was
against collective farmers with allotments, who theoretically worked in collective
enterprises, but earned cash income by selling products they raised on these allotments. 69
Potatoes: A Second Bread
In the postwar period, with high food prices, low labor power and renewed state
pressure to collect grain, the potato became a logical survival crop for Ukraine. In spite of
the fact that potatoes grew well in many parts of Eurasia, they were a fairly new crop for
66 Filtzer, "The Standard of Living of Soviet Industrial Workers in the Immediate Postwar Period, 1945-
1948.".
67 The major proof I have of a return to strip farming techniques comes from sketches and photographs of
agricultural land in Eastern Ukraine in 1948. Otchet o rabote ekspeditsiipo bor'be s kartofel'nym rakom
MSKh USSR za 1948 god. (Report on the Work Expedition in the Campaign against Potato Blight,
Ministry of Agriculture, Ukrainian Republic, 1948), RGAE, 7486/12/1414. Strip farming is a classic
indication of a shortage of draft and labor power, which was certainly the case in the wartime Soviet Union.
Ester Boserup, The Conditions ofAgricultural Growth: The Economics ofAgrarian Change under
Population Pressure (New York: Aldine Publishing Company, 1965).
68 For a different interpretation of reduced potato yields after 1948, see Medvedev, who argues that potato
production tapered off after 1948 because of a series of bad harvests. Medvedev, Soviet Agriculture. 225.
69 One traveler through Ukraine in 1951 remarked on private allotments, saying "although the quality of
field work in general was excellent, it could not compare with the quality of hand work observed where
close observation of kolkhoz gardens was afforded. Every square foot of space in corners and under trees
and to the immediate back door of the house was being utilized. Entire families on numerous occasions
were observed spading and planting their private gardens." B.Hamer, " Trip Report from Moscow to
Odessa and Return by way of Kharkov, May 1951" RG 166 FAS, Narrative Reports Box 63, Folder:
Agriculture 1954-1950.
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most Soviet citizens. Compared to other parts of Europe, potatoes had been adopted quite
late in Russia. Although potatoes were introduced in the 17 th century, for the first two
hundred years after their arrival they were grown primarily as a novelty in aristocratic
gardens rather than as a staple. This general ambivalence toward the potato was not
universal; different cultural groups living in Russia had diverse reactions to the potato.
German-speaking Mennonites who entered the country in the time of Catherine the Great
adopted potato cultivation as an accepted crop from their western homeland (the Russian
word, kartofel', comes from the German). eighteenth century Old Believer sects had a
much more negative reaction, and completely banned the consumption and cultivation of
potatoes by church members on the grounds that they were poisonous.70 In general,
Russian peasants only gradually developed a taste for potatoes and a concomitant
willingness to cultivate the crop.
Well into the 2 0 th century potatoes had not yet become a common staple food in
any part of the Soviet Union. This was not due to any sort of inherent conservatism by the
Russian and Ukrainian peasantry, but rather because it was not, in most people's
estimation, worth the time and energy it would require to change a complex and well-
ordered cropping system in order to incorporate the new plant, which was prepared and
tasted differently than other root crops popular in Russia, such as turnips and beets. 7 1
Because Soviet peasants had so little land on which to produce a significant portion of
their diet, they were careful about the choices they made concerning what kinds of foods
they raised in their gardens. Although the potato has become such a naturalized addition
to the Ukrainian garden plot that anthropologists and historians can study its centrality in
70 Redcliffe Salaman, The History and Social Influence of the Potato (Cambridge:Cambridge University
Press, 1949) 116, David Christian and R.E.F. Smith, Bread and Salt: A Social and Economic History of
Food and Drink in Russia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984). The belief that potatoes were
poisonous is a common misconception spread by European adopting cultures and may be related to the fact
they are members of the nightshade (Solanum) family.
71 Boserup, The Conditions ofAgricultural Growth, David Moon, The Russian Peasantry, 1600-1930: The
World the Peasants Made (New York: Addison Wesley Longman, 1999).
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contIemporary ulkrainlan culsuie allu cUlLurLe, tills was lnot tMe sluatonll sixty yeats ago.
Before World War II the most important staple crops for Ukraine included onions,
cabbage, turnips, carrots and beets. There was little interest on the part of peasants toward
potatoes, and little incentive on the part of the state to furnish or encourage their
cultivation. Potato cultivation would have made extra work for already strained
households in the autumn, since the work of digging up potatoes is more strenuous and
time-consuming than harvesting beets or other tubers.
This extra labor cost was a major barrier to potato adoption. Typically, when potatoes
;are a principle crop they are grown in places where more prolific grains do not do well, or
where cereals are raised for cash while potatoes are used for local subsistence. The
Peruvian highlands where potatoes were first domesticated are a good example of the
first situation, as the extreme variation of day and night temperatures prevented most
grain crops from thriving.7 3 The case of central Ireland during the 19 th century, where
potatoes were the defacto staple of tenant farmers forced to grow other grains for their
landlords is an example of the second subsistence situation. Historically in Russia and
Ukraine, wheat, rye and buckwheat were the three staple grains, raised both to eat and to
sell in different regions of the countries. All three made logical sense for staple crops in a
northern climate, as they were relatively cold hardy and easy to store and transport. The
collectivization of farms in the early 1930s threw this equation off, since collectivized
farmers were no longer guaranteed access to the grains they raised. The famines in 1931-
1932 and in 1947 demonstrated this loss of equilibrium between production and
consumption all too well. Potatoes served as a reliable back-up crop in Ukraine, where
life after collectivization became very uncertain.
72 Jane Zavisca, "Contesting Capitalism at the Post-Soviet Dacha: The Meaning of Food Cultivation for
Urban Russians," Slavic Review 62, no. 4 (2003).787.
73 Ploeg, " Potatoes and Knowledge."
~.~.~^L~.~^^~-^~~^.~~. TT1~Y^:--:,~ ,~.:,:,, ,,~ ,~,lc,.,, ~~:, ,,.,, ,,+ +~, ,:+,.,+:,, ,:,,+,,
Until the war began in 1941, peasants working in collective farms throughout the
Soviet Union were paid a large portion of their salary in grain and therefore had no
reason to seek out a new staple. During the war the Soviet government was more
concerned with finding alternative carbohydrates to feed its army and wartime population
than it was concerned about civilians. Toward this goal, the state expended much energy
on a program of raising millet in Kazakhstan. 74 The Soviet state also leaned heavily on
food imports from the United States until the summer of 1945 when the United States
unexpectedly revoked the majority of the postwar food aid it had pledged to the USSR as
part of the country's Lend-Lease entitlements.75 The Soviet Union then attempted to
better utilize its internal resources, although it did not always do so successfully. 76 In
response to grain shortages in 1946 the Ministry of Provisions cut down or eliminated
payments-in-kind (grain and bread) to Soviet peasants and took ration coupon books from
the workers and peasants who had access to allotment gardens, assuming that by storing
74 A lyrical, if unrealistic description of the wartime millet campaign in Kazakhstan is given in the
modernist poem by Bertolt Brecht, "The Rearing of Millet," New German Critique, no. 9 (1976).
75 Lend-Lease was an assistance program the United States began in 1940 to provide the United Kingdom
with food supplies, armaments and other necessary war materials. Lend-Lease assistance was extended to
the USSR when it entered the war with Germany in 1941. The Soviet Union received materials as varied as
airplanes, a tire factory, ice breaker ships, field telephone kits, and most importantly, food, primarily meat
products and fats. Until Truman's decision to not renew the agreement in the summer of 1945, lend-lease
had been providing a high percentage of the protein and fat for the Red Army. The definitive work on the
implications of the broken Lend-Lease agreements is Leon Martel, Lend-Lease, Loans, and the Coming of
the Cold War: A Study of the Implementation ofForeign Policy (Boulder: Westview Press, 1979). For an
alternate view on Lend-Lease, see Albert Weeks, Russia's Life-Saver: Lend-Lease Aid to the U.S.S.R. In
World War Ii (Lexington Books: 2004).
76 Mark Harrison has pointed out that the Lend-Lease aid the Soviet Union received after the war was
essential to tiding the country over in the wake of the bad harvest of 1946. Mark Harrison, Accounting for
War: Soviet Production, Employment and the Defense Burden, 1940-1945 (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1996).159-161. The U.S. was supposed to have helped far more. The original U.S. pledge
of assistance was for several times more food than was actually delivered, and this unexpected lack of an
anticipated food supply contributed far more to postwar privation and hunger than the reduced donations
actually alleviated. Truman revoked the Lend-Lease Program after VE Day, at the urging of Averill
Harriman, the US ambassador to Russia. While this has usually been interpreted as a policy move intended
to limit Stalin's power, Harriman understood that it would inevitably hurt the society at large. In a telegram
to the Secretary of State dated April 4, 1945, he writes "I thus regretfully come to the conclusion that we
should be guided as a matter of principle by the policy of taking care of our Western allies and other areas
under our responsibility first, allocating to Russia what is left. We should... reestablish a reasonable life for
the people of these countries (Greece and Italy) who have the same general outlook as we have on life and
the development of the world. The Soviets...have an entirely different objective." Averill Harriman,
correspondence, NARA.State Department Decimal Files RG 176.CITE
and selling garden produce, this sector of the population might fend for itself.77 In spite of
the drought having lowered yields of all foods, garden crops included, agricultural
workers could not rely on the state to supply wheat or other grains with which they could
sustain themselves over the long winter. Even though the war was over, they were still
living off what their allotments could produce, which generally meant potatoes. As one
American embassy official noted as he traveled through the rural environs of Moscow,
"potatoes are being planted everywhere; from small family plots on what would normally
be the highway right of way, up to fields four hectares or more in extent."7 8
The agricultural historian Zhores Medvedev has correctly claimed that potatoes
became "a second bread" to Russia only during the Soviet period. In his words, "the only
agricultural success which can be attributed to the Soviet system is the increased
production of potatoes." 79 Medvedev overstates the failures of the Soviet system in the
realm of agriculture, but his point that potatoes were successful is accurate enough.
Although earlier the Russian and Soviet had sometimes encouraged potato growing, it
was the lack of state-sponsored food networks that forced rural citizens to rely on
potatoes both during and after World War II.
Some of the same aspects that made the potato originally unpopular in rural
communities were crucial to its success both during and after World War II. For example,
potatoes do not lend themselves easily to machine cultivation. Throughout the 1940s
potatoes were almost exclusively planted, dug, and harvested by hand. The drudgery of
this kind of cultivation had weighed against potatoes in imperial Russia, but by 1940 this
liability had turned into a benefit. When draft power and machines disappeared from the
countryside during the war, the burden of planting, guarding and sowing grain fields
77 Filtzer, "The Standard of Living of Soviet Industrial Workers in the Immediate Postwar Period, 1945-
1948."1023.
78 Letter from Kohler to the Secretary of State, (undated, 1949), NARA.State Department Decimal Files
RG 176, Roll 30, 861.61/6-249. For other accounts of potatoes as the survival crop during the '46-'47
famine, see the firsthand accounts reprinted in Kazarezov, Krest'ianskii Vopros VRossii (Ot Kollektivizatsii
Do Perestroiki). 262-263.
79 Medvedev, Soviet Agriculture. p. 224
increased dramatically as crop returns decreased due to weeds, pests and wartime
instability. Potatoes offered higher returns for labor investment when the investment was
limited to irregular manual labor. Potatoes were also a fairly flexible crop in terms of
seasonality. Unlike most grains, in which there is typically a very narrow window in
which sowing and harvesting can be performed, potatoes can be sown at any point after
threat of frost has passed, from May to July, and harvested either before or after the frost
returns in mid-autumn. Like turnips, potatoes were a good feed crop for the animals that
were left in the countryside. Potatoes yielded more food for the amount of work put into
the crop than turnips did, and after six months in a root cellar, were generally considered
to be more palatable for human consumption than the less durable turnip. Lastly, while
hungry peasants were probably not thinking in terms of vitamins, in hard times potatoes
were one of the best choices among staple foods, especially when compared to the other
options available to Russian and Ukrainian peasants.80
Storage was another important factor that changed with the onset of war. As a general
rule potatoes were less storable than wheat, but late-harvested potatoes could keep until
early summer if they were properly cellared, providing a source of food during the hard
fieldwork of late spring when most foods were scarce. Further, potatoes were best stored
in pits known as kagatii, rather than in wooden granaries. German destruction during the
occupation and Soviet scorched earth policies had left few building standing in occupied
areas of Ukraine and Russia, including the countyside's barns and silos.81 Many people
who lived through the German occupation in rural Ukraine lived in earthen dugouts
(zemliaki) that bore more than a passing resemblance to their potato pits. In times of war,
these buildings were functional and durable in spite of being cold, dark and damp. They
could not be burned down, and they were both difficult to destroy and fairly easy to
80 Redcliffe Salaman, The History and Social Influence of the Potato.
81 Otchet o rabote ekspeditsiipo bor'be s kartofel'nym rakom MSKh USSR za 1948 god. (Report on the
Work Expedition in the Campaign against Potato Blight, Ministry of Agriculture, Ukrainian Republic,
1948) RGAE. 7486/12/1414
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rebuild. The unpleasant conditions of dugout houses, which were a source of discomfort
and ill health for soviet citizens for years after the war ended, were ideal for keeping
potatoes. The general pattern of material destruction the Soviet and German forces
engaged in did not harm potatoes the way they harmed the security of wheat supplies,
animal shelters and human dwellings.
Potato production peaked after the war, and potatoes tended to remain in the
agricultural villages where they had been grown. The historian Zhores Medvedev's has
interpreted this as a negative aspect of production: "(In 1948) the potato harvest reached a
record level of 95 million tons, but this in itself was an expression of peasant resistance.
The state had no proper system for collecting potatoes. Moreover, the potato harvest is
the last in the agricultural season to be collected. By the time it is brought in (October-
November) only two or three weeks remain before the winter frosts. Unlike grain,
potatoes cannot be taken from the villages during the winter, since frost kills the tubers.
Less than 10 percent of the potato harvest normally reaches the towns through the state
procurement system. (7.2 million tons in 1948) the rest remains in the villages...."82
Medvedev ignores private markets as a means of distributing potatoes as well as the local
nature of potatoes as a modern crop in the postwar period, two important characteristics
of potatoes that deserve closer examination.
Under the issue of marketability, it should be noted that even if Ukrainian peasants
had not been driven to growing potatoes for survival's sake, this group would have seen
potatoes as an excellent investment after the war. The price of both bread and potatoes
had skyrocketed in the early 1940s. By July of 1943 bread and potato prices were
dramatically inflated, increasing by 25 times over their price from just a year earlier, and
these prices did not decrease significantly until 1948.83 Bread, an expensive commodity
baked in cities and paid for with cash, was scarcely available in Ukraine, but potatoes
82 Medvedev, Soviet Agriculture. 143-144.
83 Moskoff, The Bread of Affliction: The Food Supply in the USSR During World War 1. 154-155.
47
could bring high returns from markets, or they could be eaten or fed to animals if the
winter proved to be especially arduous. In some years, peasants could sell excess potatoes
at fixed low prices to state-run vodka factories, but the high informal market price of
potatoes in the postwar years meant that most small growers would get the best price
ignoring the state's factories, and selling their potatoes as fresh "truck" produce. 84
American travelers who crisscrossed the Soviet Union in the immediate postwar period
reported seeing potatoes for sale in 1945 and 1946 at railroad stations throughout Russia
and Ukraine. The prices for potatoes that were on sale in these informal markets were
often many times higher the official, published price.8 5
The heft of the potato was also in the farmer's best interest in times of forced
requisitioning. Unlike grain, potatoes were heavy, so they could not be easily bagged up
and trucked away. As Medvedev mentions, these traits kept almost all of the potatoes
raised in the countryside in rural areas and fewer than 10% of potatoes made it into city
markets. Although the Soviet Union had the right to requisition food products from the
countryside for redistribution, during the 1940s the state did not have the savvy or the
manpower in the villages to locate individual underground potato caches, gather up their
burdensome holdings and cart them off.
The intrinsically local nature of potatoes at this time points to an unusual trend in
Soviet agricultural production: as a general rule, food grown in the twentieth century by
modernizing states has tended to become less local and more global as machines and
international markets begin to influence the production and marketing decisions of even
small producers.8 6 This was certainly the case in the Soviet Union, which had devoted the
decade of the 1930s to increasing its share of the world market in agricultural
84 Hessler, A Social History of Soviet Trade. 305-306.
85 There was some recognition by the Soviet government that prices continued to be inflated after the war.
For example, in Novosibirsk, another site of postwar food scarcity, one report noted that potatoes, oats and
rye were all approximately selling for three times their centrally planned price for that year. RGAE,
8297/5/3/p.28
86 Gretel H. and Pertti J. Pelto Pelto, "Diet and Delocalization: Dietary Changes since 1750," Journal of
Interdisciplinary History 14, no. 2 (1983). Tilly, from the same journal
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commodities such as wheat, rye, cotton and wool. World War II had a major positive
impact on the circulation of good and materials. During the war, certain foods began
making much longer journeys as they were processed and shipped as rations for soldiers
and civilian populations in need. The Lend-Lease program, for example, subsidized the
shipping costs of certain foods, most notably of processed meats and dairy products.
After the war, when transport subsidies and wartime shipping routes were
retracted, places such as Ukraine had no choice but revert to a more local food economy
as part of their recovery process. This created a nutrition gap: imported meat and dairy
products were no longer supplied in significant quantities, but locally produced products
were not able to fill the population's need for these products. One of the results of the war
was a less stable and less nutritious food supply. For several years after the war the
Ukrainian food economy was more locally oriented than it had been before the war.
Food scarcity and a reliance on the safety crop of potatoes were partially the result of
a postwar slump in global and extra-local food circulation. In the years after World War
II the Soviet countryside faced the challenge of rebuilding food networks in a way that
ensured a stable supply of food for the entire country. As discussed in previous sections,
this generally meant getting collective and state farmers to grow grain, which could be
shipped into cities and out of major ports, rather than potatoes, which only brought profits
and a guaranteed food supply to those who chose to grow them. How could the state get
the countryside to grow more grain? The Ministry of Agriculture, regional party offices,
the collective farm leaders and other state authorities were in a weak position after the
war. Strong-arming collective farmers, the prewar tactic of choice, was no longer an
option. Persuasion, rather than force was the new direction of postwar governance. What
the state needed was a new and persuasive local authority, one that could influence not
just the labor of collective farmers, but one that might also have claim authority and
surveillance over personal plots. The newly developed quarantine station rose to the
occasion.
The Work of the Quarantine Station
The twin threats of underproduction and poor distribution were immediate
problems for the country in the wake of the war, and in Ukraine these pressures combined
with drought and renewed grain requisitions to result in a devastating famine. In the wake
of this famine, the Ministry of Agriculture revived a relatively new rural bureaucracy,
which was meant to address the problems of underproduction and poor distribution in an
unusual way. For several years after the war, a major focus of the Ministry of Agriculture
and its associated subsidiaries was on the imprecise and not particularly acute threat of
biological infestation. 87 In order to inspect for and prevent invasions from insect and
bacterial pests, the agricultural ministry created a new department known as the
Quarantine Station, which grew rapidly in the postwar era. Although this new rural
authority only addressed problems of grain underproduction and poor distribution
tangentially, its direct campaigns against the insects and organisms that threatened potato
crops proved to be an effective means of realigning peasant work and production patterns
in rural Ukraine away from potatoes, and towards grain. The quarantine station's
peripheral attack on potato pests became a surprisingly effective method for a distant
state authority to reassert control and surveillance over Ukrainian agriculture and is a
good example of the kinds of dual-purpose agricultural governance that characterized
postwar agricultural reform.
Quarantine stations were rural offices chartered by the Soviet government in order to
screen agricultural products for plant pests and diseases that might endanger the value
and productivity of Soviet crops. In the words of the quarantine propaganda office, their
job was to "expose and destroy" unwanted pests."8 The ministry created the first
87 For example, see articles on pest infestations in Kolkhoznoe Proizvodstvo. In 1946 and 1947, articles on
pest invaders average 3 per issue. Pests targeted included rats, squirrels, ants, moths and beetles.
RGAE, 7486/12 /1339 /240 "Ministerstvo Sel'skogo Khoziastva Soyuza SSSR: Gosudarstvennaia
Inspektsiia po Karantinu s/Kh Rastenii po ukrainskoi sSR Otchet 0 Rabote za 1948 God Gorod: Kiev"
(Ministry of Agriculture in the Soviet Union: State Inspection by Quarantine of Agricultural Plants in the
Ukraine: Report on Work, 1948 in Kiev).
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quarantine stations just before World War II at the country's borders with Poland, but
these stations were abandoned during the war. The increase of quarantine station powers
and influence primarily arose in the postwar era. In Ukraine, quarantine stations were
staffed beginning in 1946, although the vast majority of their work was done after 1948.
The concept of a quarantine station was not unique to the Soviet Union; the United
States had operated Plant Quarantine and Control Administration since the 1890s, and
Germany and Great Britain ran similar facilities in the early years of the 20 th century.89
Soviet stations were partially modeled in part on these foreign designs, however the
differences between the Soviet offices and those of other countries are crucial to
understanding their importance in the postwar countryside. 90 In all countries, quarantine
facilities sought to contain the spread of plant and animal diseases. When the Soviet
Union created a network of rural quarantine stations, this was part of the country's larger
shift toward the professionalization of agricultural science, and was a variation on a
historical theme that all industrialized countries had experienced. 91 Soviet facilities might
have resembled their American counterparts more closely had a Cold War mentality of
mutual distrust not emerged immediately after the war. In 1946 the Soviet Union made a
great effort to obtain information about quarantine stations operating in the US. To do so
the USSR sent a delegation of scientists to California to visit USDA stations but at the
last minute US officials refused to allow the Soviet Union access to their stations or
provide details on their operation. This seemingly minor event had major consequences,
and after this occasion, the Soviet Union's quarantine station became a system apart. 92
89 Walter A. McCubbin, The Plant Quarantine Problem (Waltham, MA: Chronica Botanica, 1954), Ernest
Moore, The Agricultural Research Service (New York: Praeger, 1967).90 RGAE, 7486/23/6/73-76 "Spravka: 0 sostoianii dela bor'by s sorniakami I s zasorennost'yu poch' I
neobkhodimykh merakh po uluchsheniyu ego" (Report on the actions taken in the fight against weeds and
soil in unusual measures for improving it.) author: Sakharov.
91 For a history of agricultural professionalization in the Soviet Union, see Olga Elina, "Agricultural
Experiment Stations in the Begining of 1920s: Soviet Model of the Reform," in On the Edge: Soviet
Biology in the 20s-30s, ed. St. Petersburg Institute for the History of Science and Technology (St.
Petersburg: IHST, 1997).
92 NARA State Department Decimal Files LM 176, Roll 30, 861.612/6-XX48. A letter dated September 7,
1946 from a foreign attach6 Louis Michael to Mr. G.N. Shlykov, USSR Ministry of Agriculture.
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While the Soviet quarantine station did not always resemble its counterparts in other
countries, the system shared important similarities with another homegrown rural
authority that was also charged with managing production and labor in the Soviet
countryside; the Machine Tractor Station.93 Machine Tractor Stations, or the MTS, were
charged with managing the use of heavy farm machinery on collective farms. At a time
when tractors and combines were scarce, the MTS was an organization that owned,
stored and operated such machines. This allowed many small collective farms to have
access to farm machinery that they could never have afforded to purchase or maintain on
their own. MTS stations performed the services of machine plowing, sowing and
harvesting for hundreds of thousands of collective farms across the Soviet Union and by
the beginning of World War II 94% of all collective farms were served by some MTS.94
As Robert Miller points out in his book on the MTS system, the stations had a dual
function in the Soviet countryside; their direct purpose was to increase the efficiency and
output of Soviet agriculture. Their "latent" role, which was not made public, was to
"serve as the eyes of the Party and the state in the village, protecting the national interest
against self-serving locals." 95
Michael writes: "the Ministry of Agriculture of the USSR expressed the desire that entomologist Mr.
Golovizinin be given the opportunity to visit experiment stations of the USA in Florida, California, West
Virginia and Kentucky to become fully acquainted with the scientific work of quarantine measures for
insects and diseases of agricultural plants, and also with the carrying out of quarantine measures in this
direction...The entomologist appeared...with a group of soviet scientists at an experiment station in
California.. .without formal clearance, (and at that point) the USA decided in 1946 that the USDA should
not provide assistance to the Soviet Union until the country was in a position to reciprocate." This incident
was given as the reason Joseph Bulik, the American agricultural attach6 to Russia, was forbidden from
visiting any Soviet experiment station or quarantine station 1946-1947.
93 My understanding of the Machine Tractor Station comes from the following works; Roy D. Laird,
Darwin Sharp, Ruth Sturtevant, The Rise and Fall of the Mts as an Instrument of Soviet Rule (Lawrence,
KS: University of Kansas Publications, 1960), Robert F. Miller, One Hundred Thousand Tractors: The Mts
and the Development of Controls in Soviet Agriculture (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press,
1970).
94 Miller, One Hundred thousand Tractors, 50, Table 2-6. This does not mean that 94% of all collective
farms had been mechanized by 1940, it simply means that 94% of all collective farms had been assigned to
an MTS station, and had been made responsible for paying a part of the annual operational costs for this
station, regardless of whether or not the farm received useful services from the MTS. Well into the 1950s,
most collective farm labor was done by animals or people, and not by machines.
95 ibid., p. 70 This 'latent' goal is similar to my own argument that agricultural reform had stated and
unstated purposes. In the postwar period, these purposes were less focused on surveillance (although they
The quarantine station became another rural office that served as the eyes and ears of
a larger authority. One way of doing this was to focus on domestic, rather than
international products. By 1950, the Soviet station concerned itself primarily with
screening and quarantining domestic food sources. 96 In other countries, the very essence
of a quarantine station was to keep unwanted diseases and pests from being inadvertently
crossing state borders. American and German stations, for example, had been created as a
response to anxieties produced by the increased global circulation of new plants, seeds,
and fresh foods. In contrast, the Soviet quarantine station was ultimately directed far
more toward monitoring the domestic circulation of foods, this focus became an ideal
mechanism through which the state could keep close tabs on rural production. One of the
four directives of the quarantine system was to organize the "work of internal (as
opposed to international) quarantine sites" that focused their energy on individual
production and local level distribution.97 If workers at a quarantine station believed a crop
posed a particular risk to the larger agricultural area, the station had an obligation to seize
and isolate the field or the crop in order to ensure its potential infection did not spread.
Although field seizures were not common for most kinds of crops, the records of
quarantine stations in Ukrainian oblasts show that the potato fields of Ukraine were
frequently subject to this kind of treatment between 1947 and 1953, in spite of the fact
that examples of biological invasions were rarely if ever identified in these fields.98
Allotment gardens worked by individual farmers were especially vulnerable to seizure, as
were the potato fields in Ukrainian territories that had been a part of Poland before the
could be, as the quarantine station is good evidence for) and more focused on building a stronger state
through modern agriculture.
96 The directive in the 1950 Quarantine station directive reads: "Control over imported and exported
material under quarantine, both that within the bounds of the oblast, and outside of its bounds." "Work of
the Internal Quarantine Posts" RGAE 7486/12/1339/14.
97 ibid.
98 An oblast is a territorial division used in Russia and the Soviet Union, one step below the division of
Republic. In 1948, blight had only been identified in 7 of 25 Ukrainian oblasts. In spite of this, allotment
gardens were the single most common site to received blight "treatments" (usually gas) regardless of
whether or not blight had actually been identified on the property. RGAE. 7468/12/1339/17
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war. Quarantine stations might have had legitimate reasons for believing Ukrainian
potato fields might be vulnerable to diseases and infestations, and some of the threats
they perceived will be discussed below. However, their methods of identifying, isolating
and treating these fields seem to indicate that their work was fueled by the ulterior
motives of discouraging the growing of potatoes specifically, and individual production
of food in general.
The quarantine stations were initially on the hunt for signs of a potato blight, the same
kind of infection that contributed to the death of millions of people during the Irish potato
famine of the 1840s. Although this blight had been found in Western Europe for over a
century, Russian and Soviet agriculture had never experienced any severe infestations of
the disease. The blight, (rak in Russian) was a fungal infection that Soviet officials had
good cause to fear in the volatile period of food scarcity after the war. In Ukraine a
disease that could destroy over half of the annual potato crop would have meant an even
more severe famine than the one experienced in 1946-1947. The blight was a hot topic in
agricultural circles across Europe, as the war had provided an opportunity for the disease
to spread further into Germany and France. It had also caused major problems in
(Western) Poland, a nation that bordered Ukraine, where the blight had never been
identified before.99 Furthermore, blight was present in other parts of the Soviet Union, but
to a very small degree. In the late 1940s, the main plant pathology laboratory at the Plant
Research Station in Leningrad, took photographs of locally collected potatoes and tomato
plants that exhibited characteristics of the disease.' 00
The potato blight fungus, Phytophthora infestans, has been one of the most
economically devastating crop diseases in history, largely because of the part it played in
the Irish potato famine in the 1840s, where over a million people died of starvation, and
99 A.A. Cox, Potato Blight Epidemics Throughout the World (Washington, D.C.: USDA, 1960).
100 Whether the blight was induced in these plants or occurred naturally is unclear from the documents.
"1950 Annual Report on the Leningrad Scientific Experimental Station for the study of Potato Blight,
Minselkhoz-USSR" RGAE. 7486/12/ 1644.
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at least as many emigrated in order to avoid a similar fate.' 0' P. infestans is believed to
have co-evolved with potatoes in the Andes, and that mild strains of the blight had
affected potatoes in both the new and old world throughout the history of potato
cultivation. However, a virulent strain of P. infestans was imported into Europe from the
East coast of the United states in the early 1840s, and from there it spread rapidly,
culminating in the Irish famine of 1845-1847. P. infestans is an airborne fungus, and it
thrives in cool, moist conditions. After infecting a potato plant, it takes only a few days
before the infection becomes visible. The first sign of infection is a dramatic leaf-wilt,
followed by a decay of the stalks. Although the virus has no immediate effect the
underground tubers, their growth is stunted by the collapse of the plant's vascular system
and the resulting decrease in photosynthesis. It is also nearly impossible to harvest
potatoes from infected plants without exposing them to the virus, which causes them to
decompose rapidly, making long-term storage impossible. The fungus can also live in the
soil or in unharvested potato plants over the winter, ensuring that potatoes planted in the
same field the next year are at risk of becoming infected.' 02
The spread ofP. infestans is dependent on weather conditions: a cool, rainy spring
encourages the distribution of the blight, whereas warmer, drier weather stops or slows its
progress. While the Ukrainian drought of 1946 is usually identified as one of the prime
factors causing famine after the war because of its adverse affect on the wheat crops, it is
possible that the heat and drought during the summer of '46 actually kept an even more
devastating natural disaster-blight-in check. 103 In spite of the hot and dry weather, the
quarantine station devoted much of its time to searching out blighted potatoes, and to
performing experimental and unproductive treatments on affected fields. It is important to
101 Cormac O'Grada, Black '47 and Beyond" the Great Irish Famine in History, Economy and Memory
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), Cecil Woodham-Smith, The Great Hunger: Ireland, 1845-
1849 (New York: Harper Collins, 1962).
102 A.E. Cox, "Potato Blight Epidemics Throughout the World," in Agricultural Handbook (Washington,
D.C.: United States Department of Agriculture, 1960).
103 RGAE. 7486/12/2007 (no title) and, from a later year, "Report of the work expedition fighting against
Potato Blight in 1948" RGAE. 7468/12/1414.
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note that Soviet records of blight did not recognize a difference between the more and
less virulent varieties ofP. infestans that existed in Europe. To the scientists and
laboratories identifying plant diseases, blight was blight.
In the 1940s, potato blight was best managed by the application of chloropicrin, a
chemical that had been used as a tear gas during both World Wars. 104 Unlike its
American and Western European counterparts, the Soviet Union did not have a reserve
stockpile of chloropicrin left over after the war, as the gas had not been a major weapon
used by the Red Army. Although the Soviet Union plundered a number of German
chemical factories capable of producing chloropicrin in 1945, the transplantation of these
facilities back to the USSR was slow and even in 1947 the Soviet Union was neither
producing nor importing enough poison to effectively prevent or fight prevent an
outbreak of blight. In spite of the fact that chloropicrin was an impractical treatment, as
the Soviet Union had no way of producing or importing the substance in large quantities,
the small stocks that were available were transferred to the agricultural Ministry and
issued to Quarantine Stations for experimental use.
Although the specter of potato blight was real in the postwar era, the Soviet
government also had ideological incentives for investing in the services of a rural
authority that could adopt the role of overseeing the countryside. Partially, this was
because of a lingering distrust the central government had of the Ukrainian Republic.
During the war, the German army had occupied most of Ukraine in a matter of weeks, a
surprisingly swift operation that had been a major blow to Allied morale. While this was
partially due to the fact that the Red Army had been slow to mobilize against the German
invasion, there were allegations that many Ukrainians had betrayed the Soviet Union and
welcomed the German opposition. Adding to nationalist anxiety, the borders of Ukraine
104 For a history of the transition of chloropicrin in the United States, France, Germany and the UK, see
Edmund P. Russell, ""Speaking of Annihilation": Mobilizing for War against Human and Insect Enemies,
1914-1945," The Journal ofAmerican History 82, no. 4 (1996). p.1512, fn. 14.
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expanded after the war when the USSR claimed formerly Polish territories. In the wake
of the recent occupation, a newly expanded territory and lingering fears of a Ukrainian
fifth column, the Soviet quarantine station's dual focus on border control and smallholder
surveillance fulfilled the central government's desire to re-establish a firm control over
the Ukrainian countryside.' 05
While there was no indication that the potato blight Soviet scientists identified in
fields in the late 1940s was anything other than the milder, endemic form of P. infestans,
the quarantine station's official position was that it was possible that the more virulent
strain had been imported into Ukraine during German occupation, but had not yet been
identified. '" One of the jobs of the quarantine station, then, was to search for signs of
blight, and study their reaction to chloropicrin. The concern the Soviet Union had over
the potential permeability of its political territory carried over into the Ministry of
Agriculture's beliefs about the ecology of the territory: unwanted pests and diseases were
identified as western invaders.
The Soviet government also had justifiable concerns that the country might
become the object of a direct biological attack. Using pests as weapons was a tactic
practiced by both France and Germany in the course of World War II. In 1944 German
warplanes flying over British agricultural land released scores of another pest, the
destructive Colorado potato beetle, Leptinotarsa decemlineata. The German plan was that
winds would carry the beetles to the fields below, and the beetles would demolish
potatoes, which were also the major wartime food staple of the British diet.107 A very
similar French project planned to use the same beetles for the same purposes against
105 David Marples, Stalinism in Ukraine in the 1940s (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992).
106 RGAE. 7468/12/1545
107 This operation failed because Colorado beetles can neither fly nor glide. The beetles released from the
plane likely drifted into the ocean, or were killed from the fall when they hit land. For more on the history
of this operation, see Erhard Geissler, "Biological Warfare Activities in Germany, 1923-1945," in
Biological Warfare from the Middle Ages to 1945, ed. Erhard and John Ellis van Courtland Moon Geissler
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1999).p. 121, also Olivier Lepick, "French Activities Related to
Biological Warfare, 1919-1945," in Biological Warfare from the Middle Ages to 1945, ed. Erhard Geissler
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1999).
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Germany. However, this project never got off the ground, so to speak. During the war,
France maintained an extensive breeding facility to produce beetles for a similar plan of
air attack, although there are no records that such a release was ever carried out. In terms
of human costs, this was fortunate, as the civilian populations of both German and France
were acquiring over 50% of their rationed calories from potatoes at the time. Much like
the fungus F'. infestans, L. decemlineata posed a major threat to the productive capacity
of an already overburdened wartime agricultural system.
As the name suggests, the Colorado potato beetle is native to the Western Rockies. L.
decemlineata, so named for the ten bright yellow stripes that appear on its forewings, is a
small, flightless beetle. Until American farm settlements arrived in the West, the potato
beetle's primary food was a wild relative of the potato, Solanum rostratum, a particularly
nasty and non-succulent member of the nightshade family. Its small leaves and poisonous
spines meant the potato beetle was its only major predator, but its scarcity and the great
distance that separated individual plants kept beetle populations in check. Settler
cultivation of Solanum tuberosum, the domestic potato, began in the 1850s, and this crop
inspired a population bonanza for the potato beetle. It took L.decemlineata thirty years to
adapt to S. rostratum 's domesticate cousin, but once the beetle had adjusted, its
population swelled, and it became a first-class pest, moving eastward and resisting all
attempts to curb its spread. To its would-be human predators, one of the more frustrating
aspects of L. decemlineata ecology was its steadfast resistance to poisons; although
potato beetles and the first insecticides (of the Paris Green family) appeared at the same
time, poisons had little effect on the insect, which adapted itself quickly to chemical
adversity. In the 1870s, L. decemlineata edged its way to the Eastern seaboard, which
remained the insect's natural boundary until World War I mobilized the insect in the form
of food shipments to France. Between the World Wars, France's agricultural recovery
was severely hampered by the presence of L. decemlineata in its northern territories.
During World War II, the potato beetle crept eastward, into Germany and Austria. At
war's end, the pest had been identified as far East as Poland. 08
A virulent blight, new state borders and the voracious potato beetle were three
specific threats that the quarantine stations had been designed to mobilize against in the
postwar period: in the bellicose language of the time, the stations were expected to be
"organizers for the struggle against the agricultural enemies" (organizatorov po bor 'be s
vrediteliami selskogo khoziastov).' 09 In spite of this, quarantine stations were generally
not organized in a way that allowed them to deal effectively with any of the so-called
enemies the state had identified. The stations suffered from a lack of supplies, massive
underfunding, and an unstable labor force: all common problems during rebuilding
efforts." 0 These shortages and instabilities impeded quarantine work, a fact that was
outlined in their annual reports, which generally included strong pleas for extra funding.
Many stations lacked the most basic supplies, such as office furniture, bicycles or trucks
with which to travel to site inspections, some stations did not even posses typewriters.
With such poorly appointed administrative offices, it would have been hard to predict in
1946 that quarantine stations would play a significant role in changing work patterns in
the Ukrainian countryside.
The idea of a "station" (in Russian, stantsiia) is somewhat misleading term for the
actual architecture of the organization. Rather than being housed in a station or rural
outpost, quarantine stations were generally located in a poorly appointed office building,
often located in a small regional town near a railroad line."' The most important and
'
0os A.L. Efimov, Koloradskii Kartofel'nyi Zhuk I Mery Bor'by S Nim (Moscow: UchPedGiz, 1946), B. V.
lakovlev, Koloradskii Kartofel'nyi Zhuk I Mery Bor'by S Nim, ed. V.N. Tairova (Moscow: Sel'KhozGiz,
1950), W.Conner Sorensen, Brethren of the Net: American Entomology, 1840-1880 (Tuscaloosa/London:
University of Alabama Press, 1995).
109 "Report on Kharkov Oblast, 1946," RGAE. 7486/12/2007.
110 For Example, see RGAE 7486/12/1414/3.
•1' My understanding of the structure and workings of the quarantine station system come from the
following files: RGAE.7468/12/1609: "Report of the State Quarantine Inspection for Agricultural Plants,
Minselkhoz-USSR in Kharkov Oblast in 1950." Also RGAE.7468/12/ 1414"Report on the work of the
expedition fighting against Potato Blight, Minselkhoz-Ukr.SSR, 1948"
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best-staffed stations in Ukraine were in the two largest cities of Kiev and Kharkov. The
worst-staffed and most under-funded facilities were, ironically, on the Polish-Ukrainian
border, where their services might have been the most useful.112 The employment rolls of
the stations could range in size from a half-dozen workers in a smaller city to the larger
posts in Kiev and Kharkov that employed well over one hundred people.' 13
Taking Kharkov Oblast as an example, the city of Kharkov itself had one head
quarantine station in its center, which employed over 100 people by 1949 in several
different, well-organized departments, and then around a dozen subsidiary branches
spread out across the oblast. The size of Kharkov's quarantine station network is at first
surprising, as Kharkov Oblast did not share a border with any foreign countries, and no
major plant diseases were reported in the oblast in 1948.114 However, the Kharkov
stations were often called upon to do work in other oblasts, and as noted before, their
primary job was never to patrol borders, but rather to inspect the interior. There were
over a dozen different kinds of local institutions in Kharkov Oblast to inspect. The most
numerous of these were the kolkhozy, or collective farms, typically spatially organized
around one or two older village structures. In 1949, there were also 380 individual
(family, non-collective) farms for the quarantine station to inspect. Other important
places were the district's 69 state farms, 42 "potato seed distributing gardens"
(semrassadnikovpo kartofel'iu), 36 "tomato seed producing operations"
112 Officially, the Ukrainian Ministry of Agriculture was most concerned about biological invasions coming
from Poland and Czechoslovakia. RGAE. 7468/12/1339/5. "Ministerstvo Sel'skogo Khoziastva Soyuza
SSSR: Gosudarstvennaia Inspektsiia po Karantinu s/Kh Rastenii po ukrainskoi sSR Otchet O Rabote za
1948 God Gorod: Kiev" ( USSR Ministry of Agriculture: Federal Inspection by the Plant Agricultural
Quarantine of the Ukrainian SSR: Report on work in 1948 in the city of Kiev) When Potato beetles were
identified in L'vov Oblast (in far Western Ukraine) in 1948, workers from the Kharkov quarantine stations
were sent to inspect and treat the fields. RGAE: 7486/12/1414/24 "Otchet Gosinspektsii Karantina S-Kh
Rastenii MSKh-SSSR po Kharkovskoi Oblasti za 1948 g" (report of the State Quarantine Inspection for
Plant agriculture of the Ministry of Agriculture of the Soviet Union for Kharkov Oblast in 1948)
13 RGAE.7468/12/1609: "Report of the State Quarantine Inspection for Agricultural Plants, Minselkhoz-
USSR in Kharkov Oblast in 1950. RGAE. 7468/12/1339/7 (USSR Ministry of Agriculture: Federal
Inspection by the Plant Agricultural Quarantine of the Ukrainian SSR: Report on work in 1948 in the city
of Kiev).
114 In fact, such diseases had been reported in only 7 of 25 Oblasts, in spite of the fact that every Oblast
had a quarantine station set up. RGAE. 7468/12/1339/13-17
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(semenovodcheskikh khoziastvpo tomatam'), 4 scientific-experimental organizations, 37
grain sorting points, 57 grain collecting sites, 5 spirits (vodka) factories, a lone grain
elevator, the regional botanical garden, 5 indoor fruit houses, 1 airport, 97 train stations,
and 214 "otdelenii sviazii" (departmental way stations). 15 These facilities all fall into
one of three categories: points of transit, points of collection, and sites of distribution.
Certain rural institutions, such as a local vodka factory, might fit into more than one
category, but in general, quarantine stations were charged with inspecting food items at
points as they moved into or out of the region, or in situ; as they grew.
Inspecting produce as it traveled made good sense, as plant diseases typically spread
via foods bound for markets. This style of inspection is also what was practiced on
quarantine stations established in other countries before the war: quarantine stations were
supposed to intercept contaminated food at borders. However, there was a definitive shift
between the style of the small inspection projects of the first postwar quarantine stations
(1946-1948) and projects carried out by the better funded and better staffed stations of the
later (1949-1951) period. Although border control activities were originally the more
important and better staffed jobs, this changed in 1949, and in the later period the real
emphasis was on the potato department, in which the majority of staff growth
occurred. 116 In order to understand the informal shift of focus that the quarantine station
had made by 1949, it is helpful to examine the day-to-day work culture of the facility.
As was common with other bureaucratic agricultural enterprises of the time, an
average of one-third of the people employed by the quarantine stations worked primarily
at creating a paper record of the work of the station. Throughout the period of quarantine
station growth (1946-1951) even the smallest stations employed a bookkeeper as well as
a secretary, in addition to the research staff. Administrative jobs were made considerably
115 RGAE.7468/12/1609 "Annual report of the State Quarantine Inspection for agricultural Plants in
Kharkov Olbast,"
116 In Kharkov Oblast in 1950, 47 of 92 quarantine station staff members were working in the potato
department. d. 1609.The percentage of potato department worker had been much smaller in previous years.
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more difficult by the scarcity of typewriters and paper in the postwar era, as well as
desks, chairs, and watertight buildings. Other jobs that station employees might hold
included chauffeur (when the station was lucky enough to have been assigned a car),
agronomist, "iadokhimikat," or poison chemicals specialist, "brigadiers" lab technicians
and lab assistants.
Women held a significant proportion of the jobs, although the proportion of women
holding quarantine station jobs varied by region. In Kharkov the percentage of women
was fairly low, under 15%. This may have been because jobs in cities were the most
desirable and competitive to get.' 7 For the Soviet Union in general in 1949, just under
one-half of quarantine station workers had female last names.' 1 8 It is surprising to note
that from the beginning, most quarantine workers were comparatively well-educated.
Except for the positions of assistants and poison applicants, which were often short-term
contract jobs, quarantine station workers had typically completed high school, and many
had finished one or two years at a technical institute as well, specializing in agriculture or
pathology. This was impressive given the fact that free public education had been made
widely available in the rural Soviet Union for a little less than a single generation." 19 It
also indicates that as early as 1946, Soviet officials in the Ministry of Agriculture were
taking care to hire workers for their quarantine stations who had grown up or had been
educated away from the localities they were hired to inspect, as most villages and small
towns had only primary schools available. By hiring outsiders, the Ministry of
Agriculture took steps to ensure a certain amount of loyalty from their workers, at the
same time, the ministry was unable to fill the ranks of the quarantine station with workers
who possessed the ultimate show of state loyalty: a communist party card. Between 1946
117 For an overview of worker transition and demographic shifts in the postwar Soviet Union, see Basile
Kerblay, Modern Soviet Society (New York: Random House, 1983).
118 RGAE. 7468/12/1545. Ethnically Ukrainian last names are gender-neutral, so it is possible the Kharkov
workforce had a greater percentage of women workers., as first names were not always recorded. However
the majority of Quarantine Station employees in Kharkov had Russian last names.
119 On educational reform in the Soviet Union, see E. Thomas Ewing. The Teachers ofStalinism: Policy,
Practice and Power in Soviet Schools of the 1930s (New York: Peter Lang, 2002).
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and 1952, the vast majority of quarantine station workers in Ukraine were not members
of the communist party, and many offices held only one or two party members. 120
One such rank and file member on the station's rosters in the late 1940s was a young
woman named Lidia Mironenko who was listed as the "assistant poison-spreader" at the
largest Kharkov Oblast quarantine office. The offices of the head quarantine station
produced reams of policies and paperwork, which is why a record of Lidia Mironenko's
activities at the station still exists today, but Mironenko worked outside of the office, on-
site at the various collective farms, individual smallholdings, and way-stations. In the
summer of :1948, Lidia Mironenko was part of a team that worked for two months with
the poison chloropicrin, gassing several sites in a small village in Stanislav Oblast (Ivano-
Frankivsk), a formerly Polish territory of Ukraine in order to clear the area of potato
blight.
Mirononeko's department within the quarantine station was charged with using newly
acquired chemicals such as chloropicrin, DDT, and other pesticides, herbicides and anti-
mycotics to treat diseased plants and their fields and storage areas, and also to prevent
outbreaks in places that the quarantine station determined were at risk. Although these
chemicals were in short supply after the war, larger quarantine offices had access to them
for the purposes of high-profile pest combat. The quarantine stations used the new
poisons infrequently because they did not have large quantities of any of them in the
postwar era, but when they were used, was a well-documented event. In the case of
Mironenko's field team, notebooks remain recording the step-by-step applications of
chloropicrin in Stanislav Oblast.
Creating good photographic and written documentation of new technologies was
common in the Soviet Union. Although the countryside had only sporadic and unreliable
120 In Kiev, the Ukrainian city with undoubtedly the highest percentage of Communist Party members
working in the Quarantine Station, 30 of 137 workers were party members in 1948. 102 of 137 were
classified as having received a higher education. RGAE. 7468/12/1339/7
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access to industrial technologies such as tractors, trucks, combine harvesters, hybrid
seeds and purebred animals, these artifacts received a disproportionate amount of good
publicity, which helped contribute to a sense that the countryside was more industrialized
and better equipped than was truly the case. In the years after the war the number of
foreigners allowed to travel in the rural parts of the country was limited, and cameras and
film were often confiscated. One US Embassy official in Moscow forwarded a glossy
picture book published in 1948 to Washington, "not because they (the photos) depict
anything outstanding, but because they are the first agricultural photographs which have
been available for some time."l21 The book had pictures of combine harvesters at work,
new grain elevators, flax and sugar beet fields.122 In contrast to the scenes depicted in the
government-approved book, Americans traveling by train through the Soviet Union
reported seeing almost no machines in the fields during the harvest. One traveler reported
that between Moscow and the southern city of Rostov, "at least 90% of all produce
hauling was being done with horses and carts."' 23 Another traveler in 1948 reported that
from a train between Moscow and Vladivostok (a journey of 6,000 miles) "four combines
were observed in the fields. Many horse-drawn reapers were observed but a good deal of
the reaping was being done with scythes. Hand binding of sheaves was the rule."' 24
Except for traveler's reports, there are few records attesting to the scarcity of machines in
the immediate postwar era. 125 Reports and photo albums such as the one created for
121 "Letter from the Embassy to the Department of State, dated September 2, 1948,"NARA From State
Department Decimal Files, LM 176, reel 30, 861.61/9-248 "1945-1949 Soviet Union Agriculture"
122 ibid.
123 Report of a trip made by Oscar Holden, letter dated October 30, 1948, NARA State Department Decimal
Files, LM 176, reel 30, 861.61/10-3048
124 Letter from Price, dated September 24, 1948, NARA State Department Decimal Files, LM 176, reel 30,
861.61/9-2448.
125 Of course, travellers' reports could also be inaccurate and biased. In 1955 a Soviet official hosting the
US Agricultural Exchange Delegation complained that "In every kolkhoz and sovkhoz they visited, if some
of the workers were barefoot, then the members of the group and especially the photo correspondents
would take photographs at this moment....Upon seeing the housing of kolkhozniks, MTS workers and
sovkhozniks members of the group, and in the first place the correspondents.. .were impetuously all the
time photographing in an unfavorable way inside the workers and MTS associates apartments, and inside
the kolkhozniks houses." "On the arrival of the American Agricultural Delegation in The Soviet Union,
July 15, 1955-August 21, 1955," RGAE. 7468/22/105/33.
64
Mironenko's group are documents that need to be interpreted with these biases in mind,
but the level of detail they supply about the everyday work of a quarantine station
remains impressive.
Although there were seven people in the Stanislav brigade, only two were permanent
employees of the quarantine station: the technician Lidia Mironenko and her supervisor,
agronomist Gavriil Vakulin. Mironenko is a good example of a skilled middle-level
worker in the quarantine station system. Born in 1926, she finished high school during
the war and after the war took a series of short courses at a technical school to train her
for work as a chemical technician. Her biographical data indicates that she had studied
potato beetles for two years prior to accepting a position with the quarantine station.' 26
She had been hired by the state Quarantine Station in 1947, and although she was not a
member of the communist party (very few Quarantine Station workers were until after
1950) she belonged to two state-approved professional organizations, the local Machine
Tractor Station's Worker's Group, and the Zemorganov, or "Land Organization."
Four other members of the brigade included a scientist, a technical assistant
(tekhnoruk), a chauffeur, and a watchman. The seventh worker, although present in
photographs, was not listed by profession. The group was outfitted with work uniforms,
chloropicrin-spreading canister injectors, and an extra daily ration of milk.127 The brigade
hired nine locals from the village in Stanislav Oblast who worked carrying heavy
equipment, digging holes to prepare the ground for chloropicrin releases, and refilling
chloropicrin canisters with kerosene.
The stated task of the brigade was to "liquidate the isolated departmental hotbeds
(ochagov) of potato blight that had been discovered by the State Quarantine Inspection
126Although it was possible to obtain such specialized training (ie: in the biology of a single species), it was
rare, and so this claim is unlikely to be true.
127 The milk was categorized as "spetspitanie" (special rations) The Kiev institute of hygiene recommended
workers drink extra milk if they were working with Chloropicrin to neutralize any poison they might
accidentally inhale.
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the previous year.128 Their eight-week project instructed them to treat five regions of the
village, three at the local market, and then two on adjacent areas of private plots, which
collectively comprised 937 hectares of land. In an early nod to worker safety, the brigade
adopted certain precautionary measures. The quarantine station workers hung a sign
(written in Ukrainian, but not Polish) at the edge of the field in which they were working,
warning that the chemicals they were using were dangerous. The person actually
injecting the chloropicrin into the soil was instructed to wear a gas mask,.although the
two assistants who walked alongside during the application process were not similarly
outfitted. Before beginning with the group also held a mock accident, in which they
simulated their response to an accidental gas leak in front of a small audience.
In spite of their attentions to safety, Lidia Mironenko's brigade encountered
problems on the way to liquidating their blight "hotbeds," which are detailed in the report
they submitted, and also visible in the photographs of the work. Most of their difficulties
involved the five canister-injectors the brigade had been issued, which were supposed to
run on kerosene, a fuel in short supply in postwar Ukraine. Also problematic was the
weight of the chloropicrin containers, which had been shipped to the work site in
impractical 380 kilogram barrels that were almost impossible to move, especially given
the shortage of draft power in the village where the gas treatments were being carried out.
The village's small horses (which the brigade commandeered for work) had to struggle to
drag the barrels across the fields, and in photographs the barrels dwarf the animals
hauling them. The chloropicrin barrels had been shipped with no obvious openings as
well, and brigade members were forced to fashion church keys out of used rifle cartridge
clips in order to open the cans.
128 "Report on the work of the expedition fighting against potato blight: Ministry of Agriculture-Ukrainian
SSR, 1948."RGAE 7468/12/1414.
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The cost of treating the blight in Stanislav Oblast was fairly steep. While injector
cartridges and safety boots were not expensive (each under 100 rubles) and gas masks
were quite cheap, the chloropicrin itself was costly: 1887 kilos of chloropicrin priced out
at 17,756 rubles.).1 29 This was approximately the cost of a new car, an asset that the
quarantine station did not have, although the price itself is somewhat arbitrary, as the
chloropicrin had almost certainly been seized from German stocks when the Soviet Union
retreated from Germany. The high cost of such a project had little or no relationship to
the economic value of the farms being treated, and also little relationship to the level of
risk posed by the blight itself, especially as it was never determined whether the blight in
Stanislav was an outbreak of the indigenous and much less lethal strains of the P.
infestans fungus, or whether it was truly the same disease that had contributed to famine
in Ireland a century earlier. Instead the exercise and others like it that were performed
across the Soviet Union, but were especially concentrated in Ukraine provided a new
market for wartime chemicals such as chloropicrin. By putting a high price on such
chemicals the state was assigning them a position of importance in the agricultural
economy, but in doing so it put them out of range in price for collective farm
organizations. While chloropicrin was a new and powerful chemical in fighting plant
diseases, the Soviet state was careful about which authorities were allowed access to such
chemicals. Limiting their distribution to quarantine station teams was one way in which
the Ministry of Agriculture made such groups powerful and relevant in the postwar
countryside.
Conclusion
Between 1946 and 1952, the Soviet Union's agricultural production, although
low, was not much damaged by insects or blight. Colorado potato beetles, a species that
wreaked havoc with potato crops over much of Western Europe in the postwar period,
129 Ibid.
never entered the country, and the cases of potato blight that Ukraine experienced were
few, far between and rarely spread. Given these facts it might be easy to conclude that the
Soviet Union's quarantine stations were effective at controlling these biological invasions
and that the work they did in the years after the war helped to contribute to the recovery
effort and the stabilization of the rural food supply. However, by looking more closely at
the ecology of these diseases and at the kinds of work quarantine stations performed, it
becomes clear that quarantine stations did not contribute much to preventing or
controlling biological invasions.
What ecological theory tells us about biological invasions shows that the
perceived and publicized threats from blight and beetles in the immediate postwar era
were likely exaggerated or just plain false. Because at least one strain of potato blight was
indigenous to Ukraine and Soviet research literature did not distinguish virulent from
non-virulent strains of the fungus, there is no proof that the blight the quarantine stations
combated in 1948-1950 actually posed a severe threat to potatoes in the region. At its
peak, the blight only ever affected 7 of 25 oblasts in Ukraine and in most places where
the blight occurred, its incidence was limited. Imports and exports remained a potential
vector for disease, but there is no proof blights, beetles or other scourges were actually
transmitted in this way. Between 1946 and 1950 only one infectious disease was
identified in shipments of produce coming into Kharkov.' 30 There is no evidence that the
blight had established itself in Ukraine, or that it would have if no actions against it had
been taken. The same is true for the Colorado potato beetle, which did not establish a
foothold in the Soviet Union until the late 1950s. Although a certain level of
preparedness in combating such invasions is warranted, the response level that came from
the quarantine stations in the later 1940s was extreme and unnecessary.
130 RGAE.7486/12/1609 The disease was a "bacterial blight (rak) found in a shipment of tomatoes.
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In contrast, there were serious threats to agricultural productivity in Ukraine that
the quarantine stations did not address, such as the problem of weeds in the immediate
postwar period, or the low germination yield from cereal seeds furnished by the state.
These problems, which hindered agriculture far more than potential biological threats,
would have been much more appropriate problems for the quarantine station to address.
The low germination rate was an issue the Soviet government did not take up in part
because it would have meant admitting that the seed it was furnishing was substandard,
and that quality control was a problem. The weed issue, when addressed, was done so
ineffectively, and it took workers an unusually lengthy three growing seasons before
weeds stopped choking out cereal crops in the fields. If the quarantine stations were not
addressing the most basic and pressing issues of contamination that were affecting
agriculture, and if they were not preventing disease outbreaks in the postwar period, then
what were they doing, and why were they receiving so much money from the Ministry of
Agriculture'?
Thanks to increased funding from the Ministry of Agriculture in 1948, the
quarantine station program had swelled into a major operation by 1950, almost
quadrupling the size of its staff in the three years between 1948 and 1951.131 The largest
and fastest growing department was that which dealt with potatoes and the control of
potato diseases, where Lidia Mironenko worked. Although the potato department
employed laboratory scientists and even had a branch concerned specifically with
propaganda, most employees did not to treat or study potato diseases; instead they
focused on collecting records of who was growing what number of potatoes. Although
the stated purpose of collecting such records was that quarantine stations could then
better control blights and beetles, the secondary, unstated purposes for this data were
probably far more useful to the state. By acquiring an accurate count of potatoes and
'31 RGAE. 7486/12/1609
potato acreage, the quarantine stations were in a position to help establish accurate tax
records. Allotment gardens were taxed in several different ways in the postwar period,
but the highest taxes were levied against foods produced for private markets. Because
potatoes grow underground and are stored underground, it was a challenge for the state to
keep track of potato growing levels. By sending quarantine station experts out into the
field and into storage cellars, the state was able to gather better records. Even more
important than acquiring better data was the fact that the quarantine station could show
collective farmers that the state had the power to collect this data, that they were willing
to invest the manpower and money that it took to pay attention to the actions of
individual producers.
Between 1948 and 1950, the number of potatoes produced on allotment gardens
in Kharkov oblast fell by half.132 Similar drops were recorded in other regions. This drop
in potato production has been explained by historians in a variety of ways: Nove cites the
rise of a harsher system of rural taxation, Kerblay notes the decline of village markets,
and Kaplan describes an increase in the level of control collective farm chairmen had
over their workers. These interpretations are all correct, but these historians have
overlooked the mechanism behind these changes. Directly and indirectly, the quarantine
station was foundational to increasing state control in agricultural areas. Quarantine
stations had the authority to seize privately grown produce in the name of food security,
as well as the authority to prevent markets from being held. By accurately reporting how
much land households had in potatoes, the quarantine authority made that land available
to taxation by the collective farm. Inspection of private markets gave the state a way in to
examining the informal economy of individual production and establishing an accurate
tax base. Kaplan has argued that the outsider status and relatively high level of education
that new collective farm chairmen possessed in the early 1950s was a major mechanism
132 ibid
for rural change, but the first arena in which highly educated outsiders were employed by
the Ministry of Agriculture in rural areas was the quarantine station, not the collective
farms directly.' 33
After a war, and especially after a foreign occupation, a return to peace is always
preceded by a period of adjustment and change. In the case of rural Ukraine, a major
theme of this transitional period was food scarcity and insecurity, which resulted in
famine in parts of the country and the decision on the part of many peasant farmers to
continue raising the majority of their own food in the form of potatoes. During the war,
production from allotments and the informal economy of private markets had served as a
survival mechanism for rural people who did not have access to state provisions. Potatoes
grown on allotments had been outside the normal purview of the Ministry of Agriculture,
but the work of the quarantine stations brought them back under state scrutiny. By
publicly establishing that the Ministry of Agriculture was invested in monitoring this
sector of the informal economy, quarantine stations encouraged peasant workers to return
to state-approved work, such as growing grain on collective farms. Collective farm work
did not hold the benefits of allotment gardening, but on the other hand there was no direct
financial penalty involved with such work, such as the high taxes associated with
marketing potatoes.
In some ways, quarantine stations resembled the rural watchdog agency that had
come before it: the MTS system. The differences between the two organizations highlight
the strengths of the later quarantine station system, which is essentially the strength of a
small, focused agency over a large and imprecise one. In the first place, unlike the MTS,
the quarantine stations did not attempt to acquire an all-encompassing view of the
countryside. Stations were erected in parts of the country that the Ministry of Agriculture
133 Miller's analysis of the Machine Tractor Station is relevant here. Machine Tractor Stations were an
earlier rural authority, but they were not concerned with individual production or the actions of households
as much as with the loyalty and efficiency of collective farms as a combined entity. Miller, One Hundred
Thousand Tractors.
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had good cause to be unhappy with or suspicious of. Immediately after the war, a
disproportionately large number of these stations emerged in the formerly occupied
regions of Ukraine for just this reason. Also, the quarantine stations were not engaged in
an important primary task (such as operating a national fleet of farm machines) that took
considerable time or energy. Although the quarantine stations did have a stated goal of
eradicating biological pests from fields, truly damaging diseases did not invade the Soviet
Union in the immediate postwar period. The work of looking out for biological invasions
and the work of re-establishing a tax base and a presence of state authority in the
countryside by counting potatoes, locating root cellars and raiding local markets were in
fact the same tasks. Also, while the Machine Tractor Stations were charged with keeping
an eye on all collective farm activities and reporting on any irregularities to the central
authorities, quarantine stations were more selective in what they chose to care about; their
initial targets were simply the inordinately large potato crops being produced on private
allotments. Because these were private allotments, the collective farm administration and
the MTS did not normally have access to these spaces, but the quarantine stations did.
Biological invasions did not discriminate between public and private places, and so the
quarantine station had a duty not to do so either. While the MTS was an agency that was
primarily focused on reporting behavior, the quarantine station was an agency that was
focused on counting potatoes, writing down the results, and sharing these figures with tax
authorities. Potato growing was an undesirable behavior in the eyes of the state, but in the
postwar period the best way to combat such behavior became economic disincentives
rather than shaming efforts or disenfranchisement that the MTS engendered.
The drop in potato production after 1949 is obviously not 100% attributable to the
quarantine station authority, but the kind of work the quarantine station performed
marked an important and enduring change in the way the Soviet countryside would be
governed in the postwar period. By the early 1950s, other agencies such as the state
procurement agency and the collective farm administration had begun to acquire more
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power in rural areas using some of the same methods of intense scrutiny in the name of
improvement and reconstruction. The quarantine station is just the earliest example of a
new kind of regime of rural control that endured throughout the 1950s. The fact that
Ukrainian peasants chose not to grow potatoes in spite of the fact they were still a
potentially life-saving and profit-making crop would seem to indicate the presence of a
rural authority in the countryside that was capable of translating the state's desires into a
language of observation and control that peasants could understand.
Chapter Two: Animal Farms
In March of 1953, after almost thirty years in power, Joseph Stalin, leader of the
Soviet Union, unexpectedly died. After a brief power struggle for power Nikita
Khrushchev emerged as Stalin's successor. Khrushchev spent almost a decade at the head
of the Soviet Union and this period was characterized by reform and the return of a civil
society that was not governed by terror. Just as remarkable as Khrushchev's efforts to de-
Stalinize the country was his enthusiasm to reform and modernize Soviet agriculture.
Even before Khrushchev became the leader of the Soviet Union his work to modernize
and reform agriculture made a positive impact on policies in his native Ukraine and for
the USSR as a whole. One of Khrushchev's most memorable reforms was also one of his
least practical: in a speech in 1956, Khrushchev committed to "catch up and overtake"
the United States in meat and milk production. For a country that had always produced
just a fraction of what the United States did in meat and milk, this was a bold promise.
How did the Soviet state intend to increase its supply of these products? Why was such a
goal important to the new, post Stalinist government? Just as in the previous example of
crop agriculture, in animal agriculture raising meat and milk production was intended to
accomplish several goals at the same time. In addition to providing Soviet citizens with
more and better-quality food, the campaigns to increase livestock populations were
highly publicized forums that displayed the Soviet state's ability to overcome
longstanding environmental and biological barriers to high productivity that had
previously plagued animal agriculture.
The methods behind these initiatives were often quite basic: better food, better
housing, and faster breeding practices, but in all areas the Ministry of Agriculture
strained to emphasize how technologically sophisticated and well-ordered its animal
agriculture was. In doing so, Soviet animals became a showcase for the Soviet Union's
mastery of modem agriculture. Due to postwar scarcities, the Soviet Union did not have
the machines, advanced feed regimes, prophylactic antibiotics and other inputs that are
normally associated with mass-producing livestock. Nonetheless, this sector of the
USSR's economy rapidly modernized and animal production was re-ordered, intensified,
and dramatically improved. Many of these improvements were credited to Trofim
Lysenko, a scientist whose hostile attitude toward genetics might seem at odds with the
improvement of livestock. Surprisingly, in the context of animal agriculture some of
Lysenko's dubious theories actually helped to better organize animals and labor. As a
theory of human and animal management, Lysenkoist ideology was a useful tool. The
basic tenets of Lysenkoism were simple to understand, all-encompassing, and they played
to the Soviet Union's postwar strengths by emphasizing hand labor and drawing on the
Soviet Union's long history of animal acclimatization and hybridization projects.
Lysenkoist practices also introduced an element of showmanship that was often missing
from the somewhat unassuming field of animal agriculture. Khrushchev's government
was genuinely concerned with producing more animal products, but if they could
simultaneously turn animal breeding into a performance in which a new, socialist
approach to animal agriculture was proven to be successful, then so much the better.
Special Problems in Animal Agriculture
Improving Soviet animals posed special challenges to the Soviet state. The slow
war recovery, an unusually cold climate and the genetic isolation of farm animal
populations all hindered productivity. In World War II the Soviet Union lost over half its
population of horses, half its draft cattle, a third of its cows, and half of its pigs in the
war.' In addition to the draft shortages discussed in the first chapter animal products such
as meat, milk and leather were in short supply well into the 1950s. In addition to the
direct losses the war caused, livestock populations were also indirectly affected because
J.A. Newth, "Soviet Agriculture: The Private Sector 1950-1959. Animal Husbandry," Soviet Studies 13,
no. 4 (1962).
the war disrupted breeding cycles and destroyed breed records. Disease, inadequate
housing and poor sanitation killed many. In 1945 on collective farms in Kyiv, Kharkov
and Leningrad Oblasts (departments), chickens and pigs were under quarantine for the
plague (chuma). It is likely that plague and other infectious diseases were widespread in
many Soviet provinces.2 Many collectives had inadequate housing and medication. The
meat production cooperative, which maintained a small collective farm in Novosibirsk
Oblast that wrote in to the central government in 1946 to ask for an extra animal
technician (zooteknik) as well as permission to build new pig and cow barns in response
to the high death rate its animals were experiencing.3
Another major killer for animals in the postwar period was food scarcity and low-
quality feed. Keeping animals healthy by feeding them well was difficult since proper
supplies were in short supply throughout the postwar period, and any animal fodders such
as potatoes and turnips were used to feed hungry humans. As late as 1950 collective
farms were only able to hoard half of the silage the state budgets predicted they would
need for the winter. Many animals that had managed to survive the war were killed or
starved in the winters following the war because farms and private citizens did not have
the food to maintain them.
The specter of scarce winter food had loomed large throughout Russian history.
Until the postwar period large animals such as cows, sheep and pigs depended on two
very different seasonal feeding regimes. In the summer months animals served
themselves by grazing outside, an activity that involved very little work for humans. In
fact, by consuming grasses and shrubs in the case of cows and sheep) and kitchen scraps
and mast in the case of pigs, farm animals spent this part of the year converting humanly
inedible food sources into high-quality protein, thus enriching the diet and the health of
2 State Archive of Kharkov Oblast (DAKhO), DAKhO/R-6184/1/302. "Ukrainian SSR" is the Soviet-era
name for the national territory now known simply as Ukraine, which is what I will call it throughout the
text.
3 "Annual Report of the Novosibirsk Meat Trust for 1946," RGAE 8297/5/3/30.
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their human caretakers. Summer weather also favored reproduction. Although most
domesticated animals were capable of breeding year-round, baby animals survived at a
higher rate in warm weather. As this summer diet was also quite nutritious, animals
produced more milk and their offspring were better nourished. During the cold months
when grasses and other plants entered a period of dormancy animals were forced to rely
on humans to feed them, an activity that was considerably more trouble and energy than
the summer regime. The winter regime was also characterized by animals (notably pigs)
converting a greater percentage of the food they consumed into fat rather than protein,
and by a general metabolic slowdown. In cows the production of milk tapered off, and
cows, sheep and pigs all tended to sleep more and eat less. Animals were generally
sicklier in winter months due not only to poor feed, but also to the cold and to a lack of
sunlight.
In a list of the costs and benefits of animal husbandry, the principal benefits
included a reliable supply of draught labor, a source of food, and a source of
miscellaneous necessities such as leather, skins and wool. The work involved in the daily
upkeep of these animals would count as the major cost; this included the time and
material spent feeding and housing animals, as well as-perhaps especially-gathering
food and storing it for the long winter. Due to the northern location of the Soviet Union,
this season of dormancy and dependent eating was long, averaging 4-5 months, and
extending to 7-8 months at the farthest reaches of animal agriculture in the North. Even
the warmest and most agriculturally productive parts of the country had a much colder
climate than most European or North American averages.4 This meant that feeding
animals over the winter in the Soviet Union was a special liability for farmers and there
was little room for waste or excess. Most households had little use or desire to burden
themselves with large animal stocks; so farm animal populations in the Soviet Union
4 Richard Pipes, Russia under the Old Regime (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1974). 6-7.
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remained low when compared to the same populations in Western Europe or North
America where the overhead costs of keeping animals were much less.
In spite of this minimalist approach to keeping animals, among developed nations
during the twentieth century, the Soviet Union remained unusually dependent on the
products and services of farm animals. Draft animals rather than farm machines provided
the bulk of field horsepower well into the late 1940s. Pork fat and butter were the source
of nearly all cooking fat and soaps until a large-scale plant-oil industry was developed in
the early 1950s, and leather, skins, bone buttons and woolen cloth were common
materials in the USSR long after plastics and man-made fibers had replaced these items
in other parts of the world.5
The facts that Soviet animals followed a seasonal eating regime and were relied
upon as draft and for supplies are indications that Soviet animal industry was rather
different from its western counterparts. The industrialization of animals in the United
States and the U.K. had been accomplished by eliminating the seasonality of both
breeding and eating patterns and by uncoupling the meat and milk industry from the
industry of animal byproducts such as buttons, skins and furs.' In the decade following
World War II in the Soviet Union this uncoupling had not occurred. Animal
industrialization in the USSR followed a different course in which it was standardized
and intensified but retained some of its historically pre-modern characteristics, notably
the seasonality of eating regimes and breeding, the dependence on extensive work inputs
by human caretakers, and the continued use of animal byproducts in materials and in food
rather than synthetics and plant-based substitutes.
5 Richard Hellie, The Economy and Material Culture of Russia, 1600-1725 (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1999).
6 For an overview of this process in an American context, seeRichard P. Horwitz, Hog Ties (New York: St.
Martin's Press, 1998), Susan Schrepfer, ed., Industrializing Organisms: Introducing Evolutionary
History.The Soviet Agricultural Delegation to the United States wrote a private report on the topic of
U.S.animal industrialization that is much more detailed, see "Otchet Sovetskoi sel'skokhoziaistvennoi
delegatsii o poezdke v SSHA I Kanadu b 1955 g. Chast' If" RGAE 7486/22/89.
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State policies on animal breeding before the war were concerned with increasing
populations but these policies varied greatly in their effectiveness; some encouraged the
growth of animal stocks, while others inadvertently discouraged the same phenomenon.
Immediately after the war, the situation was not much better. The Ministry of Agriculture
refused to recognize that the majority of animals that had survived the war were privately
owned and tax codes persisted in discouraging private holders from increasing their stock
through purchase or breeding. In general collective farmers had permission to privately
own one cow or three sheep or goats, and a single additional pig, although they were
required to pay taxes on existing animals and a steep acquisition tax if they decided to
purchase a new animal.8 If farmers owned more of any one animal than the legal limit,
they were subject to fines that exceeded the worth of the animals and were obligated to
sell the animals at a loss to the state. Once dairy animals began to produce milk, the local
dairy trust requisitioned a large percentage of it, in some cases over half. Thus, there was
little incentive for collective or individual farmers to increase their stocks.
Animals that belonged to collective farms were typically worse off than their
privately owned counterparts in the crucial categories of food supply and caretaking.' In
general in the late 1940s, their numbers were tiny: this was the category of animal that
had been the most depleted by war. Collective farms in parts of the country that had been
occupied by German forces typically held only a few dozen animals among several
hundred people. Although newspaper reports claimed that stocks were increasing rapidly
in the immediate postwar period, statistics collected about this time period do not bear
7 On animal populations during the first thirty years, see Moshe Lewin, Russian Peasants and Soviet
Power: A Study of Collectivization, trans. Irene Nove (New York: Norton, 1968). Kerblay, Nove and
Medvedev display credible statistics on the rise and fall of animal populations between 1930 and 1965. B.
Kerblay, Modern Soviet Society (New York: Random House, 1983), Medvedev, Soviet Agriculture, Alec
Nove, The Soviet Economy: An Introduction, Praeger Publications in Russian History and World
Communism (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1961).
8 These numbers had been decided by a decree of the central committee in the early 1930s.Alec Nove,
"Rural Taxation in U.S.S.R.," Soviet Studies 5, no. 2 (1953).
9 For example, see RG 166 FAS, Narrative Reports Box 63, Folder: Agriculture 1954-1950 " "Trip report
from Moscow to odessa and Return by Way of Kharkov, May 1951 (Burlin Hamer)
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this claim out." From an economic perspective, there were few incentives for survival-
minded peasants to keep collectively owned animals alive and healthy, as their meat and
milk products were largely purchased at a loss or a negligible profit by the State
Provisioning board and various state-operated trusts and co-ops. Furthermore, when
products were sold directly, individual workers saw no particular profit.
A further problem to animal breeding was the low number of purebred stock
available to breed. While the Soviet Union had purchased purebred animals from the
United States and various countries in Western Europe from the 1920s onward, these
animals made up only a tiny percentage of the livestock of the Soviet Union. The inroads
that had been made at breeding farms prior to 1940 to create stable purebred and hybrid
animal lines had been abandoned during the war, and studbooks and other records for
these facilities had been lost." Typical Soviet farm animals were small, sickly, and slow
growing; the exact opposite traits from what is desirable in a population slated for a rapid
expansion. Generally speaking, in the early 1950s the Soviet Union still did not have the
resources such as indoor housing and extra feed necessary to breed animals year-round.
The seasonality of breeding cycles limited the number of animals that appeared in a given
year, as well as the lactation cycles of milk cows.
In spite of overall genetic isolation in Soviet farm animal communities, the unique
adaptations of local heterogeneous stocks were not always hindrances. Soviet animals
were often more cold hardy than breeds that had been developed in temperate climates.
Cows and sheep developed thick coats, and their shaggy, insulating hides were important
byproducts for the private farm sector and a secondary source of income for independent
farmers. In the case of pigs, slow growth translated into insulating layers of edible body
fat. This fat, salo, was a culinary staple of many parts of the USSR, which struggled with
1' Sotsialisticheskoe Zemliadelie,, February 22, 1947. As quoted in NARA, RG 166, Foreign Agriculture
Service Narrative Reports of the U.S.S.R., Box 1000, Folder "Agriculture 1946-1949""Report by an
UNRRA Official on Nutrition in the Ukrainian SSR."
1 On one breeding farm near Khar'kiv, 4,959 of 20,360 Ukrainian Grey milk cows-roughly one-fourth-
were listed as "purebred or (stable) breed animals with no birth records." TsDAVO, R-27/18/6671
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a shortage of plant oils and dairy fats. The small size of Soviet animals was seen as an
undesirable attribute by agricultural modernizers, but this had historically been a positive
trait. Small animals ate less and conserved heat better, thus were better suited for over-
wintering in an environment with sparse food and heat, such as that on most Soviet
farmsteads. The pre-modern look, size and behavior of Soviet animals were well-adapted
to the cold environment and scarce resource base in which they had been developed.
To sum up the state of Soviet animals in the early 1950s: per capita populations
were lower than they had been at any point in the twentieth century, and the facilities and
infrastructures set up to care for these animals were of very poor quality. War recovery
had been slow, and although populations of some animals (notably chickens and pigs)
had begun to recover by 1948, they did not approach their prewar populations until much
later.12 Soviet animals maintained a pre-industrial look that was the result of their motley
gene pool and they were typically small and shaggy with non-standard physiques. For the
majority of animals breeding records had been lost or had never existed, so postwar
breeding programs needed to start from scratch, or improvise records based on what was
remembered or assumed about an animal's lineage. Methods for caring for animals were
disorganized, especially in winter, as farms struggled and often failed to provide sanitary
and adequate food and housing for animals. The decade after the war was a challenge not
just to rebuild stocks, but also to improve, rationalize and reorganize collectivized animal
husbandry.
American visitors to the Soviet Union after the war often remarked on the state of
the farm animals they saw as they traveled the country, comparing Soviet stocks to the
more familiar creatures of their home country. As Soviet agricultural specialists were
rarely candid about the state of the animal population they had been charged with
improving, these qualitative outsider views provide a valuable perspective on the state of
12 Medvedev, Soviet Agriculture, 159.
everyday affairs. On the one hand, the Soviet Union maintained a number of model farms
stocked with plump, sleek, prize-winning animals, and comments about these operations
were uniformly favorable.'" At the other end of the spectrum were the animals Americans
spotted from the windows of cars or (especially) trains while traveling. These more
typical Soviet specimens elicited much less admiration. In diaries, reports and letters
home, travelers disparaged this population, noting generally how small, dirty, feral and
infrequently they appeared.
The reason such animals were visible at all was due to the fact they were roaming
outdoors close to train tracks and roads. In American eyes this kind of free-ranging was
potentially an appropriate pastime for beef cattle, but the late nineteenth century
movement to house animals indoors in the U.S. meant that to Americans, pigs and milk
cows living out of doors looked out of place. Such animals would have been especially
obvious due to the lack of fencing along the railway corridor, which commonly resulted
in herds of cows and sheep straying onto railroad tracks, forcing trains to slow down or
stop in order to avoid collisions. As railroad corridors were maintained in a way that
encouraged the growth of short grasses rather than trees or crops, animals and their
guardians saw the railway right-of-way as a choice spot for free grazing. In response to
this situation, the Soviet state imposed a series of fines against collective farms and
private owners that allowed their animals to graze near unfenced right-of-ways, but there
is little indication that these fines were effective at clearing the tracks.14
A report from an American traveling by train in 1948 note that "herds of 40 to 65
cattle are quite common in the central Ukraine. All herds seen were of mixed
breeds...none of the cattle observed could be classified in a beef category and no udders
1 American vistors were universally aware that these farms, modem day Potemkin villages, were not
representative. Lauren Soth, Iowa State University Archives 16/3/54 Box 11 "Photographs." 70-71.
'
4Railroad workers had the right to cultivate the right of ways, in plots estimated by one American observer
to be 100 by 25 feet. Farther away from railways stations these plots were rarely marked out, and collective
farmers often used the right of ways as a common source of fodder. Scott Lyon, Report, RG 166 FAS,
Narrative Reports Box 63, Folder: Agriculture 1954-1950 'Agricultural Observations during a Trip From
Moscow to Odessa, June 1950,"
were seen that could honestly be judged as belonging to a 2500 liter a year cow. The
general flesh and hide condition appeared good...(but) general barn sanitation can be
deduced as poor; most cows flanks and bellies were thickly caked with dung." 15 Another
traveler remarked that in Ukraine, "One traveled for miles only seeing one herd every
few miles....Herds usually numbered about fifty, composed of a motley mixture of cattle
of different colors...well nourished but often scrubby. They were practically all dairy
types, to the extent that they could be typed at all. No heavy set beef cattle were seen." 16
Another traveler said "all herds observed (in 1951) appeared thin and showed all signs of
having had a tough winter. Privately owned cattle were in much better condition (than
collectively owned cattle)."" Another traveler remarked that "the same motley type of
cattle as observed in all other parts of the Soviet Union were in evidence."'" Other visitors
remarked on the diminutive size of the cows, the obesity of the pigs, and the fat and
meaty tail of the typical Soviet sheep-a characteristic derived from Kazakh breeds that
most foreigners had never observed before.
While these chance sightings provide a relatively believable account of the state
of postwar livestock, they remained unofficial reports. Visitors were supposed to view
Soviet livestock in model collective farms that foreigners had been granted permission to
tour.'" While the well-kept animals on display at these farms did not give an accurate
impression of the state of animal affairs, they revealed how the Ministry of Agriculture
prioritized certain qualities above others in livestock, and what traits it was most
interested in showing off.2' Until around 1955, animal productivity was front and center
'5 Informational report, RG 166 AFS, narrative reports, U.S.S.R. box 1000 folder agriculture 1948-1949,
"U.S.S.R. agricultural commodity information, October 21, 1949" 7.
16 Scott Lyon, RG 166 FAS, Narrative Reports Box 63, Folder: Agriculture 1954-1950 'Agricultural
Observations during a Trip From Moscow to Odessa, June 1950.
17 Burlin Hamer, RG 166 FAS, Narrative Reports Box 63, Folder: Agriculture 1954-1950 " "Trip report
from Moscow to odessa and Return by Way of Kharkov, May 1951.
18 Burlin Hamer, RG 166 FAS, Narrative Reports Box 63, Folder: Agriculture 1954-1950 "trip report from
Moscow to Dzaudzhidau..." July, 1951.
19 Medvedev
20 This paragraph is based on regional newspapers from Kyiv, Kharkov, Dnepropetrovsk and Irkutsk Oblast
between 1946-1950.
as a priority, measured in terms of offspring output, weight gain and milk production.
The better-looking animals on display at model collective farms and agricultural
exhibitions were usually compared favorably to well-known purebred animals. Visitors
often felt the Soviet breeds of cows and pigs on exhibit looked just like the better-
groomed purebred animals they knew from their home countries. The similarities
between the Baltic Brown and the Swiss Red cow, the Khalmagar and the Holstein cow
or the Lithuanian Bacon and the Yorkshire pig were often too striking to go unremarked
in travel diaries.2'
The discrepancy in quality and appearance between the animals on display in the
Soviet Union's model farms and animals sighted from train windows is one example of
the largest ongoing challenge the Soviet Union faced in rural industrialization; that of
bringing the vast countryside up to speed with new practices, materials and animal stock.
The difference in livestock quality between the best farms and the rest was a pattern
repeated in all areas of agriculture. While the state had been previously capable of
creating model systems that worked well, such as its network of agricultural experiment
and animal breeding stations, it rarely succeeded in effectively publicizing and making
standard this new way of doing things.
The question of why Russia and the Soviet Union were so unsuccessful at
universal modernization is disputed, but some factors that were undoubtedly important
include the low education level of most rural workers, the poor system of roads and other
networks between town and country, the sheer size and diversity of the territory, and the
lingering vestiges of imperial, estate-based agriculture, which rewarded a cautious
traditional approach to farming over more innovative systems. The Ministry of
Agriculture and the Ministry of State Farms reinforced the gulf between modernized
farms and the more backwards farms by giving more money to collectives that were
21 The Soviet Union was periodically suspected of reverse engineering its animal breeds.
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already successful. Poorly performing operations were not considered to be good
candidates for new technologies or equipment. This practice formed a vicious circle in
which positive publicity, foreign tourist groups and high-quality stock were all funneled
toward a small number of well-working collective and state farms, while the majority of
farms were overlooked and remained neglected. Thus, farms that had been successful
earlier continued to be successful and well-supported, while farms that struggled were
largely left to their own devices.
The longstanding difficulty the Soviet Union had in making rural farming
progress universal is important to understand in order to make sense of a variety of
agricultural policies adopted in the postwar period. Many of these policies were geared
toward improving the state's track record on farm modernization and ending the trend of
uneven progress. Although this problem was rarely addressed publicly in the Soviet press
or by the administration, the Ministry of Agriculture and other collective and state farm
authorities were aware of and worried about the uneven development of the countryside.
The Soviet state remained committed to equipping the countryside with modern
technologies such as tractors and electric lights, two elements of modernization that had
been crucial to collectivization in the 1930s, but by the 1950s the state was approaching
the problem as one of labor management.22 In the eyes of the central administration,
unsuccessful farms lacked a fundamentally rational approach to the organization of their
work rather than the proper material goods.
To this end, its policies in these years were geared toward reforming a rural
mentality that was resistant to change and progress. Policy changes included the
collective farm consolidation movement that took place betweenl950-1954, a shift to
22 Tractorization and Electrification were the centerpieces of the collectivization movement of the 1930s.
The appeal of tractors and electric lighting was intended to be one of the major lures of collective farming
for independent peasants. In fact, both processes were imperfectly executed, and in the late 1930s the
majority of collective farms functioned without electricity and without significant machine power. For a
history of tractorization see Robert Miller, One Hundred Thousand Tractors. On electrification, see
Jonathon Coopersmith, The Electrification ofRussia, 1880-1926.
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brigade-style agriculture, and new, more simplified land-use patterns on collective farms.
These changes sought to improve the way collective farms were managed and the
efficiency with which (human and not machine) labor was performed. Agricultural
policies that pushed for modernization had more to do with reorganizing the approach
people took to the work of farming than it had to do with adding more machines, electric
lights or new chemicals to the mix.2 3
Lysenko and Displays of Progress
Like these campaigns to make work and land use more efficient, changes in
animal agriculture policy aimed to make farm animals more productive and their human
caretakers more effective. To this end, the state created and reinforced new management
policies that directed the work of caretakers toward animals in Soviet agriculture. The
structure and outcomes of these changes will be the focus of the last half of this chapter,
but before we turn to these changes, it is important to give some background into how
Lysenkoism became a tool for collective farm managers. Although not originally focused
on animal agriculture, the theories of Lysenkoism were central in reorganizing these
relationships, and in recasting the work of animal agriculture as a process that could be
controlled through scientific management. This was not the first time a form of scientific
management sought to reorder the countryside, but it was the first time such a measure
was successful.
The first time such measures were attempted on a wide scale was during the
1920s and 30s, when Soviet labor planners embraced Taylorism- the quintessential
American system of scientific management- in their efforts to reorganize factory and
city work. Taylorism, developed under a capitalist system in order to maximize the
profitability of worker time, was adopted by the Soviet state as a capitalist technique that
23 Deborah Fitzgerald has a similar argument for U.S. agriculture in the 1920s. Fitzgerald, Every Farm a
Factory: The Industrial Ideal in American Agriculture. pp. 1-8.
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could be exploited by a communist society.24 Fordist and Taylorist principles were
essential to the reorganization of factory work including assembly lines and time and
motion studies.25 Taylorism and scientific management may have inspired the brigade
field crews and tractorcades of the 1930s, but the fields of Soviet farms in the 1930s
rarely resembled factories, and industrial systems of agricultural production broke down
much more often than they succeeded. Principles that had succeeded in increasing
production and efficiency in steel making, machine building and light industry made little
headway on the collective farms of the 1930s. On-the-ground accounts report that mass
work orders were often broken up or never completed, and that animals and people
continued to provide most of the field labor for the new collective farming system.26
While there were exceptional state grain farms that provided evidence a machine based
industrial system was in place on certain farms in the country, the 1930s Soviet
countryside was simply not capable of being organized as an industrial system on a mass
scale.
At first glance, the imprecise science of Lysenkoism and the hyper-rational
system of Taylorism seems to have little in common, but a closer look at the evolution of
Lysenkoism in the postwar period shows that its popularity and staying power as official
Soviet policy had much to do with its ability to be co-opted by the state as a modernist
organizational approach to scientific farming, much the same way that Taylorism and
Fordism were "improved" by the Soviet state and used as the basis for the
24 Fredrick Taylor, The Priciples of Scientific Management (1911). Resource available online at
http://name.umdl.umich.edu/HEB01156This point is best made by the Bol'shaia Sovetskaia Entsiklopediia
entries for 'Fordism' and 'Taylorism'.
25 For a detailed description of this kind of borrowing, see Kendall E. Bailes, "The American Connection:
Ideology and the Transfer of American Technology to the Soviet Union, 1917-1941," Society for
Comparative Studies in Society and History (1981),. Kendall E. Bailes, "Alexei Gastev and the Soviet
Controversy over Taylorism, 1918-24," Soviet Studies (1977), Antony Sutton, Western Technology and
Soviet Economic Development, 3 vols. (Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press, (1968,1971,1973),
James Clay and Richard F. Vidmer Thompson, Administrative Science and Politics in the USSR and the
United States: Soviet Responses to American Management Techniques (New York: Bergin and Garvey
Publishers, 1983).
26 Harvard Interview Projects, Interviews CITE
industrialization push of the 1920s and 1930s. In the beginning of his career, Lysenko
developed and promoted his scientific ideas in a sincere effort to improve cereal yields.
As Loren Graham points out, by the 1930s Lysenko's political ambitions had altered the
way in which he presented his ideas publicly, and like many successful scientists of the
time, he reworded his arguments using Marxist terms. 27 By 1949, the science of
Lysenkoism had become an official and well-publicized state policy. Once this happened
Lysenko himself had little control over the ways in which his ideas or words were used to
further state goals. Excerpts from his speeches and writings were constantly reprinted in
newspapers and in agricultural periodicals, but these reprints were selective. Just as
Lysenko had modified his own ideas to fit the popular Marxist socialist rhetoric, the
ministry of agriculture chose to emphasize certain aspects of Lysenkoism while ignoring
others.2 8 Thus a theory of heredity and science practice, twice distorted, became a
platform for the state to further its own goals of scientific management in the countryside.
Before discussing Lysenkoism as a management science it is worth going over the
basic tenets of Lysenko's research, placing it within the historical context of a
scientifically oriented state that was interested in improving itself.29 Lysenko's theories
on plant and animal breeding, while nominally based in Darwinian evolution, also
27 Loren Graham, Science in Russia and the Soviet Union, Cambridge History of Science (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1993).124.
28 This is similar to the difference between science and ideology that Mark Adams notes in his work on the
Kol'tsov Institute. Here, I make the disctinction between Lysenko and Lysenkoism. Mark B. Adams,
"Science, Ideology and Structure: The Kol'tsov Institute, 1900-1970," in Science on the Edge (Na
Perelom), ed. E.I. Kolchinsky (Moscow: IHST, 1997).
29 My understanding of Lysenkoism is based on the work of Loren Graham, Science, Philosophy and
Human Behavior in the Soviet Union (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987), David Joravsky, The
Lysenko Affair (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1970), Nikolai Krementsov, "A 'Second
Front' in Soviet Genetics: The International Dimension of the Lysenko Controversy, 1944-1947," Journal
of the History of Biology 29 (1996), Dominique LeCourt, Proletarian Science: The Case ofLysenko
(London: Humanities Press, 1977), T. D. Lysenko, "New Developments in the Science of Biological
Species," Agrobiologia 6 (1951), Zhores A. Medvedev, The Rise and Fall of T.D. Lysenko (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1969), Nils Roll-Hansen, The Lysenko Effect. The Politics of Science (New
Jersey: Humanities Books, 2004), Valerii Soifer, Lysenko and the Tragedy of Soviet Science, trans. Rebecca
Gruliow Leo Gruliow (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1994)., as well as two of Lysenko's
published works: Lysenko, "New Developments in the Science of Biological Species." and contemporary
newspaper and magazine articles discussing the impact of Lysenkoism.
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accepted Lamarck's theory--discarded by most scientists since the late 19 th century-
that acquired characteristics might be inherited, and that plants and presumably animals
could improve their genetic stock if they were given the proper environment.
The idea that Soviet genetic stock could improve through encountering a series of
progressive environmental challenges was appealing in a country where the climate and
soil quality had played such a fundamental role in determining the scale and success of
agricultural enterprise. Opposition to Mendelian (heredity-based) genetics by Lysenko
and others was also political. Mendel was denounced as a bourgeois scientist in part
because his research was based in laboratory experiments rather than field studies. Soviet
genetics labs, like their American counterparts, had long since been separated from their
practical origins in nineteenth century programs in agricultural breeding.3 ) Lysenkoism
never lost its farming interest. In the words of Lysenko, "close contact between science
and the practice of collective farms and State farms (enables) us to learn ever more and
more about the nature of living bodies and the soil.""3
Lysenko's claim that there were simple, universal theories that governed the
development of all living organisms led him to make sweeping statements about animals
as well as plants, but his early direct experiences were with wheat, rye and potatoes. In
his early career, he acquired national recognition for his groundbreaking experiments
with vernalization, or the cold-hardening of wheat in Azerbaijan in the 1920s and 30s,
and also received a great deal early attention for his success at increasing potato yields in
cold parts of the country by modifying planting schedules. Although he was an
established field researcher, Lysenko was best known for his more abstract (and
30 Dunn and Russell discuss the role selective breeding played in the development of genetics. More
recently, Paolo Pallodino has written about agricultural plant breeding and early genetics in Britain. L.C.
Dunn, A Short History of Genetics. The Development of Some of the Main Lines of Thought 1864-1939
(New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965), Paolo Pallodino, Plants, Patients and the Historian: (Re)Membering in
the Age of Genetic Engineering (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2003), Nicholas Russell, Like
Engend'ring Like: Heredity and Animal Breeding in Early Moden England (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1988).
31 Lysenko's August speech, 1948
considerably less credible) theories on biological development and evolution, which
accepted the theory of acquired characteristics, believing that by challenging or nurturing
an organism, one could 'shatter' its hereditary tendencies and refashion them.32
Lysenko's theory of heredity led him to publicly attack the emerging scientific
discipline of genetics, as well as one of its most acclaimed practitioners, biologist Nikolai
Vavilov.33 The rivalry between Vavilov and Lysenko persisted throughout the 1930s,
with Lysenko gaining the definitive upper hand when he was appointed to the post of
director of the All-Union Agricultural Academy (VASKhNIL) in 1938. With this
appointment, Lysenko held the highest position of power at the leading agricultural
research institute in the country. Vavilov served under Lysenko at the academy for
several years, but ultimately his work in the increasingly unpopular field of experimental
genetics lost him the favor of the Stalinist regime, and died in a Siberian prison.34 By
contrast, in the face of mounting evidence against his research, Lysenko remained a
popular, well-supported figure until 1965, and during this long era had significant
influence over the direction of agricultural research and general focus of agricultural
policy. Historians have used the waxing and waning of the careers of Lysenko and
Vavilov as an allegory of a trend toward the contamination of Soviet science by socialist
politics: the integrity of linguistics, psychology, chemistry and cybernetics were similarly
compromised by the confluence of ideology and science, but this interpretation is
narrow35 While there is no question that Lysenkoism represents a troubled historical
confluence of science and politics, this was not the sole reason for its success and
endurance over a period of nearly thirty years.
32 Loren Graham, Science, Philosophy and Human Behavior in the Soviet Union.
33 The best work to focus on the rivalry between genetics and agrobiology, as represented by Vavilov and
Lysenko is Roll-Hansen, The Lysenko Effect. The Politics of Science.
34 Other books about Vavilov and his work include David Joravsky, "The Vavilov Brothers," Slavic Review
24, no. 3 (1965), Mark Popovsky, The Vavilov Affair (Hamden, CT: Archon, 1984), I.A. Zakharov, Nikolai
Ivanovich Vavilov I Stranitsy Istorii Sovetskoi Genetiki (Moscow: Institut Obshchei Genetiki im N.I.
Vavilova RAN, 2000).
35 See Popovsky, The Vavilov Affair, Roll-Hansen, The Lysenko Effect. The Politics of Science, Zakharov,
Nikolai Ivanovich Vavilov I Stranitsy Istorii Sovetskoi Genetiki.
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For most of his years in power, Lysenko limited his scientific publications to the
agricultural subject he knew best- economically important cereals- but in his speeches
and popular publications he tended to write and speak more broadly about both "plants
and animals" or "plants, animals and microorganisms," thus positing his theories of
acclimatization and acquired characteristics as universal.36 It was these generalizations
that were repeated in rural newspapers and circulars; these were the statements that
would become the foundation for a successful push toward modernization and
management in animal agriculture.
Most critiques of Lysenko have focused on the disastrous effects his theories
posed to the production of grain across the Soviet Union, especially with regard to
increasing the yield of dry-land wheat farming; a crop that experienced major setbacks
due to Lysenko's policies. The Soviet Union's expansion of its grain growing
encountered many problems, poor science among them, which will be discussed in detail
in chapter four. These problems have come to represent a total failure of agriculture and
agricultural modernization for the era. The losses the Soviet Union encountered in grain
production during these years were devastating both to the economy and the
environment, and although these topics are beyond the scope of this chapter, they should
not be glossed over.37 In general however, scholars have tended to overstate the failure of
both postwar agriculture and its most famous theorist. In the case of animal agriculture,
the popular use of Lysenkoism as a management ideology and the incremental
improvements in the scale and productivity of farm animals were linked.
Lysenkoism was also an appealing science specifically because it stood in direct
opposition to Mendelian genetics, which by the 1940s had shifted its intellectual center to
36 For examples of this, see Lysenko, "New Developments in the Science of Biological Species.",
VASKhNIL, "O Polozhenii VBiologicheskoi Nauke: Stenograficheskii Otchet Sessii 31 Iyulia-7 Avgusta
1948" (Moscow, 1948).
37 For example, see Dominique LeCourt, Proletarian Science: The Case ofLysenko (London: Humanities
Press, 1977), Zhores A. Medvedev, The Rise and Fall of T.D. Lysenko (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1969), Valerii Soyfer, Lysenko and the Tragedy of Soviet Science (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers
University Press, 1994), C Zirkle, Death of a Science in Russia (Philadelphia: 1949)
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the United States. As Nikolai Krementsov has accurately pointed out, it is not a
coincidence that the official endorsement of Lysenkoist theory by the Soviet state came
in the summer ofl948, when relations between the United States and the Soviet Union
were at their lowest point since the outbreak of World War II. 38 Today's society has
embraced the science of genetics so thoroughly that it is a leap of imagination to
comprehend how educated and highly observant citizens might popularly believe a theory
of acquired characteristics. However, sixty years ago genetics was a fairly new science,
and Lysenkoist inheritance schemes appealed to common sense rather than scientific
knowledge. If, as was commonly believed, Soviet babies could develop a tolerance for
cold weather by spending a few minutes each day naked in a cold room, and if 'warming"
foods such as vodka and pepper could counteract the fever-and-chills symptoms of the
common cold, then surely maize plants and young calves could "learn" to tolerate a
frosty Siberian spring.39
Lysenko's contrarian system was one false theory among many that cropped up in
the postwar era. During this same period, Soviet scientists published articles on how to
determine the sex of day-old ducks by examining the glands in their necks and spent
millions of rubles researching E.S.P and telekinesis. While these endeavors were
examples of bad science, they were not particularly closely related to one another, to the
oppressive political system present at the time, nor to Lysenkoism, rather they were part
of a postwar movement to separate and define Soviet science apart from the scientific
culture of western and capitalist countries.4"
38 Krementsov, "A 'Second Front' in Soviet Genetics: The International Dimension of the Lysenko
Controversy, 1944-1947." See especially pp. 249-250.
39 On cold tolerance in calves, see Kolkhoznoe Proizvodstvo, November 1949 "Kholodnyi Metod
Vrrashchivaniia Teliat" (the cold method of rearing calves) p. 27.
On ducks, see Kolkhoznoe Proizvodstvo, February 1949 pp.38-39 "Opredelenie pola ytiat v sutochnom
vozraste" (determination of sex in day-old ducklings). On ESP, see Michael Froggatt "Science Education
under Khrushechev" in The Dilemmas ofDe-Stalinization: Negotiating Cultural and Social Change in the
Khrushchev Era ed. Polly Jones, (London And New York: Routledge, 2006). State-supported projects of
dubious merit were not unique to the Soviet Union.
The animals that were bred and raised during Lysenko's tenure at the Lenin
Agricultural Academy were done so under a back-to-basics set of practices in which tried
and true breeding and handling practices acquired new prestige and accordingly were
performed with more rigor. Although partially reliant on techniques that had been
developed in the 19th century, postwar animal agriculture was not all retrograde. One of
the focal points for improvement on farms was the industrialization and mechanization of
agriculture."4 However, with the reckoning of wartime capital losses came the realization
that the mechanization of animal agriculture was still a long way off and was not a
realistic major element of the shorter-term three or five year plans that formed the
foundational architecture for agricultural policy in the Soviet Union between 1946 and
1955. Scientific management, human capital and basic, low-tech procedures substituted
for machines during this postwar modernization drive, bolstered by the Soviet
agricultural press, which in its use of Lysenkoism as propaganda and ideology, provided
a formidable if simplistic pedagogical tool.42 A Lysenkoist paradigm revalued Soviet
agricultural assets under a new rubric. Accordingly, the worth of what the Soviets had on
hand: human laborers, environmentally well-adapted animals and effective mass culture
all increased dramatically, while the things lacking from the Soviet system, such as
genetic diversity in animal populations and advanced machinery, became far less
important.
As in any other place and time, animals were an important form of capital in the
postwar Soviet Union, a source of both labor power and wealth. Although animal
populations were seriously depleted by the war, they were a renewable resource that
could re-generate rapidly. This became a priority in the Soviet Union during the postwar
41 See point five of footnote 57.
42 The Soviet rural press has gone through several period of expansion and contraction which coincide
rather perfectly with periods of more or less direct interference with the countryside on the part of the state
The most rural newspapers (by title) were published in the late 1920s and early 1930s, the fewest number
during World War II. In the postwar period, the number of rural newspapers and agriculturally-themed
periodicals first mushroomed, and then during the 1950s and 1960s slowly stabilized.
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era. To rebuild animal stocks the Soviet government adopted an aggressively pronatalist
program and state breeding farms (gosplemsovkhozy) were established and expanded, the
latest techniques of animal husbandry, including artificial insemination, were tested and
improved upon, stronger and more prolific breeds and hybrids were developed, and great
attention was devoted to the survival of offspring.4 3
Pronatalism in history has been a term reserved for the role the state played in
encouraging its human citizens to procreate. However, just as with human populations,
managing the reproduction of animals had fallen under the purview of the Soviet state in
the decades before World War II.44 In seeking to encourage a higher human birthrate, the
state hoped to meet "the demands of industrial labor and mass warfare," as David
Hoffman has argued. In lobbying for an increase in animal populations, the Soviet
government tried to meet a different set of demands, those of a prosperous and modern
society. Increasing the number of farm animals contributed to the health and wealth of
Soviet citizens both indirectly (through better diet and the increased availability of animal
byproducts) and directly (through privately owned animals kept for work and food). The
new animals that were produced, like the growth of a human population, were the results
of state managed reproduction. What were the mechanisms by which the state managed
43 "An article from, Veterinariia, September issue 1949 stated that 'the basic failure in the progress of the
fulfillment of the state plan of development of livestock raising in 1949 as an analysis of the information
has shown, is still the low output of young stock... there is still a significant waste and squandering of
livestock on the farms. ....failures in the increase of young stock is the special responsibility of the livestock
specialists and especially the zoo-technicians who have paid insignificant attention to the timely and correct
organization of breeding and artificial insemination... it is necessary to proclaim a merciless campaign with
the appearance of any kind of negligent attitude towards livestock which leads to the sickness of livestock.
It is necessary to improve the veterinary zootechnical servicng of collectivized livestock farms and, finally,
put a stop to the anti-state practice of individual chairmen of collective farms who have permitted, along
with the non-fulfillment of state plan of development of livestock raising, the expenditure of livestock on
internal collective farm needs outside the plan or simply on the sale of livestock on the side. ... in Siberia
and the southeast, the procurement of fodders in proceeding unsatisfactorily... (signed Kirk) translation of
article located in NARA, RG 166, Foreign Agricultural Service narrative reports, 1950-1951 USSR Labor-
wool box number 484, folder "livestock industries"
44 On pronatalism in Europe, see Carl Ipsen, Dictating Demography: The Problem of Population in Fascist
Italy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), Maria Sophia Quine, Population Politics in
Twentieth-Century Europe (London: Routledge, 1996).
94
this reproductive increase, and what can the management of animals tell us about the
relationship between a state, its citizens, and its animal capital?
The reorganization of animal breeding facilities across the Soviet Union in the
late 1940s as well as the development of many new hybrid and purebred animals created
to suit specific environmental and geographic regions within the Soviet Union were
projects that derived much of their legitimacy from Lysenkoism." Lysenkoism, as the
dominant scientific ideology of mid-century biology, governed theories of breeding and
selection in both animal and plant sciences. In 1948 the Ukrainian Minister of
Agriculture, V. Matskevich listed the twin setbacks of fertility and offspring survival as
the primary elements hindering the population recovery for cows, sheep, goats and pigs
in Ukraine.46 While fertility and survival were problems that had impeded animal
breeding in Russia historically, they were also issues Lysenkoism approached in an
effective way. From the standpoint of a Lysenkoist, animal breeds were capable of being
permanently improved and established over a single generation, since well-nourished
animals tended to be more fertile, and healthy animals gave birth to offspring that were
more likely to survive.
The breeding and acclimatization programs the Soviet Union carried out in the
late 1940s and early 1950s provide an excellent window in to the ways in which
Lysenkoism became a practical management tool in the realm of animal agriculture.
Animal breeding stations were locations where ideology and practice merged, thus they
are examples of how state desires were translated into material realities. In examining the
45 These two projects: farm improvement and reorganization and the creation of new breeds, were the top
priorities that zootechnical institutes were given. In an annual 1949 report (doklad) from The Danilenko
Institute of the Ukr. SSR, the institute claimed to be occupied with five projects: 1) creating new and
improved breeds of animals, 2) speeding up (uskorennoe) the general rate of reproduction, 3) increasing
productivity of agricultural animals 4) improving the nutritional value of feed and 5) improving the
productive strength of the kolkhoz (Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv, Kharkovskii Oblast (GAKhO), R-6184/1/302.
"Report from the director of the I.A. Danilenko Institute to the Soviet Ministry of Zootechnics the Ukr.SSR
for 1949."
46 Transcript of a speech given by Matskevich, the future Minister of Agriculture for the U.S.S.R., in May
of 1948. Translated by Joseph Bulik. NARA, RG 166 Foreign Agricultural Service Narrative Reports,
1946-1949 Box 1005 "Extension and Farm Management."
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history of animal breeding in the Soviet Union, the most striking development of the
postwar period is the advent of a management mentality in the realm of agricultural
science and the reconfiguring of the work of animal caretaking as a form of management
science. By 1955, a particularly Soviet way of improving animal agriculture had arisen.
State ideology, socialist work patterns, and the environmental and demographic
limitations and particularities of the country all contributed to the rise of a new and
unique industrial order.
Askaniia Nova
A logical place to begin an examination into the state's role in improving and
managing animal agriculture is to focus on the Soviet Union's most famous animal
breeding station, Askaniia Nova in southern Ukraine, a place where Lysenkoist ideology
merged with longstanding research practices, resulting in new animals and new ways of
caring for those animals. Located on the Ukrainian steppes, Askaniia Nova became the
postwar centerpiece of the Ukrainian breeding and acclimatization program.
Askaniia Nova started its existence as a nature preserve, begun in 1875 by a
wealthy Prussian landowner, P. Falz-Fein. By the turn of the century, the preserve
encompassed over 11,000 hectares. Its original mission was tied to animal
acclimatization, horticultural experiments on "virgin" steppe, and the creation of Russia's
first wildlife park. Its founder, Falz-Fein, was a great believer in acclimatization as well
as selective breeding, and his park was famed for his collections of Przewalski horses,
African gazelles, and horse-zebra hybrids.47 Falz-Fein was a hobby farmer and an idealist;
his purpose in owning such a wide range of unusual stock was to reintroduce native
species to the Eurasian steppe, and, reasoning that the steppes of Ukraine were not unlike
47 Waldemar von Falz-Fein, Askaniia Nova. Kiev: Agrarna Nauka, 1997, A.D. Babich, Stepnoi Oazis:
Askaniia Nova Kharakteristika Prirodnykh Uslovii Raiona. Kharkov: Izd. Khakovskogo Universiteta im.
Gorkogo, 1960
the savannahs of sub-Saharan Africa, he imported exotic ungulates and tropical birds in
the hopes they would adapt to their new environment and thrive. 48
Many of the zebras, gazelles, wild horses, flamingoes and other animals Falz-Fein
brought to his park did thrive, but this was largely due to humans accommodating
themselves to their charges, rather than an innate ability at rapid adaptation on the part of
the animals. People had modified the environment of Askaniia Nova throughout the late
19t h century; a vast system of irrigation was constructed in order to ensure a longer and
more lush supply of grass in the park, animals were provisioned with hay in the winters
and windbreaks were created to provide some shelter to animals in winter storms. The
landscape was changed to accommodate the new exotic animals and many of the workers
at Askaniia Nova were employed specifically as caretakers of these immigrants to ensure
that the rare and valued collection at the preserve flourished. At its peak of operation in
the 19th century, Falz-Fein's animal estate employed hundreds of people engaged in
research, grounds maintenance and animal care, and was famous throughout the Russian
Empire and the rest of Europe for its acclimatization, hybridization, and irrigation
projects.
The socialist revolution in 1917 changed both the research agenda and the
ownership of the park. Askaniia Nova became the property of the state and this change in
management did not bode well for some of the park's ecological experiments. Projects in
the discipline of grassland ecology had first been interrupted by revolution, then resumed
in the 1920s, but ultimately a Stalinist agenda that discouraged basic research definitively
ended these long-term studies into the cyclical productivity of steppe ecosystems.
Douglas Weiner has discussed the implications of such scientific repression, noting that
these ecologists were removed from Askaniia Nova because they argued for sensible
48 Falz-Fein's project was smaller in scale, but similar in approach and attitude to that practiced by
acclimatization stations in European colonial territories. See Michael A. Osborne, Nature, the Exotic and
the Science of French Colonialism (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1994).
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measures to conserve land and water resources. Their arguments and recommendations
were based largely based in the (now) familiar ecological theory of natural limits. This
was the cause of their unpopularity, as it went against Stalinist ideas about the
appropriation of nature.4 9 Ironically, the setting of this ecological research was just as
culturally manufactured, if not as environmentally destructive, as the industrial mega-
projects against which this first generation of conservationists argued. Askaniia Nova did
not become a site of intensive industrial agriculture until the post World War II period,
but the scientifically managed and re-created steppe that Falz-Fein populated with exotic
animals and economically desirable hybrids was a particular kind of colonized and well-
managed landscape. 5"
By the late 1930s, the research agenda at Askania Nova had changed away from
basic ecological research and toward the more economically relevant sector of animals
and animal breeding. This shift in focus, as well as the growing popularity of Lysenko,
was reflected in the new name of the station, it was now known as the "Trofim Lysenko
Station of Animal and Plant Hybridization and Acclimatization." While this
administrative change already reflected the triumph of Lysenko's research priorities, and
the fall of a "pure" ecological science, the station retained its longstanding reputation for
performing solid, well-funded research on a variety of rangeland animals. The disconnect
that Weiner and other have identified between the work of the research station in the
1920s and early 1930s and the work of the station after 1937 is an artificial break: in fact,
Askaniia Nova had a long and illustrious history in animal breeding and hybridizing that
predated any "pure" ecological research into grassland communities that was performed
in the early years of the twentieth century. Askaniia Nova's new purpose as a breeding
49 Douglas R. Weiner, "Community Ecology in Stalin's Russia: "Socialist" and "Bourgeois" Science," Isis
75, no. 4 (1984), Douglas R. Weiner, A Little Corner ofFreedom: Russian Nature Protection from Stalin to
Gorbachev (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999).
50 Soviet officials were just as likely as historians to forget the park's history of landscape management. A
1950 newspaper article from Kharkov refers to Askaniia Nova as "20,000 hectares that have never been
plowed, virgin...steppe" Kolkhoznoe Selo April 4, 1950 p. 2 "Okruzhim Kolkhoznye Polia Novymi
Zelenymi Polosami."
station could capitalize on its strength as a landscape that had been modified through
irrigation and plant grooming to suit the needs of a variety of rangeland animals-cows
and sheep as well as the more exotic gazelle and zebra. It was in this setting of
accommodation and adaptation that the Soviet Union's pre-eminent postwar animal
breeding program emerged.
One truth common to both Lysenko's field research and Lysenkoism was the
conflated and confusing use of scientific vocabulary, a prime example is the use and
abuse of the word 'hybrid' at Askaniia Nova in the 1950s. 5~ In the 19 th century, Askaniia
Nova had specialized in rare interspecific hybrids, those crosses that took place between
animals of two different species. The zebra-wild horse crosses and crosses between
various species (and sub-species) of antelope were the best-known examples of this
work.52 Fifty years later, in Lysenko's time, other more traditional crosses, mostly grafts
and intraspecific hybrids had become the 'hybrids' to which scientific publications
referred.53 This confusion was not unique to Lysenko or to the twentieth century Soviet
Union, indeed Gregor Mendel had also failed to recognize the difference between
interspecific and intraspecific hybridity in his famous experimental pea crosses in the 19 th
century.
However, the mix-up did have unusually important consequences in the field of
animal breeding. The permissive definition of hybrid that Lysenkoism and the Soviet
popular press supported gave rise to a new series of practices for re-establishing and
improving animal breeds. Likewise, early successes "acclimatizing" animals-another
51 For more on the poorly defined terms of Lysenkoism, see Loren Graham, Science, Philosophyand
Human Behavior in the Soviet Union pp. 124-150 and Medvedev, The Rise and Fall of T.D. Lysenko.52 Breeding between subspecies would not normally be considered interspecific. In the case of antelopes,
there is much debate over whether distinct populations are species or subspecies, and definitions have
swung back and forth several times in the past century. Harriet Ritvo, The Platypus and the Mermaid and
Other Figments of the Classifying Imagination (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997).p. 87 On
zebra-horse hybrids at Askaniia Nova, see
53 The use of the term "hybrid" is debatable, as its definition is slippery. See Ibid.pp. 85-130. Here I use
hybrid mean the definition generally accepted by plant breeders, in which two populations of the same
species of plant are crossed.
vague term- to colder climates provided new techniques for successfully expanding
livestock populations in previously marginal environments. 5' The vague terminology
allowed the words to represent a broader range of phenomena, and they also implied that
humans had a level of control and intentionality over the processes of reproduction and
adaptation that animals underwent.
This genuine confusion over the meaning of hybridity was both convenient and
useful for the Ukrainian Ministry of Agriculture. Hybrid interspecific crosses of the
imperial past were conflated with the anticipated and state-ordered intraspecific crosses
of the postwar animal recovery efforts, largely in the realm of cattle and swine
production. Askaniia's expertise in the first category led to the state assuming its
proficiency in the second category, thus the station was placed in charge of supervising
the re-establishment of several animal breeds, including the Ukrainian White Steppe pig.
In the case of the white steppe pig, the nineteenth century skill of persuading individual
animals to overcome their natural mating preferences and the twentieth century skill of
scientifically recreating a nearly defunct cattle breed were discrete. While the first
required an investment of patience, money and skilled assistance, the second required the
biological capital of a sufficient animal population, accurate record keeping, and an
authority that could identify and uphold breed standards. In other countries at earlier
times, the process of acquiring these professional skills had been time consuming and
energy intensive, and as a result wealthy private entrepreneurs rather than the state
initially funded the business of stockbreeding. 55 This was not the case in the Soviet
Union, which approached animal breeding as a state-sponsored endeavor that
demonstrated the scientific and managerial superiority of breeding farms and stations
across the Soviet Union. For an animal like the Ukrainian White Steppe pig, the postwar
54 Loren Graham makes a similar point about the vaguely defined technique of "vernalization," Graham,
Science in Russia and the Soviet Union.124-125.
55 Robert Bakewell's success in sheep breeding in England is the classic example of this process. Roger J.
Wood and Vitezslav Orel, Genetic Prehistory in Selective Breeding: A Prelude to Mendel (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2001) 57-92.
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approach to improving stock was based around new Lysenkoist notions of hybrids and
acclimatization, and this provided a catalyst to breed improvement that allowed the
Soviet Union to obtain what it judged to be animals of superior quality and productivity
more rapidly and with less capital layout than was possible under a capitalist program of
animal improvement. Lysenko's techniques of animal breeding and animal management
were not the most effective, but they were effective enough to improve animal stocks and
animal health. Furthermore, unlike the closed and invisible world of genetics research,
Lysenkoism was an open science, well-suited for simple, triumphal displays of progress
that put Soviet animal agriculture on display in everyday forums like newspapers and
posters.
Animals, Work, and Displays of Success
Organized work in breeding the Ukrainian White Steppe Pig peaked in the late
1940s and then fell off sharply in the early 1950s, when authorities redirected their efforts
toward creating a new "speckled" breed rather than resurrecting the old white breed with
which we are here concerned.56 Although the Ukrainian White Steppe Pig became an
evolutionary dead end, the effort made to improve the breed is typical of the time period,
and demonstrates the ways in which Lysenkoist ideology pervaded state-sponsored
animal husbandry, and supported an agricultural policy that was both pronatalist and
dependent on the skilled labor of women.
The Ukrainian White Steppe breed was originally developed before World War II
as a dual-purpose, meat and lard pig. After the war the population of UWS in Ukraine
was estimated at approximately 30% of the prewar population.57 In planning the recovery
of the breed, managers at Askaniia Nova foresaw three major problems: first, the
56 Tematicheskii Plan vsesoyuznogo nauchno-issledovatel'skogo institute gibirdizatsii I akklimatizatsii
zhivotnykh "Askaniia Nova," RGAE, fond 8390 (VASKhNIL) /2/ 2794/202. Reasons given for abandoning
the white in favor of the speckled pig included superior weight gain of the latter and the unfortunate
tendency toward bronchial infection in the former.
57 Tematicheskii Plan vsesoyuznogo nauchno-issledovatelskogo institute gibridizatsii I akklimatizatsii
zhivotnykh askania- Nova na 1947 god RGAE 8390/2/1558/12
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organizational difficulty of coordinating a breeding program, as the majority of the pigs
were located not on Askaniia proper, but at several farms in the vicinity of the station.
The second challenge was the very basic task of improving the daily food supply of the
animals, and the third issue was improving the breed through better selection. 8
That the UWS Pig was chosen at all for a recovery effort was a byproduct of
Lysenkoist thinking, which posited that each agricultural region of the Soviet Union
should have animals adapted to the unique ecology of the area.59 Breeding stations such
as Askaniia Nova developed breeds for use in a single oblast (department), or in extreme
cases, a single raion (district.)6" The Ukrainian White Steppe Pig, was a necessary but
inconvenient part of this movement. The breed was thought best suited specifically for
the warm, Mediterranean climate of Southern Ukraine, and had been earmarked for
distribution to two raions in Kherson Oblast in eastern Ukraine."6 However, as a hastily
and recently developed breed the UWS had a number of shortcomings, including a
propensity for weak joints and piglets that were born smaller and weaker than average,
thus it was perhaps not the best breed to single out for restoration efforts.
The idea of restoring an animal population base that had been lost in the war is
reminiscent of the state's shifting attitude toward rebuilding Ukraine in general. In the
mid-1950s, many Ukrainian families chose to start over and create new communities in
other parts of the Soviet Union, however in the late 1940s, state policies were directed
toward recreating population centers and economies that had existed in Ukraine previous
to the war, rather than founding new projects in different parts of the country. The
challenge of coordinating a breeding program between numerous farms was approached
58 The original Russian reads: "1. Osyshchestvelenie vsekh meropriatii, sostavlennogo pod rukovodstvom
institut, piatletnego plana slektionnoi Iplemennoi raboty so stadami askaniia-nova, svinosovkhozov
"artatash " "Dobraia Krinitsa'. 'komsomolets I stad kolkhozov melitopol'skogo GPR. 2. Sozdanie
trebuemoi svinovodstvu kormovoi Bazy 3. Planovoe raspredelenie plemenogo molodniaka vsekh shesti
Uinii."
59 Kolkhoznoe Proizvodstvo, October 1948 "Scientist Michurin and his Work with Mixed-Race (metis)
Cattle," 27-28.
6o RGAE d.1558 "Thematic Report...."
61 d.2794/202.
102
in the annual reports as a problem of management. To overcome this challenge, the
Askaniia station reported in 1947 that it had "strengthened the methodical management of
selection work." 62 This abstract phrase, "methodical management" conceals a real work
process that is interesting to understand. What changed in the work of the station in 1947
was first, that a general improvement in record-keeping practices took place, and second,
that the station increased the number of workers and the skill level of the workers brought
onto the project. In essence, "methodical management" meant having more people do
more work, and making note of this work in a more orderly fashion. The report goes on
to discuss the projects of the most skilled researchers and technicians at the institute,
grouped by project theme under headings such as "pigs," "horned livestock," "chickens"
and "feed." However, the fiscal reports from the station in 1947, 1953 and 1956 also
establish that a significant and increasing amount of money from the station is being
given to 22 supporting collective farms in the area. Presumably, these "supporting" farms
provided services to the station, in the case of pigs this included daily care, improved
feed, and breeding and nursery services. It is a reasonable guess then that, as was
common in the postwar period, Askaniia Nova was indirectly supporting the salaries and
in-kind payments of a newly valued Soviet farm worker, the svinarka, or female
swineherd (plural: svinarki). The histories of these workers are entangled in both the
improvement in animal survival rates as well as the new regime of Lysenkoist
management practices.
The work of the svinarka is especially important in understanding the ways in
which breeds of pigs improved rapidly. The rise of such a position-that of a female pig
tender-came about because of the skewed demography of the Soviet countryside in the
wake of World War II. In many parts of the postwar Soviet countryside, women
outnumbered men by a ration of 2 to 1, due to the high mortality rate of the Soviet Red
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62 f. 1558
Army. During the war these women had taken over men's positions on the farm, such as
plowing and harvesting, and running the grain collection facilities. After the war men
returned to these relatively well-paid positions, and the Soviet countryside acquired a
surplus of women workers. Animal care became a new sector of rural work into which
collective farms could siphon this surplus. While animal farms had always had women
workers, after the war the number of women employed by collective farms as svinarki
and the ratio of workers to pigs increased. The three-year plan for agriculture created in
1947 and the fourth and fifth statewide five-year plans called for massive increases in the
realm of animal agriculture, specifically in intensifying and improving the level of care
and feed collectively held animals received on farms. Lysenko addressed this new policy
focus directly in an often-repeated statement that "the basis for increasing the
productivity of domestic animals, for improving existing breeds and producing new ones,
is their food and the conditions in which they are kept."63
The theory of single-generation breed stabilization and rapid productivity increase
was derived from Lysenkoism, but the success of this theory was based in the work
performed by the women who took care of the animals. The striking contributions
svinarki made to the improvement of pig breeding comes first from the (nationally)
proscribed rituals of daily care, which were intended to improve survival rates by
providing nursing to sick animals and improving the cleanliness of the sheds where the
animals were housed. The second contribution svinarki made was to chronicle the
progress of their pigs by making daily or weekly accounts of individual attributes such as
weight, personality and feed consumption. As a corollary to this project, pigs had to (for
the first time) be positively identifiable as individuals, and this gave rise to a standardized
system of naming and numbering animals. 64
63 Lysenko, August Plenum, 1948. Reprinted in Pravda.
64 "Systems of Numbering Swine" fond 7803,opis' 4, delo 1349, st. 79 (1956). This is a system of ear
notching that had been in place since 1950 on the breeding farm writing the report. It was possible, using
the Soviet system, to number pigs through ear notches from 1 to 6,399. Confusingly, Soviet pigs that were
notched had a notch number and a separate genealogical number as well as a name that corresponded to
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By quantifying the experiences of their charges and by itemizing the animals
themselves, svinarki provided a window into an otherwise opaque world for outside
office-level authorities, such as the authors of Askaniia Nova's annual report, who were
able to browse through such on-site records and translate the lives of pigs in 22 separate
farms into unified narratives of general progress and modernization for the benefit of
their superiors in Moscow.6" Indeed, although historical perspective informs us that the
UWS breeding program was troubled largely due to inherited breed weaknesses, until the
UWS Pig breeding program was cancelled in 1995, there were few indications from the
research station that the program was experiencing anything aside from phenomenal
success.66
The rituals of daily care to which pig tenders were expected to adhere were
national standards set by the central animal agriculture committee. These included
hygiene basics such as cleaning stalls on a daily basis and removing uneaten food, as well
as more modem specifics, such as adding fish oil to the feed of the weakest animals and
heating the stalls of malnourished litters.67 Another report dictates the amount of time
their common-gendered parent (Klichki svin 'iam prisvaivayutsia po klichke roditelei, a imenno: khriachki
poluchayut klichi otsa, a svinki-klichku materi).65 This same project of quantification allowed bureaucrats to decide which local pigs could be considered
UWS foundational stock. For pigs of uncertain parentage, lists of size, weight, coloring and disposition
were drawn up. Authorities at Askaniia Nova then decided which pigs among these exhibited the true
characteristics of the breed. The word was not always law, however, and in at least one case, a committee
of experts made an on-site visit to a farm in order to observe the UWS candidate in situ. Tematicheskii
Plan... RGAE d.1558/12.
66 One major indication was a 1951 news story that was circulated internationally far more than it was
circulated in country: "Formalism in Pig Breeding," "Even Soviet hog breeders are not immune to the
accusation of "dogmatism" and "formalism" in their work-labels which definitely are not an aid to one's
career in the USSR. In Izvestiya, august 9, 1951, academician L K Greben was sharply and sarcastically
criticized for his inordinate pride in considering himself the heir of the late M.F. Ivanov, noted for his
development of the Ukrainian steppe white breed of pig. This vanity allegedly led him to reject the valuable
advice of his colleagues on methods of preserving and improving that breed which had deteriorated under
his direction. Leben's major crime, it seems was to suggest putting shoes on the pigs to prevent lameness.
'It is obvious why they are lame: concluded the HEIR, 'if you walked around barefoot as they, you too
would be lame. We must make shoes for the pigs!.'Letter from Moscow Embassy to Department of State,
NARA, RG 166, F.A.S. Narrative Reports, 1950-1951 USSR Labor- Wool box 484, folder 'Livestock
Indsutries" dated august 30, 1951.
67 "Materials on the condition of swine and fowl agriculture in kolkhozes in the oblast of Khar'kiv in 1956"
DAKhO 4672/7/4004.
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pigs should spend out of doors (4-6 hours in summer, two outings of twenty minutes each
in winter) and advocates the construction of smaller dens (gnezdna-budki) rather than
spacious stalls. 68 These standards of practice were disseminated in rural places through
pre-existing mediums; the local party committee coordinated their distribution. Media for
this kind of instruction included educational films shown before an evening feature film
in the recreation hall, required workshops with vet-feldshares, night classes and in some
cases illustrated posters.
Perhaps the most detailed form of instruction came from articles in local, party-
run newspapers, which included endless and endlessly repetitive stories of the daily lives
of successful svinarki, focusing on the dedication, sobriety and civic mindedness of the
workers. Front and center in these was the maternal care these women gave to their
charges and their pride in their job in spite of the challenges it brought.69 From these
various media, the message of work expectations was clear and constant: pig caretakers
were personally responsible for the fecundity of their sows and the survival rate of litters.
While incentives (such as free piglets) were occasionally given out for extraordinary
labors, low productivity or high mortality rates were a sign of poor performance.7"
Contrived socialist competitions between svinarki in weight gain or litter survival rate
were given more column space, but the real proof of the job's expectations were found in
the "shaming" sections of the papers, where drunken, slothful or otherwise inept animal
caretakers were chastised publicly, especially when their poor job performance resulted
in the death of an animal. The continued seasonality of pig management into the 1950s is
also obvious from newspaper articles: the svinarka biography appears most frequently in
the late winter and early spring when pig mortality would have been at the highest due to
flagging feed reserves and widespread illness. The stories virtually disappear during the
68 
"Instructions for Swine Production" RGAE 7803/4/1349/56.
69 For example, "From Each Sow: 27 Piglets" Kolzhoznoe Proizvodstvo, June 1949 pp.3 6 -37 .70 The free piglets were a temporary incentive, ended by decree and replaced with a cash prize in 1949.
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late spring and summer months, when articles focus on productivity in field labor, new
farm machines and the like.
One obvious way to note the presence of Lysenkoist ideology in the common-
sense and labor intensive measures bureaucrats required from svinarki and other animal
caretakers were the parallels such requirements had in the field of plant agriculture.
While plant and animal agriculture were institutionally separate organizations, the
treatments ordered for the improvement and care of seedlings and baby animals were
surprisingly similar. The vernalization of maize, the "airing" of pigs in the winter and the
"cold method" of calf raising all advocated the same approach to helping three different
species overcome their natural disinclination to cold weather. The research of
environmentally tailoring of seeds and animals to specific microclimates around the
Soviet Union was also approached in an identical manner, thus both seed strains and
animal breeds were produced to succeed in a very narrow geographical band."7 The
popularity for such an approach fell off in the departments of animal and plant agriculture
at the same time in 1955.
While the increased social value of the svinarki on a pig farm had been socially
constructed by a scientific and bureaucratic ideology keen to capitalize on the material
strengths of these farms, the work of svinarki made a difference both socially and
materially. The work of nursing runty piglets, warding off winter bronchial infections,
force feeding young stragglers and hosing down pens made a significant difference in
reversing heretofore abysmal survival rates, thus increasing the established success of
postwar pig operations. Likewise, the seemingly banal work of taking stock of pigs by
name, genealogy, growth, temperament and appearance had important ramifications
above and beyond the imaginary world of Lysenkoist breed standards and regional annual
71 In a reversal from practices elsewhere in the world, seeds and animals were often developed at a research
station thousands of miles away from their intended new home. Animal breeds and seed strains have
historically been given the names of the localities where they were developed. Counter to this, Soviet
breeds were sometimes given the name of the locality they were intended for, rather than their geographical
point of origin.
107
reports. An itemized pig was at least potentially, a healthier and more productive pig.
While the systems of indicating identity such as ear notching and tattooing could initially
be physically traumatic (deafness was common), barnyard legibility had its benefits.
Written records created medical and family histories that helped keep track of
increasingly complicated feeding regimes, growth patterns and breeding cycles. Marking
out pigs through name and number allowed their caretakers to care for their individual
life situation, even if such a caretaker had no personal experience with the animal in
question.
While the care and improvement of the Ukrainian White Steppe Pig provides
certain insights into the relation between agricultural management and Lysenkoism, the
history of postwar dairy cows does a better job of showing the ways in which Lysenkoist
assumptions about breeding and inheritance increased the value of Soviet livestock. The
account of pig improvement was meant to demonstrate how Lysenkoism revalued groups
of people, such as the svinarka. In contrast, the history of milk cow improvement is a
story about the ways in which Lysenkoism revalued certain animals. Simply put, the
confused Lysenkoist interpretation of hybridity first discussed on pages 28-29 of this
chapter allowed a large number of dairy cows of uncertain parentage to attain purebred
and hybrid status in a very short period of time. Generally speaking, and certainly in the
case of the Soviet Union, hybrids and purebreds were worth more than mongrels (or in
Soviet terminology for cattle, 'metis,' presumably based on the French), thus this
evolution of pedigree meant an increase in livestock value, but more fundamentally, a
change in the way livestock were valued more generally. Just as in the case of the
svinarka, the milkmaid, or doyarka, played a central role in improving the productivity of
cows, especially in the realm of milk production. The path from metis to hybrid was often
configured along lines of just such productivity, thus old jobs acquired new status and
new work practices resulted in newly valued animal categories.
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The progression from M6tis to established breed was common enough in the
postwar era, but there was no proscribed series of steps from one category to the next.
Promotion was sometimes decided by physical appearance, sometimes by a partially
reassembled bloodline, and often by performance. The decision to promote was always
made by a lone or collective expert from outside the host farm or breeding station. It is
unlikely that the work of "improving" breeds of milk cows, invented in 1945 and
promoted heavily between 1945-1948 meant for Soviet animals to be proclaimed
purebreds and scientifically (that is, intentionally) produced hybrids as rapidly as they
were in the 1948-1955 period.72 In 1945, Lysenko was a peripheral figure in agricultural
science, well-known for his experiments with wheat, but not yet established as the
leading voice of authority in all matters relating to scientific breeding. This had changed
by 1948, and the buzzword "hybrid" (in transliterated Russian, gibrid) had entered the
consciousness of the middle-level bureaucrats that oversaw breed improvement
programs. The best way to examine the path through which a mongrel milk cow might
attain parodnost, a Russian word best translated as "purebred status", is to look at some
real-life examples from the history of the period.
The first example comes from the now-familiar breeding station at Askaniia
Nova, which was charged in 1945 with improving Simmental cattle. Simmental cattle
were a milking breed originally developed in Switzerland that was brought to Ukraine
and Russia (along with potatoes) by German immigrants during the reign of Catherine the
Great. However, based on newspaper photographs and production statistics, the Soviet
Simmental of the mid-twentieth century diverged sharply from its Swiss ancestors in both
appearance and productivity.73 Instead, it resembled the more general account given at the
beginning of this chapter of a small, furry and nondescript multipurpose animal. The
72 "ImpTOving the Simmental breed (porodnykh grupp) in the Ukr.SSR" GAKhO R-6184/1/302/ 3
73 To this day, Simmental breeds in Russia and Ukraine average about 2/3 the size of their Western
European counterparts.
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largest minority of Ukrainian cattle that were classed as a breed at all (the vast majority,
in 1945, being listed as "bezparodnost "--without breed status) were classed as
Simmental, more commonly referred to as "shvitskoi" or "metis-shvitskoi"-Swiss-like.
At Askaniia Nova, the two principle steps that were taken in order to improve the
Simmental line were 1) breeding work and 2) changing the diet in order to produce a
"new type of high-producing animal."'4 That these two tasks (selective breeding and
selective feeding) could be considered equivalent measures for breed improvement is in
itself surprising, and will be discussed at greater length in the discussion of milkmaids.
More surprising still are the changes in policy reflected by reports from the station
published after 1948, that is, after Trofim Lysenko's rise to power.
After 1948, one branch of the work to improve the 'Simmental' cow evolved into
a push to create an entirely new breed of milk cow, the "Lebedinskii" breed. Lebedinskii
Raion was a short-lived administrative region (1945-1960s) located in the present-day
Belgorod region, directly north of Khark'iv. It contained a large number of shvitskoi,
Simmental, and metis cattle which the Ukrainian department of animal agriculture felt
were candidates for a newparodnost, Lebedinskii, a breed not yet established.7 5 This
work was not directed at breeding or feeding, rather the establishment of the Lebedinskii
breed was based on paperwork. In 1949, one major action for the "improving the cattle of
the Lebedinskii breed" was the "preparation of materials toward establishing the
Lebedinskii group as an independent breed and a statement of a verifying inspecting
body."7 6 The inspecting body traveled from Khar'kiv to Lebedinskii Raion and there
observed 3800 cattle, deciding unanimously that they might be counted as a new breed.77
Establishing a new breed meant not just giving cattle that had been considered
Simmentals a new, Russified name (although this was not insignificant). It also
74 GAKhO R-6184/1/302/3
" GAKhO, 6184/1/74: perspective thematic plan of experimental work in 1945.
76 ibid., p.5
" ibid., p.7
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established breed improvement as a bureaucratic, rather than a field activity. Although an
inspecting body had traveled to Lebedinskii in order to ascertain the parodnost of the
previously mixed-breed cows living there, their unanimous decision to establish the breed
implies a foregone conclusion; witnessing the cattle in situ was a formality necessary
only to conform to expectations of scientific objectivity.
Some breeds were of greater interest than others to the Ukrainian Ministry of
Agriculture, largely due to their levels of productivity. For example, the Simmental and
Ukrainian Grey Cattle, two breeds selected for radical improvement regimens in the
postwar period, were breeds known to be more generally productive than the nondescript,
breed less animals that American visitors spotted from their train windows. In general,
increased productivity (measure in liters of milk per year or milk fat percentages) was
linked to animal parodnost. Award-winning animals were never listed as "breedless"
when they were displayed at agricultural fairs. Between 1945 and 1947, they were listed
as "metis" milk cows. After 1948, they were listed as hybrid animals, or as animals of
new breeds. While Lysenkoism erased some of the historical value and power of elite
genealogy, it could not remove it completely. Instead, it substituted a language of
parodnost that implied that the bloodlines and productivity levels of animals were under
the purview, and therefore the competent management, of the state. While collective farm
chairmen and Ministry of Agriculture scientists often presented themselves as the
managers of these new and improved cows, this was fals advertising. In fact, milk and
butterfat productivity levels were variables over which another kind of manager, the
Soviet milkmaid had control.
The milking practices of Soviet doyarki were highly ritualized in ways that were
intended to increase milk output from each cow. The following account gives some idea
of the amount of specialized and rigorous hand labor required, largely meant to make up
for the lack of machines I the Soviet milking parlor. The first step in milking a cow was
to wash the udder with warm water, and following this, performed a 3-5 minute udder
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massage to stimulate milk production. In the winter, after milking, goose or bear grease
was applied to the teats so they would not freeze. The milk from each cow was then
weighed, and if a machine existed, it was tested for butterfat content. The weight and fat
content of the milk were recorded in a registry book, and the next cow came up for
milking. Some collective farms had milking parlors and stalls dedicated to this work but
it was more common for milkmaids to do their milking in a quiet corner or stall of the
common barn. This practice was one of the first things to change in the period of machine
industrialization that followed, but between 1946-1955 the Soviet Union did not typically
have the building resources to provide every small dairy with an additional building for
milking. In the winter, cows were supposed to be taken on a progulka, or little walk
outside to stimulate milk production. After the morning walks milkmaids tended to sick
animals and weighed the calves before the mid-day milking, when the whole cycle began
over again, and was repeated one last time in the evening. Milkmaids typically worked
12-16 hour days. Additionally, when a cow fell sick, milkmaids were expected to come in
early to provide extra care, or sleep over in the barn's sick ward. These kinds of
proscribed work routines provided a framework that allowed greater human intervention
in the process of breed improvement and stock increases in the immediate postwar
period.
Proper sanitation, heated water and periodic exercise for dairy animals were not
innovations in the late 1940s; they were simply given a new emphasis. In its heavy
borrowing from the past, postwar animal agricultural policy repeated a tactic used many
times by the Bolshevik party. As noted earlier, Lysenkoism's success was due to this
same kind of borrowing from earlier scientists. However it is important to point out that
postwar agriculture was not a particularly retrograde system; its successes lay in the skill
with which it combined old-fashioned ideas with recent advances and above all with a
language of precise management, and continual advancement. Just as in the case of
animal breeding, agricultural policies toward animal care capitalized on the Soviet
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Union's agricultural strengths. Short on machines, the Soviet countryside was long on
semi-skilled female laborers. Likewise, the Soviet Union lacked well-pedigreed farm
animals, which had been the standard measure of the capital worth of livestock. However,
the Soviet state did have plenty of knowledge about how best to manage and breed the
animals it did have towards greater productivity. It correspondingly set about redefining
the qualities that made livestock valuable at the same time it increased emphasis on the
human dimension in animal care.
Conclusion
Historians have long wondered why a system such as Lysenkoism, which did
such a poor.job of describing and predicting the life experiences of plants and animals,
could have survived for a quarter century as a dominant scientific paradigm in a modem
state committed to an ideology of rational, efficient production, especially a state in
desperate need of a better and more productive agricultural system. The standard answer
to this confusing state of affairs has been to condemn the corrupt and incompetent
political structure of the Soviet Union that placed politics over accuracy, and ideology
over experience. This chapter offers a different interpretation for the long life of a bad
science. Lysenkoism made a bad experimental science and a good practical science. That
is, it did not provide an accurate model of what happened to plants and animals as they
bred, lived, adapted and died. However, it provided an excellent set of instructions
regarding what to do. Lysenkoism described appropriate ways in which workers and
scientist could engage with-and improve-the natural world.78 These actions were not
just ideologically suitable in the narrow Marxist-Leninist rhetoric of the day; they were
also in line with the state's desire to overcome historic environmental limitations in
animal agriculture. The longstanding evolutionary adaptations domestic animals had
made to cold weather and scarce feed were traits the Ministry of Agriculture believed
78 Loren Graham makes this same point, although he attached less importance to it. Loren Graham, Science,
Philosophy and Human Values in the Soviet Union, p. 137.
113
Lysenkoism could undo in less than twenty years. Lysenkoist management techniques
transformed Soviet farm animals into creatures that were, by Soviet standards, the right
size, shape, temperament and productivity to boost Soviet meat and milk productivity and
put it into competition with the much more technically advanced system of the United
States.
Historians and social scientists have typically judged the Soviet Union's postwar
recovery to have been slow and relatively ineffective, hampered by poor organization and
the damaging rise of Lysenko's backward theories. This was certainly true for the first
years after the war, which saw extreme food privation and famine in some areas of the
country. By late in 1947, however, the country had entered a period of stabilization,
recovery and growth.79 Measured against the expanding economy of the United States,
the Soviet Union's postwar renewal does not look impressive. Yet rapid expansion is not
always the best kind of expansion, and grain production was not the only area of
agriculture the Soviet Union developed in the postwar era. 80
In studying agricultural efficiency and productivity, the ability to produce staple
carbohydrates has long been the gold standard for predicting agricultural success. The
Soviet Union's inability to increase its capacity as a grain producer is often mentioned as
an Achilles' heel of its postwar agricultural policy. But beyond grain, Soviet agricultural
policy and state production campaigns focused an unusually large amount of their energy
and finances on animals. Although the theory behind any supposedly rational modem diet
assumes that high-input animal products such as meat and milk are luxuries in developing
economies, the Soviet Union's attitude toward animal products was not always rational,
and thus milk and meat production occupied an unusually important and symbolic place
in the hierarchy of national agriculture.
79 Julie Hessler has made the same observation in her study of markets and trade in the Soviet Union. Julie
Hessler, A Social History of Soviet Trade.80 Indeed, by the mid-1960s, Soviet agricultural productivity, as measured in output per hectare (but not
output per worker) outperformed the United States, Canada, and other developed nations : 450.
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As this chapter relates, the story of meat and milk production also maps against
the standard story of agricultural intensification and modernization. better management of
humans and animals was. Postwar animal breeding and caretaking policies provided a
system through which the Soviet Union was able to temporarily surmount the
environmental and technological barriers that had prevented the state from industrializing
animal agriculture in the previous decades. Lysenkoism provided a temporary foothold
for the state, an irrational but functional system of management that effectively matched
the skills and strengths of the rural human population with the needs and challenges of
the Soviet Union's farm animals and environment.
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Improving Diets: Nutrition and Access to Food
For most of its brief history, the Soviet Union had been in a situation of food
shortage."' By the mid 1950s, food scarcities were generally subsiding. Given this new
situation, what did the Soviet state do to improve everyday diets? The Soviet Union is an
unusual case in the history of food provisioning because feeding the public was a task for
which the state claimed exclusively responsibility. Rather than simply coordinating and
regulating the private retail food trade and offering price supports for the most
economically important commodities, which was the role the U.S. and other capitalist
governments followed, the Soviet state was accountable for growing, processing,
distributing and selling enough food for every man, woman and child within its
territories.82 This task was impractically large, and it often exceeded the state's
organizational competency.
This chapter examines the development of socialist nutrition and argues that in
augmenting diets, just as in improving agriculture, the state's goals were multi-layered.
The state balanced its knowledge of human nutrition against what was possible in the
realm of food processing and preservation, and targeted dietary information and new food
products to the public accordingly. Canned tomatoes may have been a cheap and
appetizing way for Soviet citizens to consume more vegetables and increase their intake
of Vitamin C, but tomatoes also happened to be easy to grow and easy to can. The
increase in both canned tomatoes and in nutritional pamphlets that extolled their virtues
during the 1950s had as much to do with their convenience (to the state that is) as their
nutritional value.
81 For an overview of prewar scarcity, see Mauricio Borrero, "Food and the Politics of Scarcity in Urban
Soviet Russia, 1917-1941," in Food Nations, Selling Taste in Consumer Societies, ed; Warren Belasco and
Philip Scranton, New York, London: Routledge, 2003.
82 The state was more responsible to some of its citizens than others in this task, prioritizing city dwellers
over rural people, and in the countryside, state farm workers over collective farm workers.
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While nutritional guidelines, state-sponsored cookbooks and advertising
campaigns all helped define healthy eating as a theme that was important to the Soviet
state, consumer access to food was still at the heart of the matter. What was available in
shops? In this period, the architecture of food distribution, like the science of assessing
nutrition, was evolving in response to the wider availability of food. Socialist food
distribution networks had always possessed a look and logic all their own. At a time
when western countries were moving toward self-serve and one-stop grocery stores, the
Soviet Union's stocks were dispensed through specialized stores characterized by long
lines and inefficient centralized distribution, a metaphor for the country's larger problems
with food transportation and distribution. Nevertheless, the clunky-looking Soviet system
had its uses, among them prohibiting excess consumption. Unlike retail management in
capitalist countries, one function of food shops in the Soviet Union was to slow
consumers down, making food distribution more orderly by stretching out the transaction
process. In the Soviet Union, modernizing food distribution meant increasing the variety
and quality of food available while decreasing the velocity of food purchases and limiting
the distribution of the best foods to a smaller number of places. While the 1950s were a
time in which the Soviet diet improved, it was also a period in which the state quietly
recommitted itself to a distribution system that minimized purchasing power. That the
public goal of improving diets and the private goal of limiting food consumption in order
to guarantee a steady supply should not actually conflict with one another is a surprising,
but illuminating detail in the history of Soviet commerce.
New Food Values
Until a century ago, most people in most parts of the world ate the same thing
every day, often a staple grain. In Europe this was oats, rye, wheat, potatoes or maize, in
Asia it was wheat, potatoes or rice, but agricultural communities based their survival
around a principle cereal crop. Fresh vegetables, fruit, meat from domesticated or wild
animals and milk products all complimented this grain based diet, but except for cultures
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that practiced marginal farming near well-stocked oceans or forests, starches were the
mainstay of the meal.
Few cultural traditions remain fixed over centuries of time, but diets are
exceptional in this respect.8 3 Archeological sites around Kyiv show evidence of a rye-
based agriculture that was central to the Kievan Rus empire as early as the ninth century
CE.84 In the fifteenth century, once the traditional wooden izba farmhouse and its clay
oven hearth, the pech' became standard to Russian domestic architecture, baked bread,
whole grain porridges and kvas, a little beer made from fermented bread were staples of
Russian cuisine."5 Except at Lent, Orthodox diets were not vegetarian by choice, but meat
in Russia was expensive and therefore consumed only occasionally.8 6 Dairy products,
poultry and eggs were available only seasonally, when they were available at all.
Diets have historically been used as a way to code for a national selfhood, as well
as establish otherness, and Imperial Russia was no exception; the Russian diet was part of
Russian identity. 87 While agricultural technologies, crop plans, patterns of settlement and
animal feeding regimes all changed and adapted to new social and economic situations
over the course of the early modern and imperial periods, Russian diets changed very
little.88 On the eve of the Russian revolution the vast majority of the Tsar's subjects still
ate meat or fish only on the most important feast days, and only the very rich ate a varied
diet that changed from day to day.8" As they did across Europe (and ultimately around the
world) the twin processes of industrialization and urbanization introduced the most
83 Sidney Mintz mentions this as one of the central contradictions of studies, that food habits are deeply
rooted, yet often change rapidly and radically. Mintz in Food Nations, p. 26
84 R.W. Davies "Russia in the Early Middle Ages" The Economic History Review 1952. pp. 116-127. To
the best of my knowledge, Davies' article is still an accurate summary of the archeological evidence linking
Slavic prehistoric culture to that of the Alans, Scythians and Germanic and Finno-Ugric Iron Age tribes.
85 On stoves and housing, see Basile Kerblay, L 'Isba d'hier et d'aujor'hui: L'evolution de l'habitation
rurale en U.R.S.S. (Lausanne: Editions L'age d'Homme, 1973).
86 Richard Hellie, The Economy and Material Culture ofRussia, 1600-1725 (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1999)87 Tannahill, Food in History, p. 230
88 Richard Hellie, The Economy and Material Culture of Russia 1600-1725.
89 R.E.F. Smith and David Christian. Bread and Salt: A social and Economic History ofFood and Drink in
Russia. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984.
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dramatic changes to the traditional diet of Russian-speaking people since the introduction
of settled agriculture on the Scythian plains of modern-day Ukraine.
The shift to what is now considered a modem diet was directly tied to the
refashioning of work, living space and leisure time that accompanied industrialization.
This reorganization of life and work first occurred in England when the industrial
revolution began."9 Since the rise of the English woolen industry in the fifteenth century,
the diet of most of the predominately rural English population had been based on grain,
but had also varied with season and class and often included salt pork, mutton, farm
produce and fresh milk. The early industrial revolution increased household incomes
across the board and initially improving access to nutritious food. The striations in class
and geography that the new 'manufactory system' engendered gave rise to a new
industrial form of malnutrition. Across England nutrition levels fell between 1860
and 1900 as a result of rapid industrialization and urbanization. The distribution of meat
and milk into new manufacturing towns proved difficult and expensive, and these foods
were rare among the first generations of urban working-class, those who had moved into
cities or towns to work in mills or mines. 9' In the second half of the 19 h century,
industrial workers ate potatoes and white bread, drank sugared tea and beer, and
consumed very little else. 92 The best record of this collapse in English working class
nutrition is found in household budgets and public heath reports, which report not just on
diets but on rising rates of malnutrition-related diseases.93 In the late 19th century, there
was a resurgence of scurvy and rickets. These new cases were identified in factory
90 Robert F. Fogel, "Nutrition and the Decline in Mortality since 1700: Some Preliminary Findings," in
Stanley L. Engerman and Robert E. Gallman, eds., Long-Term Factors in American Economic Growth
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986), pp. 439-555.
91 On the high quality of the early modem English diet, see Susan Scott and Christopher Duncan
"Demography and Nutrition: Evidence from Historical and Contemporary Populations. Oxford, Malden,
Mass.: Blackwell Science, 2002
92 Sidney Mintz makes the stronger assertion that this first generation subsisted primarily on sugar and
stimulants. Sidney Mintz, "Time, Sugar and Sweetness," in Food and Culture: A Reader, Carol Counihan
and Penney van Esterik,eds. (New York and London: Routledge, 1997).
93 Robert F. Fogel, "Nutrition and the Decline in Mortality since 1700: Some Preliminary Findings," in
Engerman... pp. 439-555.
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workers and other sectors of the urban poor. The close quarters of urban tenements
coupled with a state of general malnourishment left workers more vulnerable to
contagious diseases. 94 Urbanization and industrialization had helped rapidly expand the
economies of the United States, Germany and England, but at the expense of the health of
their citizens.
In the process of industrialization, diets have become things that can be assessed
by experts. Their abstract qualities-things like calories, vitamins, amino acids, percent
fat, protein and carbohydrates- have become new ways of valuing food."5 Within this
matrix, meat became a food prized not simply for its good taste or scarcity (indeed, it
became much less scarce in the 2 0 th century), but because it was judged to be a superior
type of food, and that its high calorie, fat mineral and protein content best sustained an
industrial working class.96 In the Soviet Union as in other rapidly industrializing nations,
new values for food meant changes for many sectors of society: Farm animals, cafeteria
menus, and food markets were all reorganized in accordance with expert opinion.
As a late-industrializing nation, the Soviet Union was late to shift its eating
patterns away from cereals and toward the more varied diet that had become the hallmark
of modem societies. Well into the 1940s, national eating patterns resembled those of the
country's agrarian past far more than they resembled any contemporary industrial
country. Nonetheless, once the shift to industrial food began it was fast and far-reaching.
Between 1950 and 1960, the amount of meat consumed by the Soviet population
increased dramatically."97 Milk, milk products, eggs, butter and other animal byproducts
became more plentiful, and technologies such as refrigeration gave foods such as fruits,
94 Komlos calls this higher incidence of disease the "urban penalty" see John Komlos, "Shrinking in a
Growing Economy? The Mystery of Physical Stature during the Industrial Revolution." The Journal of
Economic History 1998, 58 no.3 : 779-803.
95 Harvey Levenstein, Revolution at the Table: The Transformation of the American Diet, (New York and
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988, pp. 147- 160. also Harvey Levenstein, Paradox of Plenty: A Social
History of Eating in America,(New York: Oxford University Press, 1988) pp. 13-23.
96 Harvey Levenstein, Paradox ofPlenty: A Social History of Eating in America pp. 82-84.
97 George Bergstrom, The Soviet Food Front,( Food Science Laboratory at Michigan State University,
1959.):.4.
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vegetables and meats a longer shelf life, allowing them to become available year-round
for the first time. In addition to refrigeration, canning technologies and new, improved
distribution networks made more and different foods available. Compared with other
industrialized countries, the
Likewise, the starchy and bland Russian diet became starchier and blander during
the country's own process of urban industrialization. As in Britain, the daily meal of
Russian and Soviet industrial workers remained repetitive like its pre-industrial
antecedent but became less nourishing: wheat and rye bread, tea, kasha (buckwheat
groats) and thin soup were the staples of industrial workers across the country."9 Just as in
England, the initial logistics of transporting and distributing fresh fruits and vegetables,
meat, eggs and dairy products were both expensive and complex, thus fresh foods were
either rare or pricey in urban centers."99 In most parts of Europe by the early 2 0th century,
the malnutrition trend had reversed and worker diets were improving. The Soviet Union
had inherited a tradition of malnutrition that showed no signs of disappearing in 1917,
and the uncertainty of the new socialist state and its focus on rapid industrialization did
nothing to improve nutrition in the first decade of Soviet rule. Diets relied heavily on
small grains and thus bodies were undersized compared with the rest of Europe: Russian
and Soviet citizens born in the first half of the twentieth century were shorter on average
than people in other parts of Europe, even parts judged to be equally underdeveloped,
such as Finland and Greece.
As a direct consequence of the dietary reorganization of industrialization, the
nutritional health of workers became a topic of scientific study in every industrialized
country, especially due to the development of the science of nutrition. In the late 19th
century nutrition was a new science and as such it underwent a process of
98 Mauricio Borrero, "Food and the Politics of Scarcity in Urban Soviet Russia, 1917-1941," in Food
Nations, pp. 258-261.
99 Julie Hessler, A Social History of Soviet Trade, p. 186
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professionalization. Early nutritionists were chemists and physiologists, experts in
analyzing the chemical makeup of food and relating such chemistry to the structure and
performance of the human form.""' While nutrition studies were on the rise in both Britain
and the United States in the 1870s and 1880s, it was in Germany that the practice of
relating worker's diets to the quality and quantity of work performed was studied first in
detail.
The Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Labor Physiology at War (hereafter Kaiser
Wilhelm Institute) performed such research between 1870 and 1900.""' By the late 19th
century research in nutritional science had established that a repetitive diet, especially the
new industrial version, was actively detrimental to the health. British nutritionists in the
mid-1890s designed a number of studies to compare the value of German and English
working diets, the former consisting primarily of potatoes, the latter consisting of bread
and beef. In general these studies revealed British workers to be the more efficient group,
a discovery explained by their superior diet; superior because it included animal
protein.1""2
Meat, which had been previously prized as a symbol of personal and societal
wealth, became equally valued by this first generation of nutrition analysts for its
chemical content which nutritionists felt were superior forms of nourishment for workers.
Nutritional studies such as the German versus English diet project established that high
protein foods were central to supporting efficient and constant forms of productive labor,
such as those required of factory workers and soldiers."1 3 Emerging nutritional scientific
100 George Rosen, A History of Public Health, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993),
Levenstein, Revolution at the Table.
101 Anson Rabinach, The Human Motor (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992) pp. 262-265. The
first generation of American nutritionists yielded more breakfast cereal than hard data in their first years:
the Post and Kellogg families both capitalized on nutrition science to promote new lines of dietetic cereals.
102 Rabinach, The Human Motor, pp. 216-217. John Rae's Eight Hours for Work (1894) is the classic
contemporary work on this subject. One wonders if the results would have been so tipped in Britain's favor
had German nutritionists conducted the study.
103 For more on the evocative symbolism of meat, see Amy Bentley's Eating for Victory: Food Rationing
and the Politics, of Domesticity, (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1998).
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knowledge was not simply an assimilation of chemistry and physiology, nutritional
science was a new way of thinking about human energy potential. Diets rich in meat were
desirable because of the optimal absorption and energy conversion rates of animal
proteins as compared to those of plants. Countries (such as England) rich enough to have
ample protein stocks in their large herds of cattle and sheep had what looked to
nutritionists to be a natural advantage in preparing workers for industrial labor.
While early Russian factory workers and first generation city dwellers had
suffered from the nutritional deficiencies of a starch-based diet scarce in fresh produce
and protein throughout the late nineteenth century, widespread consciousness of
malnutrition as a public health problem only appeared with the rise of nutritional studies
in the Soviet Union in the 1930s.'04 The second five-year plan included establishing food
science and food technology as priority disciplines in the Soviet Union, and accordingly
increased the staff and budget of the State Scientific Institute of Public Nutrition, a
branch of the Academy of Medical Science.'0 5 As in the industrial sector's experience
with late industrialization, there were advantages to late professionalization for early
nutritionists. New professionals rapidly adopted the latest technology for calculating
metabolic rate from other countries, as well as construct research institutions, educational
programs and scholarly journals based on patterns already established by German, British
and American professionals.1 06 One entire sector of the Institute of Public Nutrition was
given over to measuring the caloric requirements of different workers based on their
respiratory emissions, as measured by a technology popular at Germany's Kaiser
Wilhelm Institute, and almost certainly imported from Germany. Initially Soviet
104 Contemporary knowledge of industrial worker well-being relies on the more thorough (and more
contentious) tools of cliometrics. See Wheatcroft, Mironov, Hoch and Komlos in vol 58 no 1 of Slavic
Review. While contemporary Soviet health professionals also understood public health in terms of height
and weight, it is clear that nutrition was front and center in their approach to public health.
105 The Institute published a bimonthly journal as well as books on the subject of Public Nutrition, and was
active throughout the Soviet period.
106 For example, the machines used to calculate daily caloric expenditure were of German design. In its
early years (1932-1936), Voprosy Pitaniia was published with a bilingual index, a practice common in
international publications and rare in Soviet scientific publications during the 1930s.
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nutritional policies and research priorities were patterned after those of western
forerunners, but as the discipline professionalized and international relations cooled, the
tone that emerged toward tried and true Western research agendas was one of antagonism
and competition."`7
The Soviet regime was not given to frank discussions about the shortfalls of its
nutrition levels, and publications that directly addressed the topic of public dietary health,
such as the Statistical Collection on Health and the Public Health of Workers, published
in 1937, describe a generally robust and well-fed population of workers and soldiers.''8
However, dietary problems that were glossed over in these publications are evident in the
early research agendas of public nutrition. One such source, "Voprosy Pitaniia," the main
organ of the State Scientific Institute of Public Nutrition indicates a population struggling
with protein and vitamin deficiencies in the 1930s. Research plans in Voprosy Pitaniia
focus on the effectiveness of antiscorbutics in wild plants, the synthetic manufacture of
nutritional yeast (rich in vitamin B-12), research and development of a soy-based milk
beverage as well as ways to prevent zinc and iron deficiencies (classic side-effects of
insufficient dietary protein). 09
Even later in the history of nutritional knowledge, nutrition manuals intended for
mothers, cr6ches and cafeterias from as late as the 1950s stressed that protein was of the
"greatest importance" in the diet of children and workers, especially the "animal derived
107 "Codification of Food Legislation" Voprosy Pitaniia, 1932,v. I,no 5: 65.
108 Zdorovy 'e I zdravookhranenie trudiashchikhsia SSSR: staticheskii sbornik. Wheatcroft quotes from this
document extensively in his article on cliometrics. Julie Hessler cites Elena Kabo's 1927 study of worker
diets as an example of NEP era diet improvement. Worker diets were undoubtedly better in the politically
and economically stable 1920s than in the Civil War period. This does not preclude them being inadequate.
Hessler, p. 126
109 For example, Voprosy Pitania Vol. 1 no.4 (1932) includes articles on "an antiscorbutic preparation made
from black currant berries," "antiscorbutic potency of cranberries gathered in autumn," "the Water-melon
and black currant as carriers of antiscorbutic potency," "the fundamental problems in Soy-bean selection
from the nutritional point of view," "The gastro-intestinal secretion in "soy-milk" feeding." Vol. 2, Nol-2
(1933) includes articles on 'the present position of the antiscorbutic vitamin problem,' "Increase of the
antirachitic vitamin potency of yeast by ultraviolet radiation," "antiscorbutic vitamin in the juice of
preserved blackcurrant." Translations are given in the original, in both cases I have listed over half the
articles published in the journal.
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protein" found in eggs, organ meats and tvorog (a simple, homemade cheese) or other
dairy products."" The recipes in one 1951 publication call overwhelmingly for meat and
animal products in their recipes for young children. In 37 soup recipes meant for creche-
aged children, 22 call for some form of meat, and 33 list at least one animal product as an
ingredient (that is, either meat, egg yolks or milk)."'
General medical reports about World War II, published a decade after the war
ended in 1955 were candid about (non-fatal) public health problems related to poor
nutrition that had plagued soldiers and civilians. This history was the most recent
manifestation of a continuing preoccupation with avoiding malnutrition. Although the
medical reports avoided a discussion of famine deaths, there were numerous references to
widespread scurvy, weight loss, low birth weight, high infant mortality, and iron and
vitamin deficiencies (avitaminosis) among soldiers and citizens in blockaded cities.' 12 In
the war and postwar period, improving nutrition was a secondary concern to covering
basic caloric requirements, although special nutritional allowances (primarily milk and
iron supplements, but also meat) were made for mothers and young children. In the
privation of the later war years and the immediate postwar period, the government
coupon system focused on the rational distribution of the most basic staples: bread,
buckwheat groats, tea, and sugar. Meat, fat and soap (in the Soviet Union this was an
exclusively animal-derived product) were practically unavailable in state stores.
The policies public nutritionists advocated during the 1930s set the tone for
nutritional research for the next twenty years. These agendas sought to reinforce the
status of nutritionists as serious scientists as well as to support the political and social
ideals of socialism. On the surface, early socialist and capitalist nutritional
S"o Detskaia Kukhnia, 1951, Stolovaia Shkola, 1959, Dieticheskaia Stolovaia, 1955, Sbornik Retseptur,
1952
"' "Detskaia Kukhnia: Kniga dlia Materei o Prigotovlenii Pishchi Malym Detiam" Medgiz, Leningrad,
1951
112 Experience of Soviet Doctors in the Great Fatherland War 1941-1945, 1955. this approach of candidly discussing
shortages without admitting to critical malnutrition or death was also used in official reports of the 1932-1933
famine, discussed in Stephen Kotkin's Magnetic Mountain.
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recommendations often resembled one another, but over time, differences between the
two systems emerged. Perhaps the Soviet preoccupation with overcoming malnutrition
had less to do with its political ideology and more to do with the material realities of life
in a far-Northern climate, but foods that were high in the nutrients Soviet citizens most
commonly lacked: milk (calcium) berries (Vitamin C) yeast (Vitamin B) and even 'soy
cheese' (protein) were all products that received special attention not only in the 1930s,
but in the 1950s as well. S
Socialist nutrition was also preoccupied with the relationship between work and
nutrition, an early priority of the Kaiser Wilhelm institute at the turn of the century. In the
1930s the Soviet focus was less on the correspondence of better-quality food to better-
quality work, which was the relationship the German institute had studied, and more on
assessing the calories spent by workers. Studies throughout the early 1930s catalogued
the caloric needs of farm laborers, iron workers and so on.1 13 Only strenuous, high-energy
occupations were examined at the institute. Although the Kaiser Wilhelm institute had
performed similar experiments to measure work expenditure, the values they acquired
regarding the caloric requirements of workers were significantly lower than those of
Soviet workers." 4 The later Soviet studies established that Soviet workers needed more
calories, and thus must work harder, than their German counterparts. Much as the British
studies establishing that beef was a better food to fuel work, this particularly Soviet form
of one-upmanship was based around the idea that, regardless of nutritional composition,
requiring more food was better, as it implied more strenuous labor. If Soviet workers
burned, on average, 25% more calories than their German counterparts, then it logically
followed that they also worked 25% harder.
13 Voprosy Pitaniia CITE
114 Compare the worker studies appearing in 1933-1937 of Voprosy Pitaniia with published studies from
US institutes, as well as Rabinach, The Human Motor..
126
Beyond research agendas, Soviet programs of public nutrition had a more
persistent vision of mass feeding than capitalist countries and were more active in
promoting these goals. Socialist nutrition had originally favored the abolition of the
family kitchen in favor of hygienic, large-scale cafeterias and mess halls. The 1920s had
established such worker canteens and cafeterias, related both in design and in fare to the
institutional food served to the army and hospitals. During the 1930s, the Ministry of
Food Provisioning had made some efforts toward making cafeteria food tasty, or at least
palatable. In spite of these enticements, throughout the 1930s there was more push than
pull in persuading workers to dine at a mess hall rather than home. Short lunch hours and
increasingly long commutes associated with fast-paced urban growth made cafeterias the
only choice for the midday meal."' 5 In contrast, the 1950s saw more carrots than sticks in
the redevelopment of worker cafeterias. Low prices and the presence of ingredients that
were scarce in public markets meant eating at a cafeteria was sometimes more desirable
than lunching at home. As Susan Reid makes clear in her article on postwar
consumerism, cafeterias were advertised as places where the whole family could dine in
peace and comfort, and the inconvenience and stress of preparing a meal at home was
erased."6 In theory, cafeteria workers were trained professionals who had been through
upper-level cooking courses as well as courses in hygiene and sanitation. Textbooks for
cafeteria cooks in the mid 1950s required students to learn how to prepare a standing rib
roast, souffle, and other dishes one might associate with a starred French restaurant rather
than a Soviet canteen." 7
In addition to the Soviet population that starved to death during and immediately
after World War II, a much larger number of people endured a state of chronic
115 Mauricio Baurrero, "Food and the Politics of Scarcity in Urban Soviet Russia, 1917-1941" in Food
Nations: Selling Taste in Consumer Societies.(New York: Routledge, 2002): 258-76.116 Susan Reid, "Cold War in the Kitchen: Gender and De-Stalinization of Consumer Taste in the Soviet
Union Under Khrushchev." Slavic Review, Vol. 61, No 2, (2002) 211-252.
"'7 Nauchno-Issledovatelskii Institut Torgovli i Obshchestvennogo Pitaniia (Scientific Research Institute of
Products and Public Nutrition), Sbornik Retseptur (Moscow: 1952), Maks Marshak Solomonovich,
Dieticheskaia Stolovaia (Moscow: 1955).
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malnutrition well into the 1950s. Common forms of malnutrition included scurvy, protein
deficiencies, and avitaminosis, a general lack of vitamins. In the postwar period the
people most vulnerable to malnutrition and its related health complications were the very
young, the very old and infirm as well as the geographically marginal: people who were
living far away from well-provisioned cities. Malnutrition was common in the immediate
postwar period, and while vitamin tablets alleviated the worst symptoms of scurvy,
rickets and other deficiency diseases in soldiers, such pills were not generally available to
the civilian population."8 Curing malnutrition in the postwar period was inherently tied to
improving public nutrition, thus public nutrition regained its status as a top priority after
the war.
In the years after World War II the Soviet national diet reflected a new
relationship with food for the country as a whole, based not on the threat of scarcity, but
on the promise of emergent prosperity. In the 1950s, American citizens were well-aware
of the statistic that the average American ate more meat than the citizen of any other
country, but in the Soviet Union there was no such public statistic. What was apparent, or
seemingly apparent, was that meat and milk consumption rates were going up. Certainly
availability was increasing. While consumption levels of certain products remained level
or even decreased slightly in the decade after the war, access to animal-based food
products increased overall. Increases real or imagined in production were trumpeted in
the Soviet press, with articles inevitably promising that much greater increases were
anticipated in the future. Such reporting had the effect of focusing citizens on what was
yet to come.
The postwar preoccupation with producing more meat, milk and butter, while
inspired by a sense of competition with U.S. farm productivity, was part of a larger
118 Such pills were not officially available to the majority of the population. Those areas of Ukraine that
received food aid from the UNRRA received vitamin tablets, and such vitamins were available to many
consumers on the robust postwar black market.
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project to improve public nutrition, a program of "recovery plus" from wartime scarcity.
The campaign for more animal products, although the most publicly advertised, was not
the only campaign for better nutrition. Other foods had special resonance in the postwar
era, especially those that helped stave off the other scourges of malnutrion. Thus the
Soviet Union's new citrus industry, its canned tomato industry and its new range of meat
and protein amalgamate foods such as raviolis and patties all received a boost from these
concerns about malnutrition. Often these new, pre-prepared nutritionally dense foods
replaced other traditional foods (at least on market shelves) that were not so nourishing
nor so easy for the Soviet state to provision.
Perhaps as a result of the well-documented nutritional privation of the war, a self-
consciousness about vitamins arrived in the postwar period. In addition to basic concerns
about the appropriate intake of fat, protein and calories, state cooking publications had a
more sophisticated analysis of food based on vitamins and minerals such as calcium, iron,
potassium and beta-carotene. In addition to a preoccupation with having enough of these
vitamins, there were a number of panacea products, notably fish oil and canned spinach,
that were produced in order to improve specifically children's diets.
One major side effect of vitamin self consciousness was a growing advocacy for a
greater variety of foods, and thus the balanced meal. Cooking school manuals from the
1950s went beyond recommending the traditional three course meal, which had its
origins in French and Swedish formal dining habits, and encouraged would-be chefs to
serve a variety of foods in contrasting colors, to include edible garnishes and include
fresh as well as composed salads. By insisting on foods of different textures and colors,
by recommending colorful food at all, Soviet food planners made important inroads into
the larger task of reorienting Soviet dining habits toward a preference for variety of
ingredients and main dishes and viewed repetitive meals as undesirable not simply
because they were not tasty, but also because they were not nutritionally optimal.
Putting Meat (and More) on the Soviet Table
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The postwar Soviet Union excelled in its ability to harness and refine the energy
sources that defined a developed and high-tech civilization. The hydrogen bomb, first
tested in 1955 was the standard par excellence,, but other high-tech projects to refine
rocket fuel, develop jet propulsion technology and build hydroelectric dams were pursued
energetically and successfully in the postwar period.' 19 Canned meat is a more prosaic
form of potential energy than rocket fuel or enriched Uranium, but the florescence of
processed meat alongside its more spectacular cousins in the postwar era is no
coincidence-all are historical artifacts of a period that privileged concentrated,
quantifiable displays of power and wealth. Whether measured in calories, megatons or
kilowatts, energy was on display in modern systems and the ability to effectively harness
natural energy and make it available to everyday people in order to increase the quality of
their lives was one of the more humanitarian fronts upon which the Cold War was
fought.12" Meat and milk production signified wealth and prosperity but also national
strength.
The postwar era was one in which Soviet leadership prioritized public displays of
power. Throughout the 1950s, Soviet citizens could read about the work of high energy
physicists and feats of engineering in novels, magazines and newspaper articles. While
the projects to increase meat and milk consumption might seem less inclined toward
dramatic narration, these plans also received a prominent position in the popular press.
Articles discussed the new types of food that were available, the factories that produced
new foods and their price. These articles consistently emphasized the high-tech
production lines, in which many foods were never touched by human hands, the rapid
speeds of production lines, the large size and efficient operation of food factories and the
"
9 On Hydrogen Fusion, see Paul Josephson, Red Atom :Russia's Nuclear Power Program from Stalin to
Today (New York: W.H. Freeman, 2000) ch. 6.
120 John H. Perkins Geopolitics and the Green Revolution: Wheat, Genes and the Cold War (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1997).
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low cost and impending ubiquitous availability of such products."'2 Unlike high energy
physics, the project to increase meat and milk production was one in which everyday
citizens could participate.
Animals were a signal of Cold War agricultural progress, not just of high living,
but of a farming system that had advanced to the point where humans could afford to eat
higher up on the food chain, thus wasting (or at least not intercepting) the extra energy
that comes from eating primary producers. Eating higher on the food chain was a sign of
progress, but in order to ensure these products reached consumers, the Soviet Union had
to think creatively about how to reform its food chains. The country did not have the
financial resources to import or implement the kinds of cutting-edge technologies in food
processing and preserving that were helping the United States maintain the best national
diet in the world. Freezing, a common method of food preservation in the US, for
example, was beyond the capability of the USSR (at least for the six warm months of the
year), as was the project of installing refrigerated milk tanks in dairies and milk barns, a
procedure that would have extended the shelf life of fresh milk. Personal refrigerators had
become commonplace in the United States even before World War II, but in the Soviet
Union these appliances were still a rarity in 1955. Given these technological
shortcomings, how could the Soviet Union furnish its citizens with one of the best diets in
the world? Given the lack of consumer kitchen technologies, how did Soviet food
distribution planners increase the variety and availability of meat for Soviet tables?
The dislocations of supply lines during World War II and postwar restructuring
changed patterns of consumption and availability of meat and animal products in the
Soviet Union, first by reducing supplies and then by forging new lines of distribution
through the selective rebuilding and new construction of roads and rail lines. The war
profoundly crippled meat and milk supplies, but wartime provisioning measures also
121 Such articles were common in popular magazines such as Krestian 'ka, as well as in widely-circualting
national press.
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increased the use of canned food to the Soviet Union, first as a frontline provision for the
Red Army, and then as a relief and recovery product for the civilian population. 122 In the
postwar era, this reliance on canned products endured. While this was not the
introduction of canning technology in the Soviet Union, it was the first time canned
products were made popularly available and affordable to the general population through
state stores. 123 While canning and vegetables and fruits continued to be a home-based
activity for many citizens after the war, canned meat in particular acquired new
prominence in the postwar Soviet diet.
Tushonka, a canned stewed pork product, is a good example of a food that became
popular in the postwar Soviet Union because of consumer demand as well as
technological competency. Tushonka was first mass-produced during World War II and it
had been part of the red army rations and postwar food aid. In the era of the war,
tushonka was a new fangled and mass-produced product, but tushonka was also a food
with a past. As per Red Army orders, tushonka was a variation on a recipe that had been a
traditional product of the Ural mountain region of Russia.124 The high fat and salt content
of the original recipe was meant to preserve the meat over winters and the original
tushonka product, like most premodern canned meats, was actually preserved through salt
and fat rather than by pressure and heat. While tushonka 's Ural mountain origins
provided it with the cache of a traditional Russian food product, it was a global food
during the war. Most tushonka was prepared and canned by meatpackers in Iowa and
122 On death and displacement of livestock, see J.A. Newth, "Soviet Agriculture: The Private Sector 1950-
1959. Animal Husbandry," Soviet Studies 13, no. 4 (1962).129. On canned provisions, see Edward R.
Stettinius, Lend Lease, Weapon for Victory (New York: Macmillan, 1944).
123 In 1946 in July in Kyiv, an 800 gram can of tushonka cost 14 rubles in a state ration store. No fresh meat
was available in these stores, but fresh pork was available in gastronoms for 11-15 rubles per hundred
grams, approximately 8 times the price of the canned food. For further comparison, a plucked, undressed
chicken (no weight given) was not available in the state store, cost 130 rubles in a gastronom, and 85-90
rubles at the public market. L.A. Skeoch "Food Prices and Ration Scale in the Ukraine, 1946," The Review
of Economics and Statistics. 1953 p.231.
124 Wartime tushonka bore a close resemblance to the product found in Russian markets today; its
ingredients are typically pork, lard, salt, and spices.
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Minnesota, shipped into the USSR as part of the US initiated wartime Lend-Lease food
assistance program.'2 5
Tushonka 's ubiquity in the postwar Soviet Union initially had almost nothing to
do with the USSR's own production of pork, which plummeted during wartime, and
everything to do with Harry Truman's unexpected September 1945 decision to end all
"economically useful" Lend-Lease shipments to the Soviet Union.' 26 Tushonka, a product
made from low-cost surplus pork, was deemed a humanitarian supply that was not
economically useful, thus the United States decided to fulfill much of its Lend-Lease
contractual pledge with pork stew rather than materiel. By the end of September, canned
food was almost the only product still being shipped as part of Lend-Lease.'2 7 Although
the UNRRA was charged with distributing the American food supplies, largely
earmarked for the formerly occupied parts of Ukraine at risk of famine, travelers to the
Soviet Union in 1946 (and as late as 1950) remarked on seeing cans of tushonka for sale
in state shops as well as by private individuals. After US-packed tushonka disappeared
from shop shelves, the Soviet Union's meat syndicate continued producing the product.'28
Because it was shelf-stable and easy to carry, wartime tushonka had served as a practical
food for soldiers to eat. After the war, tushonka, became an ideal food for workers who
had neither the time nor the space to prepare home cooked meat. The Soviet state was
125 Stettinius Lend Lease, Weapon for Victory.
126 Canning was hardly an important sector of the food economy before the war, preserving meat in the
form of sausage seems to be more standard. The Report of Extraordinary Special State Commission on
Wartime Losses Resulting from the German-Fascist Occupation cites the following losses in the German
takeover,: "4490 meat-sausage and cheese-milk-butter enterprises, 204 sugar plants, 649 vodka-spirits
factories, 47 canning factories, 29 butter-fat (maslo-zhirovykh) factories, 47 cigarette and "fermentation"
factories (fermentatsionnykh) and others. From GARF, fond R-7021" On Truman's decision to end Lend-
Lease, see Leon Martel, Lend-Lease, Loans, and the Coming of the Cold War: A Study of the
Implementation ofForeign Policy (Boulder: Westview Press, 1979).
"Records relating to Lend Lease with the USSR 1941-1952," NARA, RG 59 "General Records of the
Department of State" Office of Soviet Union affairs, Box 6.
128 Tushonka and other canned products was made in either the "Liver-Pate" department or the "sausage"
department, of the meat factory (MiasKombinat) presumably depending on which facility had the
equipment to can meat. In 1945 at the Leningrad meat factory, of 4117 tonnes of meat processed, 1699
tonnes were "Vareny'e, or canned (in jars). This particular facility processed beef almost exclusively, so
the canned product was not tushonka in its narrow sense, although the term came to be applied to both pork
and beef stewed product. RGAE 8297/5/438.
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interested in continuing to produced tushonka in the mid 1950s because it fit an ideal of a
socialist modern food. Not only did it fit the look and taste of a modem processed meat
product (that is, it was salty, fatty, grey and gelatinous), tushonka was also an excellent
way to make the most of the predominant kind of meat the Soviet Union had the in the
1950s: small scraps low-grade pork and beef. Until the early 1950s, meat pricing was not
graded beyond the general categories of fat, organs, and first, second and third class meat,
with fat trimmings being the most expensive product and organ meat and second-class
carcass muscle being about equal in price. This system would reform by 1958 at which
point when Soviet factories adopted the more familiar system of standardized "cuts," but
until then, it needed to find an outlet for its lower quality meat. Stews, sausages and other
processes that softened and blended third-grade meat were in high demand.
Just like tushonka, pork sausages and frozen pelmeny, or raviolis also became
winning postwar foods, thanks to a happy synergy of more pigs, graded dismemberment
and new food processing madhines. As postwar pigs increased in both population and
mass, so too did the processed meats industry. One official source listed twenty-six
different kinds of being produced in 1964, although not all of these were pork.'29 Another
manual on how meat shops should wrap and display sausages listed 24 different kinds of
sausages that stores might received. In the face of a shortage of packaging and labeling,
the string that bound the sausage was wrapped in a different way for every type of
sausage, and shop assistants were expected to be able to identify sausages based on the
pattern of their binding. Pelmeny were produced, according to Soviet sources, at every
meat factory that processed pork, using an automated process in which, they were
"...made from start to finish in a special, automized machine, human hands do not touch
them. Which makes them a higher quality and better (prevoskhodnogo) product."'130 These
'
29 M.M. Danilov, Tovaravedenie Prodovol'stvennykh Tovarov: Miaso I Miasnye Tovarye. Moscow: Iz.
Ekonomika, 1964).
130o Kniga 0 Vkusnoi I Zdorovoi Pishche (Moscow: AMN Izd., 1952 ) 161
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were foods that became possible to produce economically because of a co-occurring
increase in pigs, the new standardized practice of equipping meatpacking plants with
large-capacity grinders, and freezers or coolers and the enforcement of a system of
grading meat.
Another approach Soviet planners took to increasing the availability of meat was
to access its wild stocks of fish, since preserved fish was a familiar commodity with a
pre-existing distribution network.'3 1 Dried, smoked, canned and salted fish (largely
salmon and herring) had been products of Russian coastlines for centuries. These
products started out as outpost foods, accompanying Russian expeditions into North
America during the reign of Catherine the Great. The fish canning industry-the only
robust food processing industry the Soviet Union inherited from Imperial Russia- was
well developed on both the European and the Asian coasts by the late 19th century and its
principle products were canned crab, salmon and herring, although dozens of other
varieties of canned fish were also available. Many of these products, like the caviar being
produced at this same time, were earmarked for export as luxury goods. Although
railroad shipping in theory permitted canned food products to travel across the continent
from either shore, canned, ocean-caught fish was not a commonly distributed inland
commodity until World War II. Instead, Soviet citizens living in inland areas relied on
supplies of fresh-water fish, which were commonly smoked or dried rather than canned.
This changed in the postwar period, in part because quantities of fish consumed jumped,
and ocean-caught fish were more plentiful and also because the technology of catching
and canning fish improved to the point where canned fish that was processed next to
oceans was cheaper than the less-mechanized freshwater fish industry.'32 By 1959, one-
third of Soviet meat consumption was estimated to come from fish sources, and the vast
131 An overview of Soviet fishing appears in the RAND publication George Bergstom, "The Soviet Food
Front," Unpublished Paper,Food Science Laboratory at Michigan State, 1959.
132 Bergstrom The Soviet Food Front. Immediately after the war, the ratios were /4 inland caught to ¼
ocean caught. By 1959 the rations were 2/3 ocean caught to 1/3 inland caught. Murmansk, a coldwater
seaport became the new capital of the ocean fishing industry.
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majority of these were wild-caught rather than farmed."33 This new availability of canned
seafood was reflected in recipes from the era for dishes such as crabmeat salad, canned
shrimp salad, and fish fritters, all of which called for a can of fish as the basic
ingredient.'34
Like the Virgin Lands Campaign or the corn growing campaign, harvesting wild
fish was a quick fix for both the Soviet economy and for the diets of Soviet citizens.
Unlike the Virgin Lands and corn campaigns however, the quick fix of Soviet fishing
extended well into the 1980s, at which point the annual catch began to decline. Up until
that point, the fish industry augmented Soviet meat sources and improved protein intake
for Soviet citizens.' 35 In general, historians tend to downplay and denigrate the role that
wild foods have played in sustaining the Soviet Union, but in fact, developing countries
have often maximized such resources.'36 In the United States and Western Europe such
reserves were largely depleted well before the 1950s. While hunting, fishing, and
gathering are viewed in agricultural societies as low-input activities meant to complement
the primary work of farming, in a place like the Soviet Union that had so much of its
wealth in non-arable land and water, it made good sense to spend extra time and energy
exploiting these resources. While the Soviet Ministry of Agriculture never formally non-
agricultural food-producing activities like hunting, herding and fishing, it expanded its
economic investments in fishing and sheepherding in the 1950s, and, as we shall see in
chapter 4, by 1960 the Ministry of Agriculture had redefined hunting as an agricultural
activity that fell within its purview.
Canned meats, pelmeny, canned fish and other processed products succeeded
after the war because they were well suited for the conditions of fast-paced Soviet
'33 Bergstrom, The Soviet Food Front p. 18
134See Sbornik Retseptur, (Moscow: Nauchno-issledovatelskii Institut Torgovli i Obshchestvennogo
Pitaniia. 1952) pp. CITES
135 Medvedev, Soviet Agriculture p. 280.
'
36On Soviet exploitation, see ibid., pp.134-136.
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development in which there was mass urbanization and little modern kitchen
infrastructure. Canning meat was one way to solve the chronic problem of food spoilage,
and simultaneously catered to busy consumers. Spoilage had counted for a huge
percentage of food waste and loss in the Soviet Union, mostly due to a lack of
refrigeration and poorly coordinated transit timing.1 37 At the consumer level after
purchase, fresh meats and dairy products continued to require refrigeration, and most
fresh foods needed to be cooked before being eaten. 1950s-era Soviet homes largely
lacked refrigerators, and in communal apartments stoves were shared among several
families. In these circumstances, the time and appliances required to regularly store and
cook food were just not commonly available.
It was not just humans whose feeding regimes were being intensified.The human
population was not the only group of omnivores to profit from the exploitation of wild
foods. In 1961 a group of American statesmen visiting the Soviet Union noted that the
sovkhoz Belaia Dacha, a large pig farm outside of Moscow, fed its pigs a mixture of feed
concentrate, city cafeteria food scraps and brewery waste, along with the salted heads,
flippers and claws of seals that had been harvested from the Caspian Sea.' 38 The
statesmen were unimpressed with the quality of the seal meat, rating it at "about fertilizer
level" and noting that the system of recycling city food wastes "bore little resemblance to
restaurant wastes fed to hogs in the United States, a large part of it consist(s) of
cabbage." 13 9 Even in its waste products, United States agriculture eclipsed that of the
Soviet Union, at least in the eyes of its foreign dignitaries. Soviet farms may have been
'
37 A common memory among Soviet food workers and agricultural workers is the smell of fruits and
vegetables rotting as they awaited transportation or processing. For a further discussion of timing and
spoilage, albeit for postsocialist food production, see Elizabeth Dunn Privatizing Poland:Baby Food, Big
Business and the Remaking ofLabor(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004).
138 NARA, RG 166 Records of the Foreign Agricultural Service Narrative Reports 1955-1961 Box 870
Uruguay-USSR Agriculture, Folder 'Agriculture.' Belaia Dacha processed 60,000 pigs per year. Feeding
pigs on the food scraps from factories and large-scale kitchens was a common method of recycling these
industrial byproducts. See The rate of scrap to feed (in this case 2 to 3) in this example is high for a large
enterprise.
139 Ibid. presumably, the statesmen felt the American system was superior.
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exploiting some wild foods, but in the eyes of the state, far more could be done. A 1956
memo to the Minister of Agriculture deplored the under-exploitation of miscellaneous
sources of protein like small fishes, walruses, shorebird eggs and whales in the Soviet Far
East and suggested that feasibility studies should be done on the economic profitability of
gathering such sources.'14 Much like the Virgin Lands project, which sought to utilize the
unplowed lands of the Soviet steppe, The Ministry of Agriculture's plans to utilize wild
animals as a significant protein source shows a scavenger's approach to finding food, one
that used the country's natural wealth in wild foods and primary soil fertility to subsidize
the short-term goals of agriculture and provide a temporary boost to agricultural
productivity.
Beyond meat sources both wild and tame, the malnutrition and repetitive nature of
the Soviet diet were worrying to Soviet food planners. In response, the state took steps to
ensure that food supplies in general became more varied, plentiful and nourishing. Food
was classified by its fat, sugar, protein and vitamin content, and generally speaking, the
more (of all these traits) the better.'41 The 1952 "Kniga 0 Vkusnoi I Zdorovoi
Pishche"(The Book of Delicious, Healthy Food,) a glossy cookbook put out jointly by
the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Provisions, is an example of this modem food
aesthetic in print form.' 42 Color photographs feature main ingredients (often canned fish,
crab or beef) rather than completed dishes. The publication is clearly meant as a
showcase tool of instruction in what is available to consumers. Many recipes, including
one for Roast suckling pig and another for homemade ice cream, border on the fantastical
for a population that did not have access to a full oven or granulated sugar.
140 Memo to Mikoyan, RGAE 7803/ 1/1834 "Perepiska s Sovietim SSSR po Voprosom Zhivotnovodstvo
1956." pp. 92-93.
141 A standardized overview of essential vitamins, minerals and food types (carbohydrates, proteins, fats
and sugras) appeared at the beginning of most cookbooks throughout the 1950s. For example, see the
prefaces to Detskaia Kukhnia, Sbornik Retseptur Bliud Dlia Pitaniia Rabochikh, and Kniga 0 Vkusnoi I
Zdorovoi Pishche.
142 Kniga 0 Vkusnoi I Zdorovoi Pishche (Moscow: AMN, 1952).
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While cookbooks such as these often departed from reality, they also offer
important insight into the ways in which Soviet eating patterns changed above and
beyond the increasing availability of animal products. Beyond the animal products
discussed above, Soviet citizens began eating new foods and more varied foods. Some
foods adapted better to processes of industrialization than others, and these were the food
that flourished during this period. "3 Canned fruits and vegetables in particular were well
adapted to industrial systems. Foods that lost out in the process of industrialization were
those that were delicate or perishable. These less industrially robust fruits and vegetables
remained seasonal products that remained privately produced. On the shelves of state-run
shops, fresh fruits and vegetables came to be replaced by preserved foods. Canned foods
that appeared most regularly were those that stood up well to the intensive heat and
pressure of the canning process. They were also those foods that had high vitamin and
mineral contents, and that could bolster the vitamin nutrition and diet diversity of Soviet
citizens. Tomatoes were one such industrial winner. High in vitamins C and A tomatoes
were loaded with the vitamin and mineral properties of which any nutritional expert
could approve. Tomato juice had been used in the 1930s as an anti-scorbutic (anti-scurvy)
and this medical history made the tomato all the more appealing in a postwar country still
struggling to overcome malnutrition.
The rise of the tomato can be charted through the cookbooks of the times.
Tomatoes had been cultivated in Russia and the early Soviet Union ever since their
introduction to the Russian empire in the eighteenth century, but they were hardly an
economically important crop, and were mostly consumed fresh.144 In the Book of
143 This fact was recognized by Soviet food planners as well, as reflected in their (translated) publication
The Soviet Food Industry which states that "It should be stressed that as the output of the basic foodtuffs
increases, the output of certain other foods will grow less quickly and will even decrease. This chiefly
concerns the bread, alcohol and salt industries...the more meat and butter, milk and sugar the population
receives the less bread and other food poorer in calories and other nourishing qualities it will consume." I.
Volper, The Soviet Food Industry, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1958. p. 11
144 Even then, many tomatoes were consumed green, or only half-ripened. See Elena Molokhovets, Classic
Russian Cooking: Elena Molokhovets' A Gift to Young Housewives. Trans. And ed. by Janet Toomres.
Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998. 54-60.
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Delicious, Healthy Food a column is dedicated to describing new varieties of tomatoes.
More significant than this celebratory column is the fact that there are no recipes in the
book that call for canned tomatoes, only tomato paste, ketchup, and juice. Even these
recipes appear only infrequently; there are more suggestions for what to do with
eggplants than tomatoes. 145 Presumably, then, stewed tomatoes were not a common
commodity in 1953 when the Book of Delicious Healthy Food was published. Even
recipes for tomato based soups, a place where stewed tomatoes could easily substitute for
fresh, fresh tomatoes are called for.
By 1955, stewed tomatoes were on the rise. Tomatoes had always possessed a
kind of theoretical prestige-the Book of Delicious, Healthy Food described tomatoes in
1953 as vegetables with "high vitamin content, mineral salts, and a harmonious combined
taste of sweet and salty," and claimed that they "they have earned a place as the most
healthy and delicious vegetable." By 1955 this admiration was translated into an
increasing availability of canned tomatoes in shops.' 46 Most tomatoes were produced in
the southern republics of Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova, which had the Mediterranean
climates and abundant agricutural labor, as all of these crops were hand-harvested and
thus labor-intensive. Delicate vegetables including spinach and fresh peas were also
canned in larger quantities during the 1950s, but the canning process generally made
these vegetables mushy and unappealing, and while consumption of these commodities
increased, they did not experience the rise from obscurity to popularity that tomatoes and
peppers did.'47 Sturdy, fibrous vegetables that held up well under the heat and pressure of
the canning process, tomatoes and peppers were winners in the shift to industrial food.
During the 1950s, both tomatoes and peppers became commonly available year-round
45 KVZP, pp. 192, 203, 86, 377 and 105.
146 KVZP, p. 105
147 The cans were also not necessarily a good buy. Peas came packed in a 35% water solution. KVZP
advises consumers to save this water to use as a base for cabbage soup or borscht or "any first dish that can
benefit from sugar and vitamins." KVZP, p. 247
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thanks to new canning technology and a zealous state ministry of food provisions, eager
to rapidly expand into commodity markets it was actually good at provisioning.'48
The year-round availability of vitamin-rich foods like tomatoes and peppers was
the most significant result of the increase in canned food. In Russia and the Soviet
Union, the seasonality of diets had endured until after World War II because of the low
level of food processing. No longer limited by what was seasonally available (which in
winter, might be precious little other than potatoes, beets and cabbages), canning
introduced a wider range of foods into everyday diets, canning and other methods of
preserving had the added effect of introducing a wider variety of foods into Soviet diets.
When industrialization and urbanization first changed the USSR's demographics,
year-round eating patterns began to look more like the winter model than the warm-
weather model. Although most urban workers could still afford seasonal fruits and
vegetables, the move in to town restricted the most direct ways of accessing seasonal
produce. Prewar cafeterias were meant to address the monotony and insufficiency of the
New Soviet diet, and indeed, such establishments, with their superior access to state-held
food reserves, went a long way toward increasing the nutritional content of meals.
Design and Access
While many Soviet historians have focused on the increasing availability of
consumer goods in the postwar period, few have focused on the kind or quality of these
goods, other than to notice their inferiority and sporadic, urban-biased distribution
patterns.' 49 In addition to reforming production, Soviet planners altered consumption
trends in food in the postwar Soviet Union, improving the quality of foods for sale while
148 This was signaled also by a name change, from the traditional Russian word, "pomodory," inherited
from its Turkish importers (via the Italian 'pomodoro ) to "tomaty" which is the more commonly occurring
name across Europe. In Russian, tomaty often referred to tomatoes used in processed products, such as
ketchup, juice or sauces, rather than fresh, raw tomatoes, a distinction that is still present in the Russian
language today. The cookbook discussed above refers to the fresh vegetable under the headingpomodory,
and the processed product as tomaty. Ibid. p.105
149 Susan Reid, "Cold War in the Kitchen: Gender and De-Stalinization of Consumer Taste in the Soviet
Union Under Khrushchev" Slavic Review, Vol. 61, No 2, (2002) 211-212.
141
simultaneously restricting their access. While the pace of postwar consumption increased,
Soviet plannmlers took significant steps to slow this process down as much as possible.
Not all architectural designs for places where foods were sold, stored and
prepared were new in the 1950s but most of them were of recent design. The way places
are laid out affects what it is possible to do within them, and the ways in which the new
architecture of markets, apartments and stores influenced what kinds of foods were
bought and sold, how these transactions took place, how food was stored in shops and in
homes. The link between architecture and the possibilities and limitations of an industrial
food system hold true also when one thinks of the organizational links in a food system as
one form of architecture. The political and bureaucratic structure of a system influences
what is and is not possible. By considering the visible and invisible architecture of a food
system simultaneously, it becomes possible to see how both material realities (windows,
power outlets, refrigerated cases) and the political and economic infrastructure that
construct food systems both make certain things easy while making other things
impossible.
In the 1950s in the Soviet Union, an accessible architecture began to emerge, one
designed around socialist notions of access. The birth and development of a culture of
ready-made food in the Soviet Union was constrained by cultural norms, the architecture
of commercial spaces and the presence or absence of home appliances and storage spaces
for food. First, to discuss the cultural norms it is important to understand traditional
eating patterns in the Soviet Union. Previously in this chapter we have discussed how the
Soviet diet, especially the diet of urban workers, became more varied and less repetitive
in the postwar period. While the food supply in the Soviet Union had periodically been in
short supply, food available in cities had never before been as varied as it was after the
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war. It was often neither affordable nor plentiful, but the number of different kinds of
foods being offered for sale had never been higher.' 50
In the postwar period, more Soviet citizens were eating more meals in canteens
and cafeterias than ever before in the history of the country."' While Khrushchev's
support of single-family apartment dwellings and the phasing out of communal
apartments signaled a concession to the right of families to cultivate and spend time in a
private domestic sphere, Soviet citizens were still encouraged to spend as much time as
possible in public places. •52 While the Soviet Union's restaurants were intended for
tourists and travellers, the meals served in worker's cafeterias became an important site in
which the state could display both its competence in preparing healthy food and its ability
to one-up home cooks by serving foods such as fruit cocktails and cuts of fresh meat that
citizens rarely had access to in the general marketplace. Thus, through worker's
cafeterias, food norms changed. While food prepared for masses rarely left much room
for culinary artistry, the better access state kitchens had to a range of ingredients meant
that food at cafeterias contained a wider variety of dishes and of ingredients than those
available at home. Cafeterias changed eating patterns by anchoring the day of
schoolchildren and workers around a hot lunchtime meal.
Related to the success of the Soviet cafeteria was the decline, or continuing
neglect of the home kitchen. Apartment kitchens in communal spaces were often
unusable. At best, a family living in a communal apartment had a 2 burner stove to call
their own, a shared sink for washing-up, and a dish storage cabinet. In reality, the clutter
and confusion of multiple families sharing a single room to prepare separate meals often
rendered communal kitchen spaces dirty, crowded, smelly, and populated with people
150 The early 1950s was the period in which the Soviet Union widened the variety of foods it had to sell.
This was especially true of pre-processed foods. In 1959, there were dozens of different kinds of meat
preserves and frozen meatballs. Many of these were geared toward children, with names like "Pionerski"
(the name of the children's scouting organization), Malyutka (baby) and "shkol'nye" (school-style)
151 The prewar rise of worker cafeterias is discussed in the chapter in Warren Belasco and Phillip Scranton.
Food Nations: Selling Taste in Consumer Societies (New York: Routledge, 2001).
152 Susan E. Reid. "Cold War in the Kitchen.
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one already spent far too much time in close proximity to. Urban architecture after the
war was more focused on modest modem single family apartments. These retained the
traditional design feature, maintaining a niche, or breakfast nook, that served both as
extra counter space and a space for tea and informal visiting. Ideally, new kitchens came
with appliances that made food storage and preparation easier. Deep sinks were standard,
as were small breakfast tables, a dish cabinet, and hoosier or other multipurpose storage
unit.'53 While there may, in theory have been room for these new conveniences of urban
kitchens, most families could not afford elaborate furniture, or, especially, a luxury like a
refrigerator. Refrigerators sold in the Soviet Union at that time mimicked the size and
function of the traditional (but not popular) ice box, with a storage capacity much smaller
than that of a contemporary refrigerator, and no freezer. While families lucky enough to
get apartments with balconies were often able to convert at least part of their balcony
space into a modified cold pantry, kitchens were built without siderooms, and thus
without much storage capacity. In catalogues of kitchen furniture, there were bins for 10
or 20 kilos of root vegetables, but no more, and hardly any room for storing pickled or
preserved foods. 154 The architecture of new kitchens dictated the use of the space, namely,
against hoarding or long term food storage, and toward frequent trips to the store. Urban
residents, already limited by their available free time and by what was available to buy at
stores, were further limited by what it was possible to cart home from the store, and
where they could keep such things once delivered.
Much like the architecture of new homes, the architecture of stores limited what
shopkeepers could purvey. The minimum technical requirements for stores, unlike those
for apartments, specificed that stores should have pantries or dry cellars in which to store
bulk root vegetables and other items like flour and fruits. Most stores did not have
153 For illustrations of postwar kitchen designs, see KVZP p. 33, as well as D. Tsolov and R. Krustanova,
Mebeli: Eksperimentalni Obraztsi za Masovo Proizvodstvo na Spalni I Kukhni, Sofia: Izd. Na Bulgarskata
na naukite, 1957.
154 D. Tsolov and R. Krustanova, Mebeli.
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refrigeration, rather, they had ventilation. Air flow and air circulation were points of
acute worry and tremendous preoccupation in the Soviet Union. Stores that did have
coolers most typically had coolers without windows. Stores that did have coolers often
used them for just a few products. Freezers themselves were not display appliances. Their
doors were opaque, often wooden, and access to their contents was meant for store clerks
only.
More limiting than the primitive state of preservation technologies at grocery
stores was the awkward way in which goods were exchanged, often described by visitors
to the Soviet Union, used to self-serve American shopping, with disdainful incredulity.
The process involved standing in one line and placing an order for a particular good. The
clerk taking the order made out a receipt, which the consumer then settled at a central
register (or, more commonly, with a clerk holding a cash-box and abacus). With a proof
of purchase ticket, the consumer returned to the sales area, where the original clerk
handed the purchases over and tore or marked the receipt to indicate a complete
transaction. Thus, each purchase exchange actually involved three separate interactions
with either two or three store clerks. Compared to the popular self-serve food markets of
the United States, the process seemed quite ungainly.
Its setup was meant to accomplish several tasks that are more important in an economy
of scarcity than they are in a demand based economy. The first of these was discouraging
shoplifting and other forms of graft. While various forms of graft and embezzling were
common throughout the Soviet period, store purchases were monitored closely in an
attempt to deter stealing, either on the part of the consumer, or on the part of the
shopclerks. By having several employees accountable to each other as well as to
customers, it was much more difficult to directly bribe clerks or for sales clerks to quietly
remove store inventory. This seems to have mostly just resulted in more creative forms of
graft, rather than discouraging illegal practices.
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Another reason for the bulky purchasing arrangement, at least in the case of food,
had much to do with the fact the Soviet union was not really set up for displaying foods
or other products, at least not visually. While problems of production and distribution
plagued the country, packaging of food proved to be an Achilles heel it took the country
decades to overcome. Even if consumers had been able to see what was in coolers and on
shelves, they might not have been able to recognize it. Without plastic packages, with a
shortage of jars and with inferior labels that fell off or were unreadable at a distance, the
Soviet Union's food supply was simply not engineered for a self-serve populace.
Conclusion
Soviet state nutritional policy was committed to two goals simultaneously; first,
improving the health of its citizens through diet and second, making the most out of what
was available. To this end, nutritional research was directed at overcoming the
longstanding threat of malnutrition as well as making the products with which the
agricultural sector had experienced the most success into new consumer essentials.
Cookbooks, food advertisements and nutritional pamphlets offered practical advice about
what citizens could and should eat, and this advice informed the public about good
nutrition while at the same time persuading them to adopt distinctively socialist modem
diets. Perhaps more than any other material artifact, food reflects culture, and so the
development of a Soviet pattern of eating should come as no surprise.
The new, improved form of Soviet eating suffered the same urban bias as many
other industrial projects. While food was produced in the countryside, food was
processed, stored and distributed among cities. Rural people were obliged to travel into
cities to obtain foods other than the basics and new processed and packaged foods rarely
appeared in rural stores. Nonetheless, for the Soviet Union's increasingly urban
population, diets really were changing for the better. By 1960, Soviet consumers were
eating more meat, dairy, eggs and more packaged and processed foods than ever before.
Diets were also become more varied and less tied to seasonal variation. Some foods that
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that had almost always been consumed fresh just a generation ago-tomatoes, peaches
and peppers, for example- were now much easier to purchase in cans. What these
processed foods lost in taste they made up for in year-round availability. Canning was not
the only technology that made inroads into changing Soviet diets. The state invested
heavily in meat and milk preservation and in a few frozen foods. Soviet citizens only
rarely owned refrigerators or freezers, so these processed foods were designed to be kept
without refrigeration-like hams and sausages-or they were designed to be eaten right
away-as was the case with ice cream and pelmeny.
Ultimately, Soviet diets improved but did not revolutionize. The Soviet Union's
very public campaign to increase the availability of fruits, vegetables, milk, butter and
meat experienced a good deal of success, but its own stated goal of surpassing the quality
and variety of the American diet was an unrealistic objective. Historians have typically
viewed the vacillations and shortages in the Soviet meat and milk industries as signs of
failure when in fact the overall project experienced a significant level of success.
Improving Soviet diets was only one objective among several Another equally important
aim, less publicly stated, was to modernize food distribution networks, making food into
a poplar consumer item instead a chronically scarce raitioned commodity. While Soviet
food shops hardly looked like modern, successful enterprises in the 1950s with their long
lines and laborious purchasing rituals, they were in fact institutions of convenience for
producers and distributors who wished to limit consumption, allowing a larger number of
people to have access to supplies simply by making them awkward and time-consuming
to obtain. Convenience, in a socialist food network, was in the eye of the beholder.
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Making Siberia Work: Farming in Irkutsk
Introduction
Most attempts to reorganize and improve Soviet agriculture in the postwar period
were focused on the most agriculturally productive regions of the country: Ukraine,
central Russia and the Black Earth region south of Moscow. The previous chapters have
examined how reforms in agriculture worked in areas where farming was a central part of
the economy. How far could the soviet state push its system of agricultural reform? This
chapter looks at the ways in which industrial reform affected the work and lives of people
living in one of the Soviet Union's frontiers. Siberia was the largest, coldest and least
agriculturally inclined territory of the Soviet Union. As in the examples from the
European part of the Soviet Union, the Soviet state's ambitions for reforming and
improving agriculture in Siberia was rooted in more than a desire to increase food
production. In Siberia even more than the other cases studied, agricultural reform came
attached with the goals of surmounting environmental obstacles and establishing political
control.
While the European Soviet Union had been burdened with a variety of
agricultural reconstruction since the last days of World War II, the eastern hinterlands
were largely overlooked by the Ministry of Agriculture. Siberia's traditional role as the
last wilderness of Russia, a backwater where people were relatively free to live and do as
they pleased ended in the mid 1950s when Siberia, Kazakhstan and the rest of the
Eurasian frontier were nominated as places in need of development. Located in the heart
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of Siberia, Irkutsk Oblast, with a 1950 population of just under one million people, was
the target of industrial and agricultural reforms that affected much of the Asian Soviet
Union as the USSR endeavored to settle its Siberian frontier and develop the economy of
its most underexploited territory. To this end, the Ministry of Agriculture and the
Ministry of Agriculture increased its attention to farms in Irkutsk Oblast. It hoped that by
applying more intensive agricultural methods and more skilled management that these
farms, which had been an economic drain on the country for decades, could be made to
turn a profit. I argue that farms in Irkutsk were just not capable of overcoming the
agricultural barriers of cold and isolation from which the region suffered. 55 Located far
from the lifelines of rivers and roads and dominated by the coldest of cold climates,
Irkutsk was not destined to be a self-sustaining-much less profitable-agricultural
landscape.
Siberia in general and Irkutsk in particular were touched by two parallel
development movements in this period, one industrial the other agricultural. In 1954
Nikita Khrushchev announced the creation of new "territorial production complexes," or
TPKs, areas of the Soviet Union that were earmarked for growth and development.
Almost all of these complexes were located in the far North. In Irkutsk, the Bratsk-
I'limsk territory in the northern part of the oblast was singled out for development as a
production complex. Its most important project would be the world's largest
hydroelectric dam across the powerful Angara River. In December of that year,
Khrushchev announced another Siberian development project, the Virgin Lands
Campaign, which would become the centerpiece of his leadership. The Virgin Lands
Campaign aimed at intensifying farming in the eastern Soviet Union. Determined to
improve national grain production, the campaign pushed for new fields across the Soviet
portion of the Eurasian steppe, a swath of land stretching almost 5,000 miles from the
155 When I refer to Irkutsk, I mean the entire oblast, or department. The capital of the oblast is also called
Irkutsk. When I refer to the capital, I use the full phrase Irkutsk city.
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Eastern edge of the Ural Mountains all the way to the Soviet border with Chinese-held
Manchuria. The Virgin Lands Campaign was a bold plan to begin or renew cultivation on
thirteen million hectares of land across Siberia, Kazakhstan and the basin of the Volga
River. '6
The hidden agenda these initiatives shared was to provide impetus for a second
wave of European colonization throughout Soviet Asia, a territory that had historically
been under-administered because of its great distance from Moscow. Beyond their status
as social movements and economic ventures, the Virgin Lands Campaign and the
Territorial Production Complexes were geopolitical maneuvers intended to put more of
Siberia's resources at the disposal of the Soviet state. The Virgin Lands Campaign
experienced initial success in 1956 and 1957, but then chronic and decisive failure. The
project was abandoned in 1970. The slower-paced projects of the TPKs were more
successful, but came at tremendous cost in human labor and resources. In contrast to the
mixed and disappointing results of these two public campaigns, the unstated goal of
pushing more Russian and European Soviet citizens east was a resounding success. 157
Previously European settlement in Siberia had been limited to river valleys and railway
mainlines. The settlers of these outpost communities rarely ventured further inland than
the transportation corridors they monopolized.'"" Breaking from this pattern of selective
colonization, the late 1950s and early 1960s was a period of European settlement in
Siberia. By the end of 1962, European farmers, hunters and workers were thick on the
ground throughout Irkutsk Oblast. Newly expanded Siberian cities became the command
centers for a broad range of economic activities in the hinterlands.
'
56 Ploughed acreage exceeded this plan. In 1954 19 million hectares of new land was ploughed. In 1955
and additional 14 million hectares were ploughed.
157 The GULAG system and the prison exile system precursor arguably accomplished a
similar goal of strategic European settlement across Asia. See Kennan, George. Siberia and the Exile
System. New York: Russell & Russell, 1891. Anne Applebaum, Gulag: A History (New York: W.W.
Norton And Company, 2003).
'58 On railroads as a form of monopolistic state power, see Steven Marks, Road to Power: The Trans-
Siberian Railroad and the Colonization ofAsian Russia, 1850-1917 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
1991).
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The recently published book The Siberian Curse argues that in present-day
Russia, large Siberian cities are an impractical burden on the rest of the nation.159 The
authors note the low employment rate of Siberian cities, the elevated rate of poverty and
the high cost of maintaining city infrastructures and air and rail links between Siberia and
the rest of Russia. Its author, Fiona Hill argues that Siberia's population exceeds the very
stringent natural limits of such a hostile environment. The book even describes a way of
measuring this imbalance called the "temperature-per capita." This formula- the
opposite of the 19 th century theory that linked tropical heat with native indolence-
demonstrates that the colder a city is, the less economically productive its citizens are,
with residents of Siberian cities being far less productive than their counterparts in the
more temperate areas of European Russia.
The argument is an insurmountable hindrance to development is pessimistic but
essentially true. What Hill and others have overlooked is the fact that the "drain" rapport
Siberian cities cultivate with modem Russia is the precise relationship Siberia has
maintained with the rest of Russia for centuries, at least since the rise of Muscovy in the
fifteenth century.6"" Like the Russian empire before it and the Russian federation after it,
the Soviet Union over-invested in Siberia in order to achieve a series of desirable near-
sighted goals that yielded short-term wealth by sacrificing long-term sustainability. The
process of extracting Siberia's wealth and putting it to work for the rest of the Soviet
Union was a time-tested project of empire building."6' Many countries have practiced this
kind of internal colonization; what is surprising in the Siberian case is the unusual set of
159 Fiona Hill. The Siberian Curse: How Soviet Planners Left Russia out in the Cold, (Washington, D.C.:
Brookings Institution Press, 2003).
160 The rise of Muscovy was directly linked to the city-state's ability to monopolize access to Siberian furs.
The fur trade funded the rise of every major Slavic city-state East of the Danube in the Medieval and early
modem period. Janet Martin, Treasures of the Land ofDarkness: The Fur Trade and its Significance for
Medieval Russia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986).
161 See Marks on empire building, as well as Paul Josephson, David Duke and (Empire of Nations)
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tools the Soviet government employed to do the job, a mix of expensive cutting edge
technologies and traditional non-industrial economies.
The Territorial Production Complex located in the northwest quadrant of Irkutsk
Oblast, the Bratsk-Ust Il'imsk Complex, organized a dam project centered in the
previously modest trading outpost of Bratsk. The coming of the TPK inspired a
population explosion in the remote settlement. In a single decade, the population of
Bratsk raion, or province increased from 55.9 thousand residents in 1955 to 206.6
thousand in 1966, almost a 400% increase in a single decade. 162 Along with the flood of
immigration, new industries arrived to support the dam's construction. These new
industries and people greatly increased the demands on the environment and on the
technological infrastructure of the oblast.
The concomitant Virgin Lands Campaign increased the acreage of cultivated land
across the oblast, but the increased attention the Ministry of Agriculture gave to Irkutsk
was not limited to ill-fated directives on growing sweet corn and breeding chickens.
Irkutsk's true value did not lie in converting its acidic soil and larch forests into profitable
farmland. Rather its wealth was stored in its rivers and forests and perhaps especially in
its animals, the fur-bearing creatures that inhabited the taiga that covered over 80% of the
oblast. It was toward these animals that traditional and non-industrial solutions were
directed. In the late 1950s, a new trade in fur arose as the Ministry of Agriculture's
solution to offset the financial drain of failing collective farms. Siberians had been
hunting fur-bearing animals all along, but the state's ability to request and requisition furs
that these hunters produced improved between 1955 and 1960. By creating legal, state-
regulated markets for purchasing pelts, the state acquired a windfall in good furs, which it
then sold on the international market for a high profit. By paying a fair price for the furs
162 A.A. Dolgolyuk, Formirovanie Trudovykh Kollektiviv Bratskogo-Ust'-Ilimsokogo TPK (Territorial'no
Proizvostvennykh Kompleksov). p.62
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it purchased, and by regulating the season, permits, guns and other equipment of hunters
the state was able to create a sustainable, profitable Siberian industry.
Siberia's Resources
Siberia is rich in natural resources, but these resources are not easy to access:
weather, distance and rugged terrain have stymied many ambitious development
projects. 61 3 In 2006 Siberia remains a leading producer of gold, oil, luxury fur, old
growth timber and diamonds, in other words, some of the most precious and valuable
commodities on the world market today. It is not just that Siberia, due to its
inaccessibility, has managed to avoid being plundered and depleted at the same rate as
the rest of the world. Siberia was also born rich. Two billion years ago the core of Siberia
existed as a proto-continent called Angaraland. As the Eurasian landmass formed,
Angaraland squeezed against continents and its center formed a volcanically active
territory known as the Siberian Flats. Volcanic activity and the extraordinary geomorphic
pressure of continent formation created dense mineral deposits deep uunderground.
Further geomorphic activity pushed them near to the earth's surface. Much like the early
gold deposits of California and Northern Canada, the Flats of Irkutsk and Iakustk oblasts
contained gold veins that paralleled the courses of deep alluvial rivers. Gold ore occurred
in huge, visible chunks, prompting informal prospecting as well as more formal claims by
China and Russia to exclusive mining rights.164
Unlike gold, which had been mined as early as the 18t h century by native Evenk
traders, the Siberian diamond industry was purely a product of the twentieth century,
specifically of the Cold War. Before the 1950s, the USSR had no domestic diamond
industry and imported its diamonds from the United States and South Africa. In 1950 the
163 For example, the Baikal-Amur Mainline, or BAM and the Arctic Sea Route. See Christopher Ward,
"The 'Path to the Future' or the Road to Nowhere?: A Political and Social Examination of the Construction
of the Baikal-Amur Mainline Railway (BAM), 1974-1984." Ph.D. diss. University of North Carolina,
Chapel Hill, 2002.
164 Between 1924-1925, Yakutsk oblast (today, Sakha) experience a sizeable gold rush which largely
remains historically undocumented. JohnTichotsky, Russia's Diamond Colony: The Republic ofSakha.
Amsterdam: Harwood Academic, 2000.
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United States, a leading manufacturer in industrial diamonds-those used to cut and
shape steel--banned American diamond imports to the Soviet Union in the hopes of
crippling Soviet steel output. Although trade routes to South Africa and Rhodesia (now
Zimbabwe) were still accessible to the USSR, these countries were in the business of
commercial gemstones and could not supply the Soviet Union with enough industry
diamonds. Faced with this scarcity the Soviet Union turned to its own resources, first
exploring the very costly possibility of synthetically manufacturing diamonds by
pressurizing graphite, and then studying the feasibility of creating a diamond mining
industry in distant Yakutsk oblast. The Yakutsk option was viable, and thus in 1955 a
new Soviet diamond mining industry was born. By late 1955 South African mining
experts had been hired to supervise the construction of open-pit mines. While the Soviet
Union made most of its profits from selling Yakutsk diamonds as gemstones (mostly
through South African traders), the official history of diamond mining in Yakutsk
focused on the industrial uses of the mineral, rather than on its commercial value as a
consumer item.' s"
Mineral resources were only the most obvious source of wealth to emerge from
Siberia's unusual natural history. Its most vital resource lay not in what could be
extracted from the earth, but in the living capital flourished within its borders. Siberia is
covered equally by three very different ecosystems that stretch like bands from east to
west across the territory. Each of these swathes stretches the length of Siberia. The
northernmost band is tundra, a great semi-frozen plain that supports shallow rooted
grasses and lichens. The southern band is another belt of grass, the steppe. Between these
lies the taiga, the larch and pine forests where the majority of Russia's fur-bearing
animals lived.
165 Tichotsky, Russia's Diamond Colony, ch. 3. Tichkovsky describes the central irony of this new industry,
which is that Soviet exports consisted of tiny gem-quality diamonds and the newly created American
"anniversary" wedding bands, studded with smaller diamonds, was the niche market that Soviet exports
were best able to fill. Thus the country that willfully disrupted stopped diamond imports in the hopes of
economically crippling the Soviet Union became a net importer of Soviet diamonds.
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The taiga of northern Russia contains 22% of the world's forested area.'"1 In the
1960s, these numbers were even larger. In contrast, Canada's forests count for less than
7% of forested area. Almost all of Russian forests are of the northern boreal type, often
referred to as taiga, and the majority of these are located in Siberia. Irkutsk holds over
half of Russia's coniferous forests and timber was one of the first industrial products to
be extracted from Irkutsk. Lumber mills constructed along the banks of the Angara were
central to the industrial development of Irkutsk. While lumber was not associated with
the same quick profit that the gold and diamond industries were in the neighboring
Yakutsk Oblast, timber milling and the paper industry were the province's bread and
butter economies and remain so to this day.1 67 The forests that covered over 3/4 of Siberia
were important for the Siberian economy beyond its status as a supplier of wood and
wood products. The fur-bearing animals living within the forests: squirrels, foxes, ermine
and sable also helped Siberia's economic development. Furthermore, unlike the gold rush
or the lumber mills that went up along the Angara which were relatively recently
developed industries, the Siberian fur trade had been a continuous source of income from
the middle ages up to the present.
Furs have always been used by humans because of their superior ability to
insulate, but they are also a symbol of luxury. When the first international trade networks
were established between Slavic speaking city-states in the territory that would become
Russia and the Kingdom of Poland-Lithuania, the first traded goods were luxury items
such as pepper, spices and salt and most importantly fur. The ascending European
empires adopted the passion for fur trimmings and costumes that had been a constant of
the Ottoman and Chinese empires. Most of the fur that adorned the capes of royalty and
other rich classes in European, Asian and Middle Eastern Empires started as the hides of
166 From http://www.forest.ru/eng/basics/
167 See Bureau for Regional Outreach Campaigns, The Wild East: Trees in Transit, 2001. Available online
at http://www.forest.ru/eng/publications/wildeast/.
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animals from the far North of Russia and Siberia. From the Middle Ages through to the
present day, the two most popular furs coming out the Ural mountains and the Siberian
taiga were squirrel and sable. European red squirrels were common across the Eurasian
continent, but Siberia was home to grey squirrels, a larger, plusher species.'68 Sable, the
most expensive and rarest commercially available fur, was also one of the most insulating
furs but it was most valued (and thus graded) principally on its color and on its
glossiness.'"'
Once the pelts of these two animals, sable and squirrel, made it out of Siberia and
into a furriers sewing room, the two species of fur filled two different marketing niches.
Squirrel pelts were the more plentiful and more reasonably priced, and hats, capes and
coats made entirely from the skins of squirrels was worn by royalty and rich commoners
alike, especially after the 15th century, when the volume of furs exported out of Siberia
increased tremendously.17 Sable, on the other hand, was rare and expensive and used
only for trim, mostly for the clothing of royalty. This exclusivity had been established in
medieval Europe through legal decree. While squirrel pelts were an affordable luxury,
sable trim was restricted to the royal elite.
The prices of squirrel and sable pelts were relatively static in relation to each
other, but the price of furs overall fluctuated tremendously, based on the volume of trade
merchants were able to do with Moscow, Novgorod and Kazan.'71 Over the course of the
early modern period demand for squirrel and sable pelts rose and fell depending on
patterns of national wealth and also depending on the fashions of the French courts. At
times when full fur costumes and capes were popular and European royalty could tolerate
commoners in fur, then squirrel was in demand and trimming furs like sable waned in
168 The European red squirrel is Sciurus vulgaris. The Siberian grey squirrel is Sciurus cinereus.
169 Janet Martin Treasures of the Land of Darkness: The Fur Trade and its Significance for Medieval
Russia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986).
170 Ibid.
'7' According to this book, sables fetched between 5-10 times the value of squirrels in trade between
Moscow and the Polish Empire. In modem times,
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popularity. When times when leaner, or when the courts of England, France or the
Netherlands had active legislation forbidding commoners from wearing skins aside from
those of local animals, then sables were the choice of the market and the demand for
squirrel pelts dropped. Throughout the Early modem period, furriers invented new ways
of wearing fur, such as muffs and stoles which put skins (either sable or squirrel) on
display as an even more visible accessory item, thus expanding the overall fur market.
The varying but ever-increasing international demands from European markets
influenced hunting and trade practices in northwestern Russia and Siberia. Demand for
sable in particular pushed the early Muscovy empire to establish trading ports along
Siberian rivers, effectively colonizing Siberia and lengthening the trade and tribute paths
that had already been established with circumpolar hunting peoples in north Russia and
the Ural highlands.172 Such pressures were ecologically unsustainable.'73 From the 17 th
century until the late 19t century, sable became so scarce that it disappeared entirely
from forests west of the Urals, where it had once been plentiful, and was so rarely
encountered in Siberia that iasak and other taxes, which had originally been expressed in
sable pelts, were recalibrated using other animals or money. By the middle of the 19t
century, due to general fur scarcity the iasak had evolved into a system of monetary
taxation for a number of far northern peoples. 174
Because of the environment in Siberia and because of the colonial, iasak based
economy Russia imposed on the territory, squirrel and sable skins were an important
commodity throughout Siberia's long history of human habitation. The first Russians to
travel through Siberia established trade-tribute relations with natives who were already
172 Yuri Slezkine, Arctic Mirrors: Russia and the Small Peoples of the Far North (Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 1994).
'73 John F. Richards, The Unending Frontier: An Environmental History of the Early Modern World
9Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003) 517-546.
174 Slezkine, Arctic Mirrors, pp. 88-89. Tax categories were based on more than just fur scarcity and
monetary wealth among native groups; they were putatively based on whether native groups were "settled,"
"nomadic" or "wandering" (that is, semi-nomadic). Slezkine argues that categorization was affected by
political and economic concerns as much as by traditional land-use relationships.
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hunting the animals. In exchange for guns, beads, bolts of cloth, alcohol, tobacco and
other manufactured goods from western Russia, Russian traders demanded the pelts of
sables, minks, martens and squirrels.' 75 In addition to the human predation, the
populations of fur bearing animals in the far north waxed and waned depending on
natural pressures such as ground cover and food availability. Grey squirrels were prey for
many of the larger forest-dwelling carnivores. Sables, on the other hand, were near the
top of the food chain and had few natural predators aside from the occasional Siberian
tiger, but, as in the example of early modern sable scarcity given above, human predation
was hardly insignificant. Preying on fur-bearing creatures in Siberia was an activity that
required a high level of skill as well as no small investment in equipment. Hunting sable
and squirrel were complimentary activities, and most hunters were "universalnye"
meaning they went after both quarry, as well as foxes, martens, beavers, lynxes and
bears. Well into the mid-twentieth century in Irkutsk, hunters went about trapping,
snaring and shooting their game in ways that closely resembled the practices of hunters
from the seventeenth century and earlier."76
Hunting had originally been an occupation of Siberia's native groups which in
Irkutsk were made up of Evenks, Tofa (Tofalar) and Buriats, semi-nomadic tribes who
combined seasonal hunting with year-round semi-nomadic reindeer herding, fishing and
horse breeding. While the Russian empire's early attempts to colonize Siberia had only
'175 In the mid 17 th century, a typical iasak exchange was 5 sable-pelts (with tails) for 1 priatka bisery
(presumably shank of beads) or 1 priatka odekuyu (presumably bolt of cloth). Materiallypo Istorii lakutii
XVII Veka, dokumenty iasachnogo sbora (Files on the History of lakutia in the 17 th Century, Tribute
Collection Documents) chast 1, Nauka Press, Moscow, 1970. p. 60 .The iasak is almost always treated in
the historical literature as a forced extraction rather than an exchange. I disagree. While iasak meant
different things at different times, in Irkustk it was primarily a trade exchange.On iasak as involuntary
tribute, see Yuri Slezkine, Arctic Mirrors, Cornell University Press 1994, Basil Dmytryshyn "The
Administration Apparatus of the Russian Colony in Siberia and Northern Asia 1581-1700 in The History of
Siberia, ed. Alan Wood 1991, and Raymond Fisher The Russian Fur Trade, 1550-1700. Berkeley and Los
Angeles, University of California Press, 1943. David N. Collins' critique of this historiography is
persuasive."The natives, who had known yasak, or alman, before the Russians arrived on the scene and
regarded it as a payment by a vanquished people to its conqueror...would pay only as long as it suited
them." "Subjugation and Settlement in 17t and 18 th Century Siberia," The History ofSiberia, p. 42.
'
76 Lyudmila M. Saburova. Kul'tura I Byt Russkogo Naseleniia Priangar'ia (Nauka Press, Leningrad
1967).
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limited success, the trapping and hunting economies had been permanently influenced by
one category of Russian immigrant to Siberia--the promyshlenniki, (literally a producer
or furnisher; a frontier entrepreneur)-who served as a less-than-scrupulous middleman
in trade with native groups as well as operating independently as a hunter and trapper in
his own right. These traders introduced two important changes to the fur economy. First,
far more often than the Russian state officials, they proved willing to use force, extortion
and kidnapping to get what they wanted from local populations. While the Sibirskii
Prikaz, or Siberian District Office in charge of collecting, appraising and selling Siberian
furs adjusted iasak requirements depending on animal availability as well as market
demands, the less honorable promyshlenniki made no such allowances. 77 While the
Sibirskii Prikaz only rarely used extreme force in collecting iasak from native groups, it
gladly purchased all the pelts promyshlenniki had to sell, thereby unofficially subsidizing
an unregulated and unethical system of trade."17 Because they made their living off of
trade, promyshlenniki also encouraged native dependency on European staples such as
wheat flour, tobacco, alcohol and sugar, eroding the self-sufficient economies of these
societies.
The arrival ofpromyshlenniki in Siberia also created a new cultural identity, the
Sibiriak or Russian Siberian. Such a social category had never before existed, but the
model proved durable, and the term is used proudly by European Siberians today."17 In
behavior and appearance, these first generation Sibiriaki were superficially similar to the
native groups whose property and livelihood they had usurped through extractive trade
relations. Rugged and self reliant, the Russian Sibiriak also resembled the stereotypical
mountain man of the American West, or the voyageur of Canada, and like these other
'77 An example of the Sibirskii Prikaz adjustment: In Iakutiia prior to about 1750, the annual iasak expected
of each adult native man was 20 sables. After 1750 this was reduced to 5 sables, and a larger range of
animals were accepted in place of sable pelts.
178 Dmytryshyn in The History ofSiberia, pp. 22-24.
'79 In 1950 there were a number of different periodicals dedicated to the Siberian hunting and fishing
lifestyle, and the local newspaper, Vostochno-Sibirskaiapravdu ran hagiographic articles on such men
throughout the 1950s.
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iconographic characters, the Sibiriak became a symbol of nationalist pride, an authentic
and legendary member of the pageant of Russian history. While promyshlenniki operated
as traders, most of them hunted and fished. Over time, many of them acquired deeds
through gift or purchase from the imperial government for property in the arable valleys
of Siberia While many of the original promyshlenniki moved East without spouses or
children, intending to make or increase their fortunes before returning to European
Russia, a significant number of these men permanently settled in Irkutsk and other
eastern districts, often settling down with native women and raising mixed-race
families. 18
The ancestors of this first generation ofpromyshlenniki as well as more recent
immigrants were residents who, at the time of the Russian Revolution in Irkutsk, made
their living in part off the twentieth century fur trade."1 ' In the 1950s these men-and they
were almost exclusively men-still hunted as they had several centuries earlier, on foot
either individually or in groups of three or four.182 Their equipment included dogs, rifles,
thick boots and jackets. Since 1900, sable populations had been so low the animals had
almost disappeared from the registries created by the state, but by 1955 studies by Soviet
geographers and biologists determined that the animal had recovered and was plentiful
across most of Irkutsk.' 83 This discovery happily coincided with the need to find Siberian
collective farmers an additional occupation: agriculture in Irkutsk and elsewhere in the
territory was simply not a profitable venture. While the original European settlers of
Irkustk had settled in to farming in the relatively temperate and productive valleys of the
is0 Dmytryshyn, ..22,31-32.
'sl 19 th century immigrants to Siberia included tens of thousands-perhaps hundreds of thousands--of
prisoner-colonists. These were petty criminals: mendicants, drunks and thieves who had been sent East
rather than to prison. East. George Kennan, Siberia and the Exile System (New York: Russell & Russell,
1891).
'
82 Lyudmila M. Saburova, Kul'tura i Byt Russkogo Naseleniia Priangar'ia (Leningrad: Nauka, 1967).
183 "Otchet o Rabote Ekspeditsii po Okhoty Ekonomicheskomu Analizu...1959-1960," Gosudarstvenny
Arkhiv rkutskoi Oblast (GAIO) R147/ 1/ 10:1309 author: B.V. Lazarev. p.21. Lazarev writes "at the
present times sables have settled in almost all hunting districts (okhotugod'ia).. .The greatest density of
sables have been observed in the districts on the right bank of the Lena River, and also in the northern
hunting district collectives."
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Angara and Lena Rivers, collectivization and the push to produce more grain for export
had turned previously self-sufficient farms into bankrupt, dependent entities.
Farming and Industry in Irkutsk
The Buriats, Evenks and Tofa who first settled in Irkutsk were hunters and
reindeer pastoralists who also fished and bred horses but did not farm. Although
nomadic, their migration routes were limited to river valleys and former lakebeds, taking
advantage of these open, grassy areas in a landscape that was otherwise marshy and
forested. The first farming societies to settle in Irkutsk were the Kurikany, who inhabited
the Angara river basin between the sixth and the ninth centuries, digging irrigation canals
and creating reservoirs to trap water during spring floods for use in their fields during the
dry summer months. 184 When Russians arrived and built their first fort in Yeniseisk in
1619, the Kurikany were long gone, but the European immigrants relied upon Evenk
informants to teach them about navigating the water networks and to help them create
maps that would govern their further movements into eastern Siberia.'85
Since the first fort at Yeniseisk, human settlements have stayed close to the same
river valleys the original indigenous inhabitants sought out. In the 1950s, 95% of the
population of Irkutsk was still located in the valley of the Angara.'8 6 And, although during
the Imperial period the Russian forts remained militarized and relied on boat deliveries of
food and supplies from the west, over time small villages and settlements appeared on the
banks of the Angara. These farmers were a diverse community of Old Believers expelled
from the Russian Orthodox Church in the sixteenth century, escaped serfs, second and
third generation promyshlenniki and prisoner-colonists, exiled to Siberia for petty crimes.
Riverside farms were small and diverse: a shortage of human and horse power limited
both plot size and productivity; in 1949 the oblast was farmed by 38,449 horses and just
184 B.B.Dashibalov, Arkheologicheskie Pamiatniki Kurykan IKhori (Ulan Ude: BNTs SORAN, 1995).
185 Leonid Bezrukov, Angara: Doch'Baikal. Trans. Grigorii Bobylev (Irkutsk: ULISS, 1994).
186 Ibid.
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under 2,000 low-horsepower tractors. 187 Farmers raised buckwheat, barley and wheat, a
few vegetables, and turnips and hay for their cows and horses. Produce went mainly to
feed the farmer's family, but surplus was sold to the military populations within the forts
as well as to native populations. By the late nineteenth century, and extending into the
postwar period, Irkutsk peasant farmers had created a rural culture that was descended
from but not identical to peasant culture in European Russia. Siberian farmers had a
separate vocabulary, used different tools, different farming techniques and in general
practiced much more communally-based forms of rural enterprise than their European
counterparts. 188
The major technological innovation to increase the ties between European Russia
and Siberia at the end of the 19th century was the completion of the Tran Siberian railroad
in 1891.'"1 While the rail line was hardly fail safe-ice, derailments and engine failures
were all too common--the Tran-Sib represented a regular and (comparatively) timely
link between Siberia and European Russia. Before the railway, travelers and caravans had
relied on roads and waterways which were impassable during the slushy periods of spring
and fall. The roads were rough and boat travel was both dangerous and slow, as the rivers
in Siberia all ran swiftly Northwest, making travel into Siberia go at a snail's pace. Once
the Tran Siberian line was in place, it was possible to travel to and from Siberia in
relative comfort and in a relatively short time-weeks instead of months. It was also
possible to send shipments of heavy things like canned foods, sacks of grain. For the first
time, weight was not a major barrier in shipments sent to Siberia.
Irkutsk farming and hunting enterprises were both collectivized in the first
collectivization drives of 1929-1930. The Committee of the North was originally in
187 "Svodnye godovye otchet za 1949 god. Irkutskoi oblast"RGAE 7468/15/ 263:120. Total (machine)
horsepower of working tractors was listed at 26, 985 HP. This means that horses were by far the most
important source of draft power in the oblast.
8 8 Lyudmila M. Saburova, Kul'tura i Byt Russkogo Naseleniia Priangar'ia. This last claim of communality
is credible but suspect, given the expectation that ethnographic studies would find evidence of such
communality.
189 Steven Marks, Road to Power.
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charge of organizing hunting and herding collectives. In general, the collectivization
campaigns of the first Five Year Plan oversimplified the economies of far northern
groups, lumping them into exclusive categories that did were not necessarily a good fit
with their traditional mixed economies. Thus Buriats became shepherds, Evenks were
classed as hunters, and so on. These categories were all lowing-paying and excluded
native groups from access to skilled jobs, thus preventing them from social mobility. 9"" In
the 1950s in Irkutsk the Ministry of Agriculture inherited the responsibility of overseeing
these cooperatives as well as the more traditional farming enterprises, with whose
practices the Ministry of Agriculture was more familiar.
Socialist political agendas in general and collective agriculture in particular had
never been pursued enthusiastically in the oblast. While the marginality and uncertainty
of rural life in a cold frontier naturally united neighbors and villages more strongly than
they did in prosperous areas with better road networks, the Irkutsk countryside was not
known for its political activism. Outside of the city of Irkutsk, the oblast's single major
urban area, the number of members of the Communist Party was far lower than it was for
the Union as a whole."' While most farms had officially been collectivized in the 1930s,
mechanization and electrification, the hallmarks of kolkhoz modernization, had still not
reached the majority of collective farms as late as 1958.192 Collective farmers plowed
with horses, used kerosene lamps at night and hauled water by hand from wells in old
milk cans, sometimes from as far as five kilometers away."' Collective farms and hunting
190 Aleksander Pika and Dmitri Bogoiavlenskii have discussed this phenomenon, naming it lumpenization.
Aleksandr Pika ed. Neotraditionalism in the Russian North: Indigenous Peoples and the Legacy of
Perestroika. Seattle and London: Univesity of Washington, 1999. p.8, p.128-129
'9' ObKom Part Arkhiv CITE
192 GAIO/ R147/1/1628a. Of 547 Kolkhozii in Irkutsk in 1958, only 140 had electricity. Tractor numbers
are harder to gauge, as the number of working tractors was counted in different ways at different times of
the year. The small kolkhoz of Bolshevik, had 40 adults, and one tractor (a tiny DT-14) in 1958. In 1960
the kolkhoz Taezhnik, with 88 adults had two tractors, both DT-54s. GAIO R147/1/1309, GAIO
R147/1/1313
193 In spite of(or perhaps in place of) the lack of machinery, the oblast printed a surprisingly high number
of rural newspapers; 42 were listed in 1950, at least 12 dedicated specifically to modem agriculture. Irkutsk
ObKom PartArkhiv 127/27/10 Protokoly 21-29 Aprelia.
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cooperatives alike held few administrative meetings, a signal to the Party that enthusiasm
was low in the countryside. 194 While Irkutsk had few of the material benefits that came
along with belonging to the Soviet Union, it made the same sacrifices as mainland
Russia, losing 60% of its male population to the war, 15% permanently."' As late as
1960, women were the majority of workers on collective farms and correspondingly did
much of the hardest work. Women worked as grain weighers during the harvest in Irkutsk
throughout the 1950s, a job women held in European Russia and Ukraine only during and
immediately after the war."96
Beyond the labor shortage that plagued Siberia in the postwar years, Irkutsk
suffered from a number of other endemic problems. The first and most obvious of these
was the weather: it was simply too cold to cultivate many kinds of plants and animals,
and the Ministry of Agriculture's optimistic central planning directives meant that
collective farmers wasted time pampering delicate plants in greenhouses, scraping snow
off fields to promote ground thawing, and planting fruit trees that would not survive their
first winter."7 Another concern was the poor soil quality. Most of Siberia's soils, like
Kazakhstan's, were pod'zol, a loose, acidic sandy soil without much clay to hold it
together. While the soil of the Angara's river basin was richer in sediments, it was still a
sandy pod'zol, which meant it could be easily depleted of its nutrients and was prone to
blowing away if it was overtilled. Thus the less-effective wooden ploughs and harrows
that were still in use in the twentieth century were better suited to the marginal fields of
Irkutsk than mechanized, large scale agriculture ever could be. In general Irkutsk was
capable of supporting agriculture for only a very small number of people. Before the mid
twentieth century this was hardly a problem because very few people had chosen to settle
194 ObKom PartArkhiv CITE
195 This is not the percentage who died at the front, but the percentage who had not returned home after the
war. This is an average. One collective farm in Chakuskogo district, with 88 members in 1960 reported that
60 of its members did not return from the front. "Otchet ob okhotustroistve Selkhoz artel Taezhnik"
GAIO/R147/1/1313: 12
196 "Dokumenty po vydache natural'noi premii kombainerov MTS...1958-1960" GAIO R147/1/1629: 6
197 All these activities were featured in articles in Vostochno-Sibirskaia pravdu, the Irkutsk City newspaper.
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in Eastern Siberia. Those who were there, whether native or European, approached
farming as an afterthought: the real draw of Irkutsk, except for those exceptional people
who came or stayed for the aesthetic beauty of the place, was in its extractive industries.
Farming was a means of provisioning more profitable ways of living.
Siberia's rise to prominence in the 1950s and 1960s was part of a larger campaign
to encourage the economic growth of the Soviet Union's less-developed Asian half by
creating new agricultural and industrial centers of production.' 98 One The Virgin Lands
Campaign encouraged families and young workers to move east in order to establish
farms in previously untilled lands across Siberia and Kazakhstan and the Territorial
Production Complexes created new extractive industrial bases: the diamond mines in
Yakutsk, six different hydroelectric stations along the Angara and its tributaries and new
paper plants on the banks of Lake Baikal were all new industries in Siberia that began as
TPK projects. 199 While different in theme -the VLC aimed to increase the productivity
and profitability of agriculture while the TPKs were targeted at the so-called "heavy"
industries- both projects shared the goal of putting Siberia to work for the Union.
Additionally, the economies and materials of agriculture and other industries were so
intertwined by mid-century that the TPK at Bratsk and the Virgin Lands Campaign
throughout Irkutsk influenced each other in ways neither anticipated by the state, nor
respond to within the established framework of industrial development.
As Michaela Pohl has shown in her excellent work on the Virgin Lands
Campaign, this project had several goals. One was to isolate potentially insubordinate
populations in Europe, removing them from economically strategic locations such as the
Crimean peninsula, and thus reducing their power as dissidents. These forced relocations
were similar in form and execution to the exile of political activists to Siberia in the
198 While the state had possessed an ongoing interest in establishing collective farms in the east, its most
prominent statement of intentions to industrialize the East were given in the 1939 Party Congress. For an
overview, see Stephan G. Prociuk, "The Territorial Pattern of Industrialization in the USSR: A Case Study
in Location of Industry," Soviet Studies (1961):
199 Leonid Bezrukov, Angara: Doch' Baikal, Trans. Grigorii Bobylev.(Irkutsk: ULISS, 1994).
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nineteenth century.200 While the involuntary nature of some moves should be highlighted,
plenty of European Soviet citizens willingly moved to Kazakhstan and Siberia. Even
before the Virgin Lands Campaign began in 1954 many Soviet citizens whose homes and
farms had been occupied and damaged in the war had moved east, because, as one such
immigrant noted, it was easier to have a fresh start in a new place than it was to rebuild
what had been destroyed. In the last years of Stalin's reign, when simply having survived
the war while living in Nazi-occupied territories was a potentially criminal act of
collaboration, voluntarily relocating to Siberia and Kazakhstan allowed many the chance
to get lost in an administrative shuffle, thus erasing the looming suspicion of wartime
collaboration and avoiding an involuntary trip North or East, to one of the many prisons
of the Gulag system.20'
In Khrushchev's time, citizens were actively encouraged to relocate. Due to the
mass urbanization movement in the postwar era, European Soviet cities were
overcrowded and housing for new in-migrants was critically short. Living and working in
popular cities in the Soviet Union was regulated by the state, and a variety of devices
were invented to discourage people from moving to Moscow and Leningrad. Recent
college graduates, to repay the free education the state had given them, were expected to
provide several years of service in whatever Soviet town or city required their services.
The Ministry of Work advertised its Eastern settlements as desirable places to relocate,
offering free train fare to families with two or more full-time workers. These ads stressed
the high quality of life, the interesting jobs available, and highlighted the spirit of
adventure inherent in these eastern projects.20 2 Migrating East was an opportunity to
participate in history, a chance to help physically build socialism much as the postwar
generation's parents and grandparents had done in the 1920s and 1930s, by constructing
200 Suspicion often fell on ethnic minorities, such as German-speaking Russians. See Michaela Pohl. The
Virgin Lands: Between Memory and Forgetting. Ph.D. diss. Indiana University, 2001.
201 Anne Applebaum, Gulag.
202 Pohl, Between Memory and Forgetting.
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dams or starting farms. The incentives to head East combined with the hardships facing
young workers in the crowded cities of the European Soviet Union were a combination of
push/pull factors that helped many decide to make the move.
The conditions immigrants found in the east were often not what they expected.
Everyday supplies like home furnishings, shoes and clothing were very scarce; in Bratsk
workers walked around town in "Studebakers", thick homemade shoes with soles cut
from spent truck tires.20 3 On the newly created state farms of the Virgin Lands, public
institutions like schools and bath-houses were also rare or non-existent. Housing for
many new immigrants was in earth dugouts, or worse-in tents. 204 Immigrants to new
state farms were supplied with machines that didn't work due to poor gas and oil
distribution networks and almost no supplies of spare parts. While the Ministry of
Agriculture had managed to organize an impressive rush-order shipment of several
thousand of its best combines and tractors east, it had failed to anticipate the inevitable
break-downs of new machines. Worse yet, the rushed nature of the orders meant that
many machines had shipped out before being completely finished at the factory.
Receiving officials reported tractors and combines missing such vital components as
seats and steering wheels. Providing the right combination of tools for the job was also a
challenge. Although the oblast was chronically short on tractor power, the Machine
Tractor Stations in Irkutsk received thousands of state-of-the-art combines, machines that
were most effective when used in co-odination with tractors. In 1958, when the Machine
Tractor Station system was dissolved, small collective farms that were otherwise
dependent on horses for field work were forced into buying these expensive machines,
falling deeply into debt from purchases they could not use.
203 On unexpected hardship, see Pohl, Between Memory and Forgetting ch. 2. On conditions in Bratsk, see
"Visit to Irkutsk, Bratsk and the Lake Baikal Area " in NARA/ RG 166 "Records of the Foreign
agricultural service Narrative reports 1955-1961"/Box 870, December 21, 1961, The USSR originally
acquired Studebakers from World War II era British lend-lease shipments.
204 On statistics for baths, dugouts and tents, see GAIO/R127/27/12: 5
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The Virgin Lands Campaign planners made a number of mistakes and
miscalculations. The most grave of these were environmental. Optimistically assuming
that the erosive tendencies of pod'zol soils could be solved through technical
interventions like windbreaks and irrigantion, agricultural policies in the Far East worked
the land much too hard. After a series of successful years starting in the late 1950s, by the
early 1960s the Soviet Union was battling serious erosion across almost all of its newly
ploughed lands.20 5 Mass cultivation, deep, straight-line plowing and over-disking made
the newly opened Virgin Lands susceptible to wind erosion in a way that smaller,
irregular horse ploughed fields were not.
The Virgin Lands Campaign in Irkutsk, ironically involved very few 'virgin'
tracts of land. Instead, the Virgin Lands committee earmarked funds for the creation of a
number of new state farms across the department for the purpose of better provisioning
the new anticipated urban areas Irkutsk would soon support. In ten years, the department
expected to double its total population, from fewer than 2 million in 1960 to over 4
million by 1970.206 One major mistake the Ministry of Agriculture made when addressing
food provisioning was to use an approach that had become common (and was in fact
fairly successful) around European soviet cities. This was to artificially manufacture a
series of distribution rings around major metropolitan areas. The areas of specialization
for farms, taxes, and prices were all reckoned using a series of concentric circles, with
higher-priced and fragile commodities being located closer to urban centers, and more
robust and less valuable commodities being produced further from cities. The intent was
to localize as much of the food production as possible, thereby reducing transportation
costs and loss due to spoilage or poor coordination. Moscow, the best-realized (and most
functional) model of this system had dairy farms and fruit, potato and vegetable farms
immediately outside the urban district. Further out in a second ring, pig farms and
205 Medvedev, Soviet Agriculture, 192-193.
206 "Visit to Irkutsk," op. cit.
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chicken farms raised meat for the city.207 One ring past that were fruit orchards and grain
fields. While Moscow, as the USSR's largest city, was a sink for much more produce
than that raised in its environs, the system was still successful at earmarking strategic
suburban spaces that afforded cities a basic level of self-sufficiency.
The imposition of these farming rings had worked well across the European
USSR, and as a result by the 1960s every major city had a small but reliable supply of
truck produce, that put fresh fruits, potatoes and milk on sale in urban state stores. The
novelty here was not that local foods were being sold in cities rather that the state's
farming systems had succeeded in this task. This system of grading local and extralocal
provisioning was one the state had appropriated from private and informal food
distribution networks. Given effective management, there was no reason to believe this
system would not work in any location where an urban population was settled in an
agriculturally productive place. Irkutsk, however, was not such a place.
Postwar immigrants to Irkutsk had moved there to build a dam and participate in
other developing industries and by 1960 the rate of immigration was 100,000 new
residents per year.20 8 These new immigrants were workers and not farmers, but they
needed food. The cheapest and most convenient way to feed these new workers would
have been to supply them with locally produced food, but agricultural networks were, for
the reasons discussed above, still weak when the Bratsk project was gathering
momentum. In the first years of the Bratsk campaign provisions were shipped to the city
by rail, but the high cost of transportation made this prohibitively expensive. Foodstuffs
in general were more expensive in Bratsk than in the rest of the country, reflecting these
high transportation costs. Although the state was prepared to expand and intensify
farming in the oblast, environmental and geographical obstacles prevented the successful
207 For an example of the pig farms, see "perepiski s sovet ministrov RSFSR 1956" RGAE 7803
(MinSovKhoz) /1/1861: 41-42
08 Ibid. The number of total immigrants expected in this decade would thus be I million. Presumably, the
further 1 million person population gain Irkutsk expected would be made up of new births and longer life
spans.
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implementation of the "ring" design so favored by the Ministry of Agriculture east of the
Urals.
Nonetheless, around the major cities of Siberia and Kazakhstan ring farms were
established in an attempt to provision urban areas. Around the cities of Irkutsk and Bratsk
milk, fruit and vegetable sovkhozii were established within a half day's train ride. In order
to combat the cold, building, maintaining and heating greenhouses was a major capital
expense of many farms. Tomatoes, peppers, cucumbers and fresh peas were started in
greenhouses across the oblast; they never would have survived outside.20 9 In general,
greenhouse grown food was labor intensive and yielded low returns for a very high input.
The milk and meat producing sovkhozii were expected to produce their own winter
fodder, partially in the form of feed corn, which had become the feed staple for the rest of
the Union. The same was true of the numerous dairies in Irkutsk Oblast, which had been
established to supply cities with fresh milk, but which produced so little milk they were
only commercially productive for 5 months of the year. Dairies and open-range cattle
grazing were the biggest drains on the Ikrutsk agricultural economy.210
Beyond the weather and the shortage of labor these concentric ring farms were
bound to fail because the economies of the USSR's outpost holdings functioned very
differently from those of the main part of the country. Historically, Siberia, Kazakhstan,
Mongolia and Manchuria all enjoyed close ties to the Russian empire and later to the
Soviet Union, but in this relationship, these places were colonies and not fully
participatory states; the Russian state acted as a benefactor. All of these lands were
agriculturally marginal with low human populations. The native civilizations that had
lasted longest in Irkutsk and the other northern and eastern provinces were those that
relied on livelihoods other than agriculture: hunting, fishing, and herding sheep or
209 Vostochno-Sibirskaia Pravdu CITE
210 "Svodnyi Godovoi Otchetza 1962 God. Irkutskogo oblastogo Upravleniia Proizvodstva Izagotovoi
Sel'khozproduktov" GARF 616/1/5642.
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reindeer. The Europeans who had previously settled in Irkutsk had wisely adopted similar
lifestyles, supporting themselves through diverse occupations, including but not centered
around farming. This promyshlennik lifestyle, in which colonists and traders lived so far
away from their homeland that they turned to local economies and lifestyles in order to
survive, became an important part of Siberian (European) cultural identity.
In reckoning the costs of industrializing Siberia, the state had performed a series
of complicated calculations that anticipated the needs of the new population base in
Irkutsk. Glaringly absent from these calculations was a consideration of the cost of food.
Planners assumed that the Virgin Lands Campaign would succeed, and the territory
would be able to feed itself. In 1961 a regional political official announced to his
American guests that the oblast was not only grain self-sufficient but also a net exporter
of grain.2 11 This simply wasn't true. In places where the oblast was self-sufficient, food
supplies were very low. By 1960, for example the population of the city of Bratsk was
relying on milk, egg and vegetable production from just nine small kolkhozy located
upstream from the project.212 This was a very small number of suppliers for a city as
large as Bratsk. To make matters worse, these farms were scheduled to be flooded when
the dam began to fill its reservoirs in 1961.
Compared to other Siberian regions participating in the Virgin Lands Project, most
of which were not thriving, Irkutsk's agriculture was exceptionally marginal. In a memo
dated March of 1956, an Irkutsk agriculture official, Gutsalenko, reported that the 5
granaries in Irkutsk had a holding capacity of 16,000 tons, but only 9.6 thousand tons had
been stored by the end of August, which was the last month of the wheat harvest. By
contrast, Omsk Oblast, a neighboring oblast with a larger Virgin Lands project had the
capacity to store 128 tonnes, and already had 60.8 tonnes in granaries by August.
211 NARA RG 166 Records of the Foreign Agricultural Service, Box 870 CITE212 N.N. Kazanski. "Selsko-Khoziastvennoye Osvoveniye Srednogo Priangaria v Sviazi so Stroitelstvym
Bratskoi GES." Izvestiia, Academy of Sciences USSR 1960, No. 7 pp. 53-60.
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Shkalovskaia Oblast had a capacity to store 211 thousand tons and by the end of July
(when Irkutsk granaries were empty) already had 70 thousand tonnes of grain.2 13 The
collective farms were worse off than the granaries. Major state farms were subsidized by
the state, and their losses were absorbed by grain and cattle trusts. Smaller kolkhozii did
not have the luxury of this kind of insurance policy; their failures were directly absorbed
by the kolkhoz members in the form of reduced wages and reduced capital funds. In 1960
the Soviet Union made a large grain purchase from China, and reports indicated that
almost all of this grain stayed east of the Ob' river because it had been bought to feed
Siberia.
The economy of the oblast had first been based around the fur trade, then the
lumber industry. In the 1950s when Irkutsk's economic base expanded, the state hoped to
tap into two previously unexploited natural resources, first the agricultural productivity of
the region, second the hydroelectric potential of the Angara River, Irkutsk's major
tributary. The Virgin Lands Campaign, discussed above, was the first approach the state
used to exploit the region's agriculture. When it became clear that this tack was not
working, the state redefined the work of agriculture and allowed a number of farmers to
return to a mixed livelihood. This will be the subject of the last section. In order to
exploit the Angara's potential energy, the state's TPK began work on the Bratsk
Hydroelectric Station, which was to be the largest of its kind in the world. Announced in
December of 1953, the project was already well underway by the end of 1954. With four
separate turbines and twenty generators the new station had the capacity to produce 4.5
million kilowatts of power. During its decade-long construction phase, it employed
40,000 workers working around the clock in groups of 9,000. The Bratsk project
welcomed women as well as men for construction labor and a representative from the
American embassy who visited the project in 1961 noted that 1/3 of the workers were
213 : "Perepiski s Sovet Ministrov RSFSR 1956" RGAE, 7803/1/ 1861: 38.
172
women.214 The Bratsk station was a classic Soviet great works project, breaking several
world records in construction statistics and designed to almost double Siberia's electrical
capacity once fully operational. The biggest obstacle the project faced was not producing
power, but finding consumers for electricity, the usable form of Angara's potential
energy. Irkutsk lacked the industrial infrastructure to take advantage of even one-tenth of
the electricity the Bratsk station would produce, and while Soviet engineers excelled at
building power stations, they stumbled at effectively and economically distributing such
power over distances greater than a few hundred kilometer. Save Irkutsk, located 300
kilometers to the south of Bratsk, the nearest population center to Bratsk was
Novosibirsk, over 1,200 kilometers away. The closest center in active need of electricity
was Sverdlovsk (now Ykaterinburg) on the far side of the Urals, over 5,000 kilometers
away. 215
Developing the hydrological capacity of the Angara by installing a dam at Bratsk
was clearly going to create more problems than it solved; a fact that would have halted a
less visionary project. Not so with Soviet Central Committee as they drew up the Sixth
Five Year Plan for 1956-1960. Soviet industry and its economy worked best when there
was just such an easily identified area of underdevelopment which could be seized upon
and intensively improved. Early estimates were that creating a fully functional industrial
corridor along the Angara would run upwards of 80 billion rubles and require an
additional 3.2 million workers.216 The most famous great works projects of the Soviet
era: the White Sea canal, Magnitogorsk and the Baikal-Amur Mainline all paled in
214 "Visit to Irkutsk..." op. cit. To quote from the document: "The reporting officer questioned...how these
young people were induced to come to Bratsk with its 90 degree range in temperature and its two-summer
months marred by the appearance of moshki, or biting gnats which require workers to wear a protective
netting over their head. Answers varied. Some attributed the willingness of Soviet youth to serve as a mark
of their high devotion to building communism. Others mentioned a bonus called severnyi (Northern) paid
to Bratsk workers at a rate of an additional 5% for each year served."
215 Michel Aloys and Stephen Klain. "Current Problems of the Soviet Electric Power Industry." Economic
Geography 40, no. 3 (1964): 206-220. Stephan G. Prociuk, "The Territorial Pattern of Industrialization in
the USSR: A Case Study in Location of Industry."
2 16 ibid. p. 74
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comparison to this investment in capital and workers. Yet so great was state confidence
in its project to industrialize Siberia that the state banked on this improbable future: the
presently isolated Territorial-Production Complex at Bratsk was just the beginning of a
much bigger plan that would result in the permanent occupation and appropriation of the
power and natural resources of the entire Siberian subcontinent.
The industrial projects in Bratsk and elsewhere were also a drain on the farming
population, offering better pay, better hours and better living conditions to workers. In
1962 in Irkutsk, area sovkhozy expected a net gain of 663 workers on their farms. Instead,
the sovkhoz complex lost 18,498 workers. 2' 7 Kolkhozii were again, worse off. On the
bankrupt farm "Bolshevik" 61 workers had left the farm in the previous decade, leaving
only 40 able workers on the farm. One estimate for Bolshevik was that it 65 rubles to
produce a tsenter of grain in 1958, which then was purchased for 45 rubles. 218 When the
Bratsk dam was filled, starting in 1961 and ending in 1967, it destroyed the traditional
pattern of flood plain agriculture for the communities flooded by the reservoir as well as
those located downstream, who depended on the floodplain of the angara to restore
organic material to the fields they used. "this resulted in particular, acute food supply
problems in Irkutsk Region. The Bratsk reservoir flooded ten percent of arable farmland
in the region.219
The Hunting Compromise
As the historian Yuri Slezkine has described, the hunting, herding and fishing
kolkhozii established for groups of previously nomadic northern hunters were essentially
enterprises in repression. These farms, which evolved before the second World War
sought to change hunting into an exclusively economic level activity for groups who had
always hunted as a way of life. Native caribou hunters as well as herders (two distinct
217 "Oborotnye Stredstv... "RGAE/ 616/1/ 5672
218 (n.t.) GAIO/R147/1/1309: 16
219 Bezrukov, Angara, Doch' Baikala.
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types of collectives) sold carcasses to one state authoity and then purchased back skins
and meat from a different state authority. This level of bureaucratic remove ignored
ceremonial and seasonal patterns of caribou hunting, thus significantly weakening the
strong traditional relationship caribou hunters had maintained with caribou for several
thousand years.
Regardless of hunting policies, during the 1940s and early 1950s the Soviet state
was so short on all materials-especially those that might be used for clothing or that
could be sold for American dollars-that it advertised in the Irkutsk local papers for city
residents to bring all kinds of skins (mentioning rabbit, dog and seal specifically) to
regional slaughterhouses (Skotouboinykh punkt) to exchange for cash or credit. The same
ad addressed hunters separately from urban suppliers: "Hunters! Bring in fur-bearing
animals: squirrels, ondartu, gornostaia, kolonka, fox and sable for special exchange
rates! ,,"220
In truth, the special rates advertised in the early 1950s were hardly special or
tempting, and often amounted to little more than a few rubles and credit at local stores. It
is likely but undocumented that until the Soviet state officially sanctified sable hunting in
the late 1950s that there was a lively black market trade in skins and furs through Korea
and China; ethnographic information collected by the anthropologist Aleksandr Pika
suggests as much. 221 Although little is known about sable hunting until the mid 1950s
since it was an informal economic activity, it is clear that in terms of state profits, the
sable economy became a boon only after 1955. Between 1946 and 1955 the state
collected fewer than 50,000 sable pelts. This figure jumped for the period between 1956
and 1965 to over 150,000 pelts, a number that held steady until the late 1970s when
sables were first fanned successfully.222
2 20 January 14, 1953, Vostochnyi Sibirskii Pravdu, "Pushnina: Miagkoe Zoloto" p.4.
221 Aleksandr Pika, ed. Neotraditionalism in the Russian North. p.100
222 ibid, p.98
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This new market in sable skins had its roots in McCarthy-era legislation that
banned the import of any luxury good from the Soviet Union that could be produced
domestically. Squirrel, fox and ermine were all animals that were plentiful throughout the
northern Soviet Union and were easier to catch, process and market than the expensive
but volatile sable market. While some sable furs were sold for thousands of dollars at the
Leningrad fur auction, sable fur varied greatly in color and quality, and from year to year
it was difficult to predict which kind of pelt would prove the most fashionable, and
therefore expensive. Squirrel, fox and ermine were safer products to put up for auction.
However, from 1950 on these were banned and sables became one of the few furs the
Soviet Union could legally export.223 While this rule was not always followed, the drop in
the market for these three species shows that the law had a serious effect. Particularly for
ermine, one of the most expensive furs the USSR exported, the drop was remarkable.
Between 1946 and 1955 the state fur industry dressed 400,000 skins. Between 1956 and
1965, the number was only 250,000. Fox and squirrel dropped accordingly. The only
other fur whose market share grew after 1950 was muskrat, a generally inexpensive fur
produced mainly for the Soviet domestic market that had been successfully farmed
starting in th elate 1940s.224
Thus northern fur-bearing animals were affected in the 1950s and 1960s by a
Cold War ecology in which the lives of Eurasian ermine were spared, but the previously
overlooked sable were now the prey of choice for Soviet hunters.225 The state had the
power to select the hunter-delegates who would pursue its newest fur market investment.
In keeping with the state's larger goals of keeping native populations underdeveloped
while raising the fortunes of European Siberians, the State Farm Ministry chose to outfit
223 The fur industry opposed such legislation. The New York Times reported in 1949 that "surveys made by
fur publications indicate that not more than 1 out of ten women have voiced any interest in the country of
origin in connection with the furs that they wear." New York Times, July 14, 1949 p. 59.224 Pika, Neotraditionalism in the Russian North pp. 98-99225 In 1950, Soviet exports to the US were estimated at 50 million USD. Furs represent 60% of this. source:
New York Times CITE
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the small, failing kolkhozii in the most isolated parts of Irkustk as part-time hunting
groups rather than re-invest in its previously established native collective hunting
enterprises. 226
During the 1950s, the Soviet state had several different and conflicting policies
about hunting, primarily centered on the anxieties of furnishing firearms to untrustworthy
citizens. While there was no universal ban on owning or using weapons the laws
regulating arms ownership were, theoretically it was a tightly controlled system. In
practice, many World War II veterans had simply kept their rifles and service revolvers
after the war without bothering to register the guns or obtain the proper permits to store
and use them. The question was especially muddled in Siberia, where the Ministry of
State Farms and the Ministry of Agriculture had supervised a number of hunting and
herding kolkhozy where members were allowed to own guns, but administrative overview
was lax. In general, native Siberian hunters and many Siberian farmers treated the issue
of owning a gun as a right, while the state treated it as a privilege, albeit one that was not
hard to obtain.
In 1956 the Ministry State Farms ceded this question to the Ministry of the
Interior, at least as far as it concerned Irkutsk hunters. In the first months the Ministry of
the Interior was charged with creating a universal arms policy for Eastern and northern
farms, there was a flurry f activity around deciding how arms should be distributed, and
more importantly, kept track of. One idea was to lease the guns for a part of the year.
Another was to allow gun ownership, but to keep close tabs on ammunition. In these
discussions, which mainly concerned caribou hunters, it is likely the Ministry of State
226 Native farms were systematically passed over for every form of improvement or economic development
imaginable. Small native collective farms were specifically not combined with the larger, better funded
state farms that arrived in eastern Siberia in the late 1950s. Native people were prosecuted for hunting
without permission, and by 1957 caribou hunters not associated with a caribou collective needed to become
licensed hunting "specialists" before they were given permission to hunt. Classes were provided for free at
the Institutes for Hunting Industry, located in large metropolitan areas, usually several day's journey away
from native kolkhozii. "Perepiska s sovetom ministerstvo RSFSR 1957" RGAE 7803/1/1862: 57-58.
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Farms was considering native collective farms, and not European ones, where rifle
owning was, presumably, less contentious.227 Another proposed solution was to ban all
hunting unless the Soviet state placed specific orders for animals. Also in 1956, as part of
the flurry of potential legislation, the Ministry of the Interior made a list of its northern
and eastern territories in which residents possessed unregistered rifles. It is unclear how
they obtained this information, but the list maps more or less directly onto the raions of
Siberia in which native collective farms were located.228 In 1957 in a native walrus
kolkhoz of Yakutsk, kolkhozniks were forbidden from killing polar bears or walruses,
"except in times of acute need" when single walruses could be harvested and collectively
portioned out. Outside scientific expeditions were allowed to kill caribou and walruses to
feed sled dogs, but native Chukhot and Koriak sled dogs (much less their owners)
received no such food allowance. 229
The alternative to native hunters was European hunters, and the Soviet tate, like
the Russian empire before it relied on the sibiriak culture of the promyshlennik to
furnish sable skins. This meant allowing rural men who had worked as collective farmers
to become part-time hunters. In 1958 and 1959, the Ministry of State Farms approved a
hunting pilot project at two failing European collective farms, Bolshevik and Taezhnik.
The pilot project at kolkhoz Bolshevik reckoned that hunter-kolkhozniks could spend 1/6
of their work days engaged in hunting activities without harming the economy of the
collective farm230 Almost all of this time would be during the late fall and winter, which
was a relatively dormant season on the kolkhoz, and preparation for hunting rather than
the actual time spent in the field would occupy the vast majority of this time budget.
227 "Perepiski s sovet ministrov RSFSR 1956" RGAE 7803/ 1/1861:114-119 The text reads: "...In a
month's time will be decided the question of a simplified procedure for receiving permission for the
acquisition and retention of guns and bullet casings for hunting and caribou production... this question of
the guns is to be decided by the ministry of the interior."228 "Perepiska s Sovetim SSSRpo Voprosom Zhivotnovodstvo,"1956 RGAE 7803/1/1834: 19.
229 
"Perepiska s sovetom ministerstvo RSFSR 1957" RGAE 7803/1/1862: 57
230 GAIO R147/1/1313 CITE
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Hunters needed to construct small shacks across the wilderness in which they would be
hunting which they could use as base camps. Building and maintaining these huts was the
task that planners anticipated would take up the most time. Other preparation tasks
included training dogs, traveling to remote hunting sites and repairing guns.
On hunting trips, hunters were placed in groups of three or four men, usually
neighbors, friends or family members. This was in contrast to the general trend of the
1940s and 1950s to remove this personal aspect from working groups, which the Ministry
of Agriculture in general and Nikita Khrushchev in particular felt was at the heart of
much graft and cronyism. In another nod to tradition rather than modern ideals the most
experienced hunters were allowed an early opportunity to go into the woods alone, often
coming back with more animals from this first, solo trip than less experienced groups
would later in the season. One hunter named Berezovskii, rated the best in the kolkhoz,
brought back 5 sables and 104 red squirrels after 6 days of hunting in 1959. In 1959,
sables brought an average price of 488 rubles a piece (the range was from between 450-
500) and squirrels a price of 8 rubles a piece.231 In that same year the family
Popamarychuk, on the pilot kolkhoz Taezhnik earned 2,482 rubles from kolkhoz work
(not including their in-kind grain payment) and 3,590 rubles from the single two-week
trip of one member in which 6 sables and 140 squirrels were caught.232 These very
successful hunters were probably not typical. Perhaps a more realistic review of what
sable hunting added to the household economies of Irkutsk kolkhozniks is the experience
of the family Zchev, also of Taezhnik whose kolkhoz work netted 3,189 rubles (plus
grain) and whose hunting brought in 1 sable and 140 squirrels for a total of 1,380 rubles.
The project to make failing agricultural kolkhozii into mixed-use farming and
hunting kolkhozii was a limited success. Hunters earned a little extra money, the state
231 At the official exchange rate of 2 rubles to the dollar, this would be equal to 244 USD per sable and 4
USD per squirrel. Most visitors to the USSR in 1955 noted that this rate was skewed, and guessed a more
reasonable exchange would be about 5:1, making each sable worth approximately 100 USD and each
squirrel worth 1.60 USD.
23 GAIO/R147/1/1313: 14-15
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earned lots of extra money, and while native groups lost out, the Sibiriak identity that had
been forged in the seventeenth century was revived. One of the best indicators of this
revival was found in the fate of the sable hunter's dog, the loyal laika breed of eastern
Siberia. These dogs were one of the most important tools any Siberian hunter had, as
dogs were indispensable in tracking and treeing sables. Hunters could only shoot at sables
once they were stranded in trees. The new market in sable fur meant the Soviet state was
inspired to revalue the laika.
The word laika means 'barker' in Russian and as the name suggests they are
barking hunters, isolating their prey in the branches of a tree and guarding it from below
while vocalizing so that hunters can locate them. It is uncertain what native Siberian
group first developed the laika, but the Siberian environment is so demanding that few
dogs without the laika's thick coat and efficient physiognomy could survive. When
Europeans arrived in Siberia, they noted laika-like dogs living among most of the native
tribes they encountered. Besides hunting laikas were trained to a variety of tasks
including herding reindeer, guarding human camps and pulling sleds.
Laikas had not been thought of as an official, intentional breed throughout their
long history in Siberia, which extended back to prehistoric times, but this status changed
over the course of the twentieth century. At the turn of the twentieth century, two other
kinds of dogs from the Russian arctic, Samoyeds and Siberian huskies gained
international. This recognition was due to their role in delivering lifesaving diphtheria
medicine by sled to remote regions of Alaska in 1925. In 1947 the laika was formally
classified in print. The Institute of Hunting Industry declared for the first time that laikas
were a breed, and furthermore that they had become an endangered economic resource.
Laikas were the necessary assistants to the sable, fox, bear and marten hunters of Siberia.
This feeling that the laika, which had never previously been identified as a breed had
suddenly become a breed that was in danger of being lost was an unusual way of
establishing a breed standard and a breeding program, but that is exactly what happened.
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The reason for the decline of the laika was unknown: possibly due to the decline in
commercial hunting and possibly due to the state's unwillingness to plan for dog food.
Regardless of the reason, the Ministry of Hunting Industry's declaration further stated
that laikas were a Soviet breed of dog, evolved to uphold a traditional, Siberian lifestyle.
Laika-like dogs had existed for centuries in Finland and Korea, but because these
populations occurred outside the USSR they could not be considered true laikas, and
when it instituted a breeding farm for laikas in Irkutsk the Ministry of Hunting Industry
would only accept local dogs: from Irkutsk, Yakutsk and Novosibirsk oblasts.
The rising fortunes of the laika and their evolution from the dogs kept by natives
to a working breed that was listed as standard equipment for Siberian-European hunters
parallel the rising fortunes of sable hunters across Irkutsk. Much like the dogs, twentieth
century sibiriaks were in danger of becoming irrelevant. Their once self-sufficient
lifestyle as farmers and traders settled on the banks of the Angara had been simplified
and degraded by the process of collectivization. Multi-skilled settlers who had once
combined three or more ways of life in order to survive and thrive in the taiga of Irkutsk
had been reduced to work at a single, unsuccessful occupation-that of farmer. The
revived interest in sable hunting coincided with a new movement toward redefining
Russian nationalism away from the pan-Republic vision it had earlier embraced and
toward a Russified version of empire. The resurrection of laikas and sibiriak hunters were
a part of both of these trends.
Conclusion
The Soviet preference for European hunters over native hunters of native hunters
in Irkutsk is indicative of the shifting goals of the fur industry. In some ways, little had
changed from the early days of iasak. The state still set annual quotas and fixed prices for
furs, Moscow still profited fantastically from the labor of its most distant subjects, and
sables were still the most precious luxury item the Soviet Union exported. Likewise, the
techniques of hunting had not evolved from the early modem period when Evenks,
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Nenets, Chukchi and other native groups went after the same quarry with dogs, snares
and (by the 18 th century) rifles. The work, the landscape and the product were the same as
when sable hunting had been a traditional subsistence activity of the far northern people
who originally populated Siberia.
While these native groups had not disappeared from Irkutsk and other sable-rich
oblasts, the majority of hunters registered as sable procurers in 1960 had Russian or
Ukrainian last names and they were paid for their efforts in sums that far eclipsed the
wages of other work available to them in the oblast. In choosing to provide new
economic opportunities to marginal collective farmers of European origin rather than
allowing native hunters to return to a traditional occupation, the Soviet Union reinforced
its policy of settling Siberia and making the territory modern. In the case of Irkutsk in the
late 1950s modernity was a multi-pronged assault of construction, stylized large-scale
agriculture, and compassionate compensation for the long-standing sibiriak lifestyle that
was disrupted by these newer developments. By investing in European hunters, the Soviet
Union practiced selective memory, a tried and true method of state building. It chose to
remember the sibiriak, the part of its past that established European fur hunting as a long-
standing practice that enriched individuals, communities and the state's coffers. It chose
to forget the even longer standing traditions of iasak and the Russian state's original
reliance on the local knowledges and skills of a group of people widely believed to be
intellectually and culturally inferior to the Russian invaders who colonized them.
Because Irkutsk was so cold and so environmentally disinclined to dense human
settlement in myriad other ways-poor soils, narrow bands of floodplain agriculture,
thick forests, dense swamps, miserable black flies-progress and prosperity were always
expected but never arrived in spite of the state's concerted efforts to triumph over these
environmental limitations, there were limits to what it could accomplish. Although the
Bratsk dam was completed ahead of schedule and the state farms of Irkutsk remained
resolutely in place, churning out meat, milk and fresh vegetables at a loss, neither
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industry proved to be a bellwether for further settlement and development. The oblast's
value never lived up to the optimistic plans of Khrushchev-era agricultural and industrial
planners, and its population has never exceeded the anticipated number of 4 million
persons that officials quoted in 1960. As of 2002, the population was just over 2.5
million. 233 In the case of Irkutsk, agriculture's ulterior motives of state-building and
environmental control broke down in the face of extreme distance and extreme cold.
233 See the 2002 Russian census: http://www.perepis2002.ru.
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Conclusion
As I have argued, agriculture is used for purposes other than producing food. In
the postwar Soviet Union, agriculture increased the power of the state in the countryside
and provided a public forum in which the state could herald its successes. The Soviet
state focused on projects that established stronger scientific and technical bureaucracies
in rural areas, and projects that were intended to surmount the environmental barriers to
farm production that had historically hindered the territory. Historians and analysts have
rightly pointed out that the Soviet state was not often successful in its stated goals of
improving the quality or quantity of food it produced. Yet agricultural spending increased
fourfold between 1953, when Stalin died, and 1964, when Nikita Khrushchev was forced
out of power. If this increase in spending did not dramatically improve production, what,
if anything, did it improve? T
The standard answer has been that this money was wasted and that postwar
agricultural reforms did little if anything to improve the state of Soviet farming.
However, judging Soviet agriculture only by its levels of food production ignores the
more important uses that agricultural reform has for a state in search of greater legitimacy
and control. While the Soviet system was often wasteful and certain reforms were
complete failures-both at the level of production and the level of governance- in
general the history of postwar Soviet agriculture should be viewed as a series of hits and
misses, with most programs possessing certain elements of success and failure.
This dissertation has argued for a simultaneous consideration of all three of these
goals, founded in the belief that agricultural 'failure' in one area (like production) does
not preclude success in other fields, like governance or environmental control. By
looking at these goals at the same time, Soviet agriculture appears to be a much more
rational and successful system.
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In the first chapter, on the state's efforts to end subsistence farming in Ukraine
began with an impasse between a relatively weak postwar rural authority and a rural
population that was extremely wary of the state's ability to guarantee food or a stable
economy. This tension came to a head over the issue of potato farming, the most popular
crop for subsistence farmers to grow and one that was notoriously difficult for the Soviet
state to keep track of. How could the state get Ukrainian collective farmers to reduce the
amount of time they spent in their private gardens and increase the time they spent
working on state fields? The answer was the quarantine station; a relatively new rural
authority that was originally developed to monitor fresh produce as it crossed regional
and international boundaries. These stations were intended to screen fruits and vegetables
for economically damaging insects and diseases, stopping contaminated produce from
crossing into uncontaminated zones. In postwar Ukraine, the work of the quarantine
stations changed slightly, and the stations began inspect produce as it was growing in
fields. Rather than preventing the in-migration of unwanted pests, the quarantine station
was turned into an authority that monitored the health and location of local plants. While
there were very real infestations that threatened Ukrainian potatoes, neither of them was
an enemy contained within the country, which was the kind of enemy the quarantine
stations principally searched for.
In sifting through potato bins, gassing common pastures, surveying gardens and
confiscating and quarantining dozens of "suspicious" but not definitively contaminated
crops, the quarantine stations managed to establish a level of control over the potato
growers of Ukraine that had not existed before. Using the authoritative will of science
and technology to launch a campaign directed against irresponsible private farmers, the
state established a new, on-the-ground authority who worked to monitor both potatoes
and their growers.
The second chapter, about the efforts to increase meat and milk production in the
Soviet Union focuses on animal breeding and animal care. Animal stocks and animal
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productivity were famously low across the USSR, partially due to an inhospitable
climate, and partially due to the losses causes by decades of war and rural unrest.
Ironically, unlike other industrial countries the Soviet Union was especially dependent on
its animals: in the absence of a robust plastics industry, consumer products like buttons,
combs and shoes were made out of animal products. Many farms lacked sufficient
machine power for field work, and here animals continued to serve as draft power.
Perhaps more important than either the Soviet Union's scarce supply of animals or its
dependence on their labor and their byproducts, at mid-century, animal agriculture was
seen as a growth industry for any industrialized country. The fact that the Soviet Union
lagged behind other industrialized countries was a source of consternation for the
country's leadership; both Stalin and Khrushchev spearheaded major campaigns to
improve animal stocks.
These campaigns were both public and non-conformist. Publicly, Soviet animal
agriculture was a maverick enterprise that relied upon the home-grown science of
Lysenkoism for its successes. Due to postwar scarcities, the Soviet Union did not have
the technological or scientific resources that are normally associated with the
industrialization of livestock. Lysenkoism provided a relatively low-tech approach to
livestock improvement that allowed the Soviet Union to play to its strengths in animal
agriculture: namely, its vast supply of human labor. In field agriculture, Lysenko's
dismissal of the principles of genetics would ultimately devastate yields, but placing
Lysenko's theories in the context of animal agriculture rather than plant agriculture
shows that as a management theory that organized animals and labor, Lysnekoism
worked, at least in the short term. As the example of the research station at Askaniia
Nova demonstrates, Lysenkoism also tapped into the Soviet Union's impressive history
of animal acclimatization and hybridization.
The state's purpose in improving animal agriculture was twofold: on the one
hand, it hoped to increase the supply of meat and milk its citizens had on hand. It also
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hoped to prove to the world that socialist agricultural science and management offered an
option to the dizzying successes of capitalist agribusiness. This was clearly an ambitious
goal, and in order to accomplish it the Ministry of Agriculture took a number of risks,
including enforcing Lysenkoist animal management techniques. While Lysenko's ideas
about multi-generational breed improvement were shaky at best, his ideas about the
personalized care and feeding of farm animals resulted in a significant improvement in
the health, size, productivity and survival rate of Soviet animals. While productivity
levels never approached those of the United States, productivity did go up, especially on
farms where animals were given especially good food and care. These improvements
resulted in modest increases in the availability of animal products to consumers, but their
use as good publicity for the success of collective agriculture and socialist production
networks was far more valuable to the regime, and it seems likely that this an important
reason that Lysenkoism remained official state policy long after its problems for plant
agriculture had been definitively proven.
The third chapter discusses the improvement and modernization of the Soviet diet.
For most of its history, food had been a scarce commodity, but now that this was no
longer the case the Ministry of Provisions needed to modernize the products that were
available for Soviet consumers as well as the technologies that produced these products.
While the state was interested in improving diets, it was also concerned with ensuring
that it, once again, played to its strengths and got the most possible publicity and mileage
out of the few food products it was capable of producing in abundance. To this end, the
state slanted its nutritional information toward what was available.
Just as important as improving nutrition was creating the impression that nutrition
was being improved. To this end, modern new foods were marketed aggressively in
advertisements. Beyond the limits and possibilities of food processing technologies,
which tended to turn out cans, single-serving freezer packs or creatively new sausage
varieties, the architecture of food distribution was the single most important technology
187
in affecting what people ate and how they acquired it. At a time when western
consumers could serve themselves at one-stop grocery stores, Soviet citizens were
waiting in line. Nevertheless, the slower and seemingly retrograde Soviet system was
useful to the state; it slowed consumers down, rationalizing food distribution by
prolonging the process. While the diets of Soviet consumers improved and became more
varied during this time, the most important success of the project to increase meat and
milk consumption was to create a modem food distribution system based on limiting
what consumers might buy, while simultaneously allowing the state to claim a victory in
improving its distribution system.
The last chapter looks at the limits of state agricultural reforms in Siberia. It
argues that while in many cases the Soviet Union experienced significant successes in
reforming agriculture, especially if the secondary goals of reform are considered, in some
environments such ambitions simply broke down, and Siberia was one of those
environments. Not just the cold, but also the vast distance, poor soils and general effects
of poor and rushed planning hindered Soviet agriculture in Irkutsk Oblast, located in the
heart of Siberia.
In order to maintain a sustainable system of agriculture, the Ministry of
Agriculture was forced to compromised and re-introduce a more traditional form of
livelihood--hunting, into the struggling collective farms of the oblast. Collective farmers
could earn as much in two weeks hunting sable in the Siberia taiga as they earned in a
year of labor for their collective farm. While this compromise revalued a set of
premodern skills to collective farm workers, the compromise was noteworthy as much for
whom it excluded as for whom it helped. Native hunters and trappers were barred from
hunting, selling furs and owning weapons, effectively disenfranchising them from a
traditional way of life that European immigrants to Siberia had appropriated. In making
these decisions, the Ministry of Agriculture was less concerned about food production
and more concerned about stabilizing and civilizing its Eastern frontier.
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In all four of these examples, the state's initial ambitions were much bigger than
the results that were ultimately realized. Negotiation was a key to the success of
agricultural reform in the postwar period. As a general rule, the Soviet Union dreamed
big and loudly, and then compromised quietly. It was always clear to Khrushchev that
producing more meat and milk than the United States was an impractical ambition, yet
this goal was exactly what he proposed in 1957, in spite of the fact the project was bound
to fail. Likewise, the plans to make Siberia into an efficient and profitable territory and
the project to micromanage individual production in Ukraine after the war were destined
to never be completely realized. This approach, which blended an air of false bravado
with an ability to respond to local circumstances, was a hallmark, not just of the reform-
minded Khrushchev years but also of the late years of Stalinism which preceded them.
This spirit of compromise had very little to do with the inherent generosity or flexible
nature of the Ministry of Agriculture, and much to do with the results-based assessments
that agricultural professionals faced from their superiors. The Ministry of Agriculture was
forced to compromise in local situations, since things almost never worked as planned, it
was essential that plans could be modified. While the will of rural people was strong and
often strongly against the desires of the state, it was the stubborn and intractable nature of
nature itself which ultimately trumped Soviet agriculture and forced the system to come
to terms with the real world. The postwar Soviet Union is the place and the time in which
this crucial aspect of agriculture stands out in the sharpest relief.
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Appendix: Structure of Soviet Agriculture, 1945-1965
The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was a federation of 15 smaller republics
that were based on historical national or ethnic territory boundaries: Russia, Georgia,
Ukraine and the Kazakh republic were all component republics of the Union. Republics
were further broken into departments, or oblasts, which ranged in size from just under 1
million to over 10 million people, and oblasts were broken into regional districts, called
raions. Oblasts, raions and cities all maintained some form of local government. Local
rural authorities had lost a significant amount of power in political purges in 1937 when
many were arrested and exiled or executed. This legacy meant that until the late 1950s
local (oblast, raion and village) level officials had little effect on questions of policy or
production.
Leading the Soviet state was the General Secretary of the Communist Party, a
post filled by Joseph Stalin between 1924-1953 and by Nikita Khrushchev between 1956
and 1964. Between 1953 and 1956 Khrushchev shared executive power with two other
politicians, Georgii Malenkov and Lavrentii Beria, but his leadership in agriculture went
unchallenged after 1953. Formal meetings of the Central Party Committee were rare, but
when they did occur their resolutions set priorities for all aspects of state policy in the
Soviet Union, from agriculture to education to housing supply to wartime pensions. A
series of federal-level ministries reported to the central committee and had a more hands-
on approach to governance than the powerful but somewhat removed central party and its
chairman.
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For this dissertation the most important federal ministry is the Ministry of
Agriculture (Ministerstvo Sel 'skogo Khoziastvo or Minselkhoz) which became a more
powerful and generalized ministry after 1950. Briefly after the war the Ministry of
Agriculture was divided into four lesser ministries: a ministry of food crops, a ministry of
technical crops, a ministry of animal production and a ministry of state farms. The first
three Ministries were re-amalgamated into a strong central ministry in 1950, but the
Ministry of state farms remained separate. In general, the Minselkhoz was there to
translate the visions of the state's political and academic leaders into policy and action.
Georgii Malenkov (during his brief stint as chairman of the central committee) might
have said "the most urgent task is...the creation in our country of an abundance of food
for the population and of raw materials for the light industries," as he did in 1953, but it
was up to the Ministry of Agriculture to decide how to accomplish this goal. Other
Ministries relevant to this study are the Ministry for State Provisions which oversaw the
production and rational distribution of food products and other grocery items, and the
ministry of state farms, which shared and needlessly duplicated many responsibilities for
managing state farms with the ministry of agriculture.
In its heyday between 1950 and 1958 the Minselkhoz was responsible for almost
every aspect relating to union-wide agricultural policy, and many local projects as well.
The Minselkhoz set pay scales and production quotas, tax rates and payments in kind.
While planting and harvesting plans were drawn up by individual farms, the ministry of
agriculture approved these plans after each oblast's agricultural office had collected them
and the Minselkhoz also reviewed their success at the end of the year. The Minselkhoz
directed agricultural institutes, research stations and quarantine stations, it set breed
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standards, purchased and imported purebred animals with which to improve its stocks
and managed livestock stud farms. In short, for most of the 1950s, there were few aspects
of agricultural production in which the Minselkhoz was not involved in some way.
The period before 1950 represents a time in which agricultural policy was isolated
by crop. As I show in this dissertation, this had the strength of permitting the smaller
ministry of animal agriculture to focus all of its efforts on breeding and increasing
livestock. It broke down where the different branches of agriculture naturally intersected;
the technical crops that were used as animal feeds, for example, or the state farms that
were also livestock breeding facilities. After 1958, agricultural policy was characterized
by a partial restoration of the local authority that was lost in 1937. This power was
largely restored to local "professional" authorities rather than to the village or district
level bureaucrats who were purged in the 1930s. In place of these bureaucrats, trained
professionals with advanced degrees in the social or natural sciences become local
advisors to help distant authorities administrate more effectively.
There were two main types of collective farms, the smaller kolkhoz, or collective
farm and the larger, more factory-like sovkhoz, or state farm. Sovkhoz workers were state
employees and received wages and pensions. Kolkhoz workers were contract laborers
paid only quarterly or semiannually and entitled to no pension. Until the late 1960s, a
large part of the kolkhoz salary was paid in kind, usually in bread or grain, and wages for
work on a kolhoz were almost always lower than those on a sovkhoz, even for equivalent
labor. The official reason for this discrepancy was that sovkhozii were more mechanized
and thus their workers were more skilled, but in practice both kinds of farms relied on
draft power and hand labor until well into the 1950s.
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After 1958 the federal level Minselkhoz concentrated more on what might be
considered the pure science of agriculture and on research and development. The
Minselkhoz continued to preside over animal breed development, disseminating scientific
and technical information, academic publishing, plant and animal research stations and
higher-level pedagogy. A number of scientific research institutes that were directed by
the Minselkhoz appear in this work, including the quarantine station, the All-Union
Institute of Hybridization and Acclimatization, the Institute for Social Nutrition and the
Institute for Hunting and Fur Production.
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